Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BISHKEK184
2007-02-15 14:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

FORMER PM KULOV THROWS DOWN THE GAUNTLET

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000184 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG
SUBJECT: FORMER PM KULOV THROWS DOWN THE GAUNTLET

REF: A. BISHKEK 87

B. BISHKEK 79

C. BISHKEK 64

BISHKEK 00000184 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000184 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KG SUBJECT: FORMER PM KULOV THROWS DOWN THE GAUNTLET REF: A. BISHKEK 87 ¶B. BISHKEK 79 ¶C. BISHKEK 64 BISHKEK 00000184 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Former Prime Minister Felix Kulov told an overflow crowd of press, diplomats, and supporters February 14 that he was joining the political opposition. Saying that he could not remain a "passive observer," Kulov vowed to "unite and lead" the forces that want "radical, positive changes." Kulov said he accepted some of the criticism of his actions while in office, but maintained he had been limited in what he could do as prime minister. Kulov pulled no punches as he attacked Bakiyev and his administration, saying that Bakiyev worked for the benefit of a family clan rather than the whole country. Kulov offered no specifics of his own plan or program, but some opposition figures suggested that Kulov's involvement would give a boost to their efforts. Nevertheless, many in the opposition remain distrustful of Kulov and bitter about his lack of support during the November 2006 demonstrations. Kulov's declaration has certainly made him a mortal enemy of Bakiyev, and we can expect that the pressure tactics the government has applied (effectively) against the opposition will now be focused on Kulov. END SUMMARY. THE FIGHT BEGINS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During his much anticipated February 14 speech to an overflow crowd of press, diplomats, supporters, and other interested observers, former Prime Minister Felix Kulov threw down the gauntlet in front of his former "tandem" partner, President Bakiyev. Kulov vowed to unite and lead opposition groups, and to fight against corruption and nepotism within state structures. Kulov said he felt obligated to oppose the "seizures of state property by a small clique, the control of television channels by people close to one family, and the rise of criminality within the government." The former PM added that he could not stand aside while such developments brought the country closer to "catastrophe." "I TRIED TO FIGHT THE SYSTEM" -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Kulov said he accepted some of the criticism of his actions, and he acknowledged that remaining loyal to Bakiyev in the "tandem" had hurt his reputation and cost him the support of friends. Kulov went on to cal
l the Bakiyev administration a "vicious system" that he was powerless to fight as prime minister. As an example, he cited the debate over the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Kulov said he initially opposed HIPC, until Bakiyev made it government policy for Kyrgyzstan to pursue HIPC debt relief. At that point, he said, he undertook to implement HIPC, not just as a tool for debt relief but also measure to push for reform in budgeting and in the energy and mining sectors. (Note: Kulov's support for the highly unpopular initiative contributed significantly to parliament's refusal to confirm him as prime minister. See Refs B and C. End Note.) Kulov added that he also rallied against Bakiyev's failure to improve the economy, tackle corruption, and fight organized crime, but to no avail. POSSIBLE ALLIANCES, OPPOSING FORCES -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Noting that he would not limit his involvement within the opposition to any one political party, including his own Ar Namys party, Kulov said that he would work with a broad range of groups to unite the opposition. Following the BISHKEK 00000184 002.2 OF 002 speech, opposition MP Omurbek Tekebayev said that his Ata Meken party would look to the possibility of establishing an alliance with Ar Namys. Opposition movement For Reforms coordinator Omurbek Abdarakhmanov told the press that Kulov's decision to join the opposition did not automatically secure his position as leader. Instead, said Abdarakhmanov, Kulov's position within the opposition would depend on his aims, and if those aims coincided with those of the opposition's. Oppostion figure Almaz Atambayev, however, appeared to rule out any possible alliance with Kulov. ¶5. (C) Separately, opposition figure Edil Baisalov told Poloff February 15 that Kulov would have to prove himself as a sincere opponent to Bakiyev before the opposition was able to accept the former prime minister fully. Baisalov said that many within the opposition remained bitter over Kulov's lack of support during the November 2006 demonstrations, and Kulov's past errors invited doubt about his ability to stand effectively against Bakiyev. Baisalov said he would prefer to see Kulov use his influence with opposition MPs to push somehow for early parliamentary elections, instead of simply inciting more political protests. "We're not ready to call (Kulov) our leader," said Baisalov, "but at the end of the day, it's better to have him on our side." COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) Over the past months, opposition figures have made clear to us their bitterness toward Kulov. He may well have missed a chance last November to unite the political opposition by not supporting them during protests, and the opposition may not be ready today to proclaim him leader, but Kulov's forceful speech has changed the political calculus. The administration has reacted cautiously, with the president's press secretary saying that Kulov had misapprehended the situation -- that it was Kulov's dispute with the parliament, not Bakiyev breaking the terms of the "tandem" agreement, that led to his ouster as prime minister. Interestingly, state TV covered the speech, with only a perfunctory rebuttal, but Kulov's declaration has certainly made him a mortal enemy of Bakiyev. And we can expect that the pressure tactics the government has applied (effectively) against the opposition in recent months will now be focused on Kulov. LITZENBERGER

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