Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK351
2007-03-30 13:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

NEW KYRGYZ PM CONFIRMED; WILL NAME CABINET MONDAY

Tags:  PGOV PREL KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000351 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KG
SUBJECT: NEW KYRGYZ PM CONFIRMED; WILL NAME CABINET MONDAY

REF: A. BISHKEK 350

B. BISHKEK 347

C. BISHKEK 343

BISHKEK 00000351 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000351 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KG SUBJECT: NEW KYRGYZ PM CONFIRMED; WILL NAME CABINET MONDAY REF: A. BISHKEK 350 ¶B. BISHKEK 347 ¶C. BISHKEK 343 BISHKEK 00000351 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Parliament overwhelmingly confirmed opposition leader Almaz Atambayev as prime minister March 30. Atambayev offered to serve as a "bridge" between the opposition and government, and he said he would propose the new cabinet by April 2. Several opposition leaders have already said, however, that they will not serve in a "coalition cabinet" under Atambayev. It is not clear at this point that Atambayev's appointment and the offer to bring the opposition into government will weaken support for former Prime Minister Felix Kulov's United Front, which is pushing ahead with plans for mass demonstrations in April. Much will depend on who joins the cabinet and how much independence Bakiyev gives Atambayev to pursue reforms. END SUMMARY. PRIME MINISTER IN A DAY -------------- ¶2. (U) Following the March 29 resignation of Prime Minister Azim Isabekov, President Bakiyev nominated 51 year-old opposition figure Almaz Atambayev as prime minister. Bakiyev went to parliament March 30 to endorse Atambayev, arguing that he was not a "randomly selected" or "imposed" candidate, but was instead a candidate with merit. Bakiyev said that "Atambayev has extensive and successful experience in the market economy; and, unlike some others, has been in the opposition for many years and knows all the drawbacks of the government very well." He added that "through (Atambayev's) views, he showed himself to be a steadfast democrat, champion of the market economy and patriot of his country, who cares about its development." Parliament subsequently confirmed the appointment by a vote of 48-3. ¶3. (U) In his remarks before parliament, Atambayev said he accepted the offer to become prime minister for the sake of achieving political stability. Atambayev told parliament that the possibility of Kyrgyzstan splitting in half increased as the gap between the opposition and government widened, and he offered to serve as "the bridge" to connect the two. He pledged to consult with all political forces in forming the new government, work hard to implement long-awaited reforms (including constitutional reform),and &
#x000A;lead the fight against crime and corruption. In his view, a new constitution should be based on the November 2006 constitution with a mixed parliamentary-presidential system, curtailing current presidential powers. Atambayev promised to resign if constitutional reform stalls. He expressed optimism in his ability to reach agreement with former prime ministers Kulov and Tekebayev prior to April 11 -) the date when opposition protests are scheduled to start in Bishkek. ¶4. (U) Atambayev did not speculate on who would serve in the cabinet, but he did say that current First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov would not be in the new government. Atambayev named presidential deputy chief of staff Medet Sadyrkulov as chief of the prime minister's staff. (NOTE: Sadyrkulov also serves as the chair of Kyrgyzstan's Millennium Challenge Account committee. END NOTE.) UNITED FRONT'S PUBLIC STANCE: ON WITH THE PROTESTS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Both the United Front and the For Reforms opposition movements announced that they would not participate in a BISHKEK 00000351 002.4 OF 003 coalition government under Atambayev. Following a meeting of the two groups, they announced that United Front and For Reforms would carry out their political activities jointly, prepare a new draft constitution, and cooperatively organize the planned anti-Bakiyev demonstrations in April. (NOTE: The United Front has announced plans to begin the protest with a ceremonial hunger strike April 5, followed by demonstrations in the regions starting April 9 and in Bishkek April 11, and continuing until Bakiyev resigns and calls new presidential elections. END NOTE.) Separately, United Front representatives called Atambayev's appointment a "cynical attempt to deceive the public that the president is holding a dialogue with the opposition." Interestingly, United Front leader Felix Kulov flew off to Moscow early on March 30. THE OPPOSITION'S WAY FORWARD? -------------- ¶6. (C) During a March 30 discussion with the Ambassador, For Reforms members Raya Kadyrova, Asiya Sasykbayeva, and Nurlan Sadikov outlined their understanding of the opposition plan for a new constitution and early presidential elections. They maintained that Kulov was pragmatic, and his maximalist stance was a political tactic to force Bakiyev to move on reforms; if Bakiyev didn't fear the planned demonstrations, he would continue to delay. They did not expect Atambayev to be effective as prime minister because he was not a "decision maker" and represented only himself, not the opposition. The only way to resolve the situation, they said, was to have negotiations between Bakiyev and Kulov directly -- possibly with third party mediation. ¶7. (C) Kadyrova said that the opposition had a plan for moving ahead with constitutional change. According to this plan, the United Front and For Reforms would present Bakiyev with a draft constitution by April 5, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. This version, currently being written, would be based largely on the short-lived November 2006 constitution, which expanded the role of parliament. The key change in this version would be new presidential elections to be held in October or November 2007. Under a complicated legal scenario, the parliament would annul the law which enabled the December changes to the constitution, thereby reviving the November version. The new constitution would then be approved by the parliament and sent to the Constitutional Court, which would render its opinion no less that three, but no more than six months after submission. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) At this point, there are more questions than answers. Whether Atambayev can make progress on reforms and effectively bridge the gap between government and opposition will depend, in large measure, on who joins the cabinet. While Kulov and the United Front show no public sign of moderating their stance and seem determined to push forward with demonstrations, we are heartened by the report that this is a tactic. Nevertheless, the compromise Kulov apparently seeks will be difficult, if not impossible, for Bakiyev to accept. ¶9. (C) What seems clear is that there needs to be negotiation between the real "decision makers," perhaps with third party mediation. No one has asked for third party intervention, and we suspect that neither Kulov nor Bakiyev would be enthusiastic about such assistance. The OSCE Mission in Bishkek has told us that it is prepared to be helpful, but it would need a formal request. While the April demonstrations BISHKEK 00000351 003.2 OF 003 are looming, from a Kyrgyz point of view there is still plenty of time to find a compromise, so we do not expect movement in this direction anytime soon. If demonstrations go forward in April, there will a chance that events could get out of hand. (Most believe that with a mistake or a misstep, the November demonstrations could have turned violent.) Depending on how the political situation develops, the visit to Bishkek of OSCE Chairman in Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, scheduled for April 13-14, might present an opportunity to offer the services of the OSCE. YOVANOVITCH

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