Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BERN965
2007-09-28 13:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bern
Cable title:
SWISS PLAN TO NOTIFY UN IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
VZCZCXYZ0007 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHSW #0965/01 2711312 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 281312Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY BERN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4547 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2770 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0035 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0150
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000965
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW),IO/T (H.VONBEHREN),T, P, INR,
EUR/AGS (Y.SAINT-ANDRE),AND NEA/IR (S.GROEN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: ETTC KNNP IAEA PARM UN IR SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS PLAN TO NOTIFY UN IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
OF DUAL-USE EXPORT
REF: A. BUCK-NEPHEW E-MAILS (26/27SEP07)
B. BERN 913
Classified By: CDA Leigh G. Carter; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 000965
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW),IO/T (H.VONBEHREN),T, P, INR,
EUR/AGS (Y.SAINT-ANDRE),AND NEA/IR (S.GROEN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: ETTC KNNP IAEA PARM UN IR SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS PLAN TO NOTIFY UN IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
OF DUAL-USE EXPORT
REF: A. BUCK-NEPHEW E-MAILS (26/27SEP07)
B. BERN 913
Classified By: CDA Leigh G. Carter; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Swiss Department for Economic Affairs (SECO)
State Secretary Gerber reported that Switzerland plans to
notify the UN Iran Sanctions Committee of a dual-use export
(grinding machine) to the Mapna Turbine Engineering and
Manufacturing Company (aka "Tuga") (ref A). SECO Export
Controls and Sanctions Division Chief Wyss said that the
export involved is a "grinding machine" that is captured by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part II (dual-use) list
and, therefore, according to UNSCR 1737, the export needs to
be notified to the UN Iran Sanctions Committee. Wyss said
that SECO has "no legal basis to deny the export." In
presenting the case of the grinding machine, Gerber went to
some length to argue that Switzerland strictly controls
exports to Iran. He said that the GOS is notifying the UN
Iran Sanctions Committee of this export, as required by UNSCR
1737, and asserted that the GOS is "fulfilling 100%" of its
obligations under UNSCRs 1737/1747. This and another case
(reftel B) appear to indicate, however, that the approach
taken by Switzerland involves a relatively narrow reading of
export control and UNSCR texts. Swiss officials claim that
Swiss law and policy ("neutrality") leave them no other
options. Post will continue to urge Swiss officials to take
the broadest possible approach to restricting the export of
dual-use items to Iran, and would welcome Washington guidance
on how best to tailor that message. End summary.
2. (U) StS Gerber was accompanied in the meeting by SECO
Assistant Secretary Monika Ruehl and SECO Export Controls and
Sanctions Division Chief Othmar Wyss. Emboffs accompanied
the Ambassador.
-------------- --
SECO Claims "No Legal Basis to Deny the Export"
-------------- --
3. (C) Swiss Department for Economic Affairs (SECO) State
Secretary Gerber used a previously scheduled September 26
SIPDIS
meeting on another topic with the Ambassador to inform us
that Switzerland plans to notify the UN Iran Sanctions
Committee of a dual-use export (grinding machine) to the
Mapna Turbine Engineering and Manufacturing Company (aka
"Tuga") (ref A). Gerber said that he expected that the
notification would occur at the latest by October 1. He
emphasized that he was informing us in advance of the
notification in the interest of transparency, and added that
he thought that this would be the first such notification by
any country to the UN Iran Sanctions Committee.
4. (C) SECO Export Controls and Sanctions Division Chief Wyss
said that the export involved is a "grinding machine" that is
to be used in the manufacture of electrical equipment
unrelated to the nuclear sector. He stated that the grinding
machine is captured by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part
II (dual-use) list and, therefore, according to Article 5(c)
of UNSCR 1737, the export of the machine to an entity in Iran
needs to be notified to the UN Iran Sanctions Committee.
Wyss said that SECO has no reason to believe that the
grinding machine will be used in the nuclear sector in Iran,
and therefore has "no legal basis to deny the export." He
said that a license to export the grinding machine to Tuga
was approved by SECO six months before UNSCR 1737 came into
force, and the machine itself had been exported to Tuga in
Iran within the past week. Wyss said that the GOS is not
able to provide the name of the Swiss exporting firm, due to
commercial privacy restrictions. He commented that the
export license for the grinding machine includes an end-user
statement that provides for end-use checks. (Note: SECO
officials subsequently indicated to poloff that they expect
to do an end-use check on the grinding machine after it is
reported installed at Tuga. They claimed that Tuga is an
established gas turbine manufacturer that has
technical/commercial cooperation with companies in other
European countries. End note)
-------------- --
SECO Pitches Swiss Export Denial Record on Iran
-------------- --
5. (C) Gerber said that Switzerland has always taken great
care to ensure that Switzerland is not used to circumvent
high-tech export controls or sanctions. He added, however,
that Switzerland could not enforce U.S. or EU export
restrictions that go further than UN sanctions, since "that
would go beyond (Switzerland's) neutrality policy."
6. (C) In presenting the case of the grinding machine, Gerber
went to some length to argue that Switzerland strictly
controls exports to Iran. He said that the GOS is notifying
the UN Iran Sanctions Committee of this export, as required
by UNSCR 1737, and asserted that the GOS is "fulfilling 100%"
of its obligations under UNSCRs 1737. Noting that
Switzerland apparently will be the first to make such a
notification, he wondered aloud whether some other states
perhaps are not meeting their obligation to notify the
committee of dual-use exports to Iran. In that context, he
provided a chart that he said indicates that Switzerland has
the third highest number of export regime denial
notifications on Iran, implying that the GOS is stricter than
some other governments in controlling such exports.
According to the chart, Switzerland had a total 67 export
denial notifications (NSG, MTCR, AG) as of September 24,
placing it behind Germany (179 denial notifications) and the
UK (113). (Comment: It is difficult to assess how
meaningful this data is, absent adjustment for relative trade
volumes, but SECO officials argue it is a telling statistic.
End Comment)
--------------
Comment/Guidance Request
--------------
7. (C) Swiss officials assert that Switzerland strictly
enforces export controls on Iran, according to the
requirements of the multilateral export control regimes and
UNSCRs 1737/1747. This and another case (reftel B) appear to
indicate, however, that the approach taken by Switzerland
involves a relatively narrow reading of export control and
UNSCR texts. Swiss officials claim that Swiss law and policy
("neutrality") leave them no other options. SECO contacts
emphasize the value they place on close bilateral export
control cooperation and information sharing with the USG.
Post will continue to urge Swiss officials to take the
broadest possible approach to restricting the export of
dual-use items to Iran, and would welcome Washington guidance
on how best to tailor that message.
CARTER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW),IO/T (H.VONBEHREN),T, P, INR,
EUR/AGS (Y.SAINT-ANDRE),AND NEA/IR (S.GROEN)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2017
TAGS: ETTC KNNP IAEA PARM UN IR SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS PLAN TO NOTIFY UN IRAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
OF DUAL-USE EXPORT
REF: A. BUCK-NEPHEW E-MAILS (26/27SEP07)
B. BERN 913
Classified By: CDA Leigh G. Carter; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Swiss Department for Economic Affairs (SECO)
State Secretary Gerber reported that Switzerland plans to
notify the UN Iran Sanctions Committee of a dual-use export
(grinding machine) to the Mapna Turbine Engineering and
Manufacturing Company (aka "Tuga") (ref A). SECO Export
Controls and Sanctions Division Chief Wyss said that the
export involved is a "grinding machine" that is captured by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part II (dual-use) list
and, therefore, according to UNSCR 1737, the export needs to
be notified to the UN Iran Sanctions Committee. Wyss said
that SECO has "no legal basis to deny the export." In
presenting the case of the grinding machine, Gerber went to
some length to argue that Switzerland strictly controls
exports to Iran. He said that the GOS is notifying the UN
Iran Sanctions Committee of this export, as required by UNSCR
1737, and asserted that the GOS is "fulfilling 100%" of its
obligations under UNSCRs 1737/1747. This and another case
(reftel B) appear to indicate, however, that the approach
taken by Switzerland involves a relatively narrow reading of
export control and UNSCR texts. Swiss officials claim that
Swiss law and policy ("neutrality") leave them no other
options. Post will continue to urge Swiss officials to take
the broadest possible approach to restricting the export of
dual-use items to Iran, and would welcome Washington guidance
on how best to tailor that message. End summary.
2. (U) StS Gerber was accompanied in the meeting by SECO
Assistant Secretary Monika Ruehl and SECO Export Controls and
Sanctions Division Chief Othmar Wyss. Emboffs accompanied
the Ambassador.
-------------- --
SECO Claims "No Legal Basis to Deny the Export"
-------------- --
3. (C) Swiss Department for Economic Affairs (SECO) State
Secretary Gerber used a previously scheduled September 26
SIPDIS
meeting on another topic with the Ambassador to inform us
that Switzerland plans to notify the UN Iran Sanctions
Committee of a dual-use export (grinding machine) to the
Mapna Turbine Engineering and Manufacturing Company (aka
"Tuga") (ref A). Gerber said that he expected that the
notification would occur at the latest by October 1. He
emphasized that he was informing us in advance of the
notification in the interest of transparency, and added that
he thought that this would be the first such notification by
any country to the UN Iran Sanctions Committee.
4. (C) SECO Export Controls and Sanctions Division Chief Wyss
said that the export involved is a "grinding machine" that is
to be used in the manufacture of electrical equipment
unrelated to the nuclear sector. He stated that the grinding
machine is captured by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part
II (dual-use) list and, therefore, according to Article 5(c)
of UNSCR 1737, the export of the machine to an entity in Iran
needs to be notified to the UN Iran Sanctions Committee.
Wyss said that SECO has no reason to believe that the
grinding machine will be used in the nuclear sector in Iran,
and therefore has "no legal basis to deny the export." He
said that a license to export the grinding machine to Tuga
was approved by SECO six months before UNSCR 1737 came into
force, and the machine itself had been exported to Tuga in
Iran within the past week. Wyss said that the GOS is not
able to provide the name of the Swiss exporting firm, due to
commercial privacy restrictions. He commented that the
export license for the grinding machine includes an end-user
statement that provides for end-use checks. (Note: SECO
officials subsequently indicated to poloff that they expect
to do an end-use check on the grinding machine after it is
reported installed at Tuga. They claimed that Tuga is an
established gas turbine manufacturer that has
technical/commercial cooperation with companies in other
European countries. End note)
-------------- --
SECO Pitches Swiss Export Denial Record on Iran
-------------- --
5. (C) Gerber said that Switzerland has always taken great
care to ensure that Switzerland is not used to circumvent
high-tech export controls or sanctions. He added, however,
that Switzerland could not enforce U.S. or EU export
restrictions that go further than UN sanctions, since "that
would go beyond (Switzerland's) neutrality policy."
6. (C) In presenting the case of the grinding machine, Gerber
went to some length to argue that Switzerland strictly
controls exports to Iran. He said that the GOS is notifying
the UN Iran Sanctions Committee of this export, as required
by UNSCR 1737, and asserted that the GOS is "fulfilling 100%"
of its obligations under UNSCRs 1737. Noting that
Switzerland apparently will be the first to make such a
notification, he wondered aloud whether some other states
perhaps are not meeting their obligation to notify the
committee of dual-use exports to Iran. In that context, he
provided a chart that he said indicates that Switzerland has
the third highest number of export regime denial
notifications on Iran, implying that the GOS is stricter than
some other governments in controlling such exports.
According to the chart, Switzerland had a total 67 export
denial notifications (NSG, MTCR, AG) as of September 24,
placing it behind Germany (179 denial notifications) and the
UK (113). (Comment: It is difficult to assess how
meaningful this data is, absent adjustment for relative trade
volumes, but SECO officials argue it is a telling statistic.
End Comment)
--------------
Comment/Guidance Request
--------------
7. (C) Swiss officials assert that Switzerland strictly
enforces export controls on Iran, according to the
requirements of the multilateral export control regimes and
UNSCRs 1737/1747. This and another case (reftel B) appear to
indicate, however, that the approach taken by Switzerland
involves a relatively narrow reading of export control and
UNSCR texts. Swiss officials claim that Swiss law and policy
("neutrality") leave them no other options. SECO contacts
emphasize the value they place on close bilateral export
control cooperation and information sharing with the USG.
Post will continue to urge Swiss officials to take the
broadest possible approach to restricting the export of
dual-use items to Iran, and would welcome Washington guidance
on how best to tailor that message.
CARTER