IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL'S BRIEFS ON HIS MOST \

2007-03-16 12:23:00 07BERN259 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN258 VZCZCXRO7543\ OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\ DE RUEHSW #0259/01 0751223\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ O 161223Z MAR 07\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3817\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000259 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ STATE FOR P, NEA, ISN, EUR \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 \ TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC SZ SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL'S BRIEFS ON HIS MOST \ RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN AND REQUESTS MEETING IN WASHINGTON \ \ REF: BERN 258 \ \ Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \ \ -------------- \ Summary \ -------------- \ \ 1.(C) Just back from three days in Tehran, Swiss DFA State \ Secretary Michael Ambuehl on March 16 briefed Ambassador \ \ SIPDIS \ Coneway on his meetings with Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali \ Larijani and asked for Embassy support for a meeting in \ Washington with U/S Burns and/or other senior Department \ officials next week (week of March 19). Ambuehl described \ the senior Iranian officials as "feeling cornered, but \ remaining intransigent" on the suspension of enrichment. \ Nonetheless, Ambuehl believes there is hope the Iranians will \ agree to talk. While Ambuehl made it clear that he had "no \ scoop" for us (his words),Embassy Bern believes a \ senior-level briefing in Washington would offer an \ opportunity to gain Ambuehl's insights and provide the \ Department an opportunity to reinforce the USG position on \ Iran with the Swiss. End Summary. \ \ -------------- \ "No Scoop" \ -------------- \ \ 2.(C) As he had previewed to EUR Assistant Secretary Fried on \ March 9 (reftel),Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \ Michael Ambuehl, with DFA Near East/Africa chief Livia Leu, \ traveled to Tehran March 12-15 to underscore to Iranian \ officials the need to abide by the UN Security Council and \ IAEA demands. Ambuehl advised that IAEA DG ElBaradei had \ encouraged him to make the trip. In a March 16 briefing for \ the Ambassador, DCM, and Poloff, Ambuehl said that he had met \ twice with Nuclear Negotiator Larijani and his deputy Sayyed \ Ali Monfared, again separately with Monfared, and with Deputy \ Foreign Minister Jalili (whom Ambuehl described as seemingly \ out of the nuclear picture now). \ \ 3.(C) Ambuehl said he had reiterated his previous message to \ Larijani that Iran must comply with UN Security Council \ Resolution 1737, or face further sanctions. Larijani's \ reaction, Ambuehl said, was "irritation with the Swuss \ insistence." Ambuehl said Larijani was similarly irritated \ following telephone calls from Swiss Foreign Minister \ Calmy-Rey and (Ambuehl understands) German Foreign Minister \ Steinmeier. Ambuehl assured us he had made clear to Larijani \ that the visit was a Swiss initiative, with backing from the \ IAEA. Ambuehl shared with the Ambassador a paper he had \ passed to the Iranians describing the Swiss proposal (para \ 7). According to Ambuehl, Larijani said Iran could accept \ all points in the paper, except the most important point -- \ suspension of all enrichment-related activities. \ \ -------------- \ Briefing Washington \ -------------- \ \ 4.(C) Notwithstanding Iran's intransigence on the enrichment \ issue, Ambuehl said that the "hours" of meetings yielded some \ interesting insights. He said he hoped to brief Washington \ as soon as possible -- as early as Monday, March 19 -- if \ Under Secretary Burns and/or other appropriate senior \ officials would be available. The Ambassador asked Ambuehl \ if he had heard anything from Iran that he hadn't heard \ before. Ambuehl replied that he had no actionable \ recommendations for the USG, but thought his readout would be \ of value to the Department. He could not say he was \ encouraged, neither was he discouraged, but felt it would be \ worthwhile "to reflect to the US in exact terms" what the \ Iranians said. The Ambassador thanked Ambuehl for both the \ preview of the visit to A/S Fried and the briefing \ immediately after. He agreed to convey Ambuehl's request to \ the Department and get back to him. \ \ -------------- \ Comment \ -------------- \ \ 5.(C) Given ElBaradei's putative role in the Ambuehl visit to \ Tehran, we gather that the Swiss initiative echoes \ ElBaradei's views, and may have been previously conveyed to \ Tehran by ElBaradei. While Swiss side efforts give us cause \ for concern, the fact that Larijani appears to have rebuffed \ the Swiss could be helpful in convincing fence straddlers in \ the international community that the Iranians are \ intransigent. \ \ \ BERN 00000259 002 OF 002 \ \ \ ¶6. Embassy Bern believes it would be constructive for \ Department officials to receive State Secretary Ambuehl the \ week of March 19. Ambuehl made it clear that he (and one or \ two others) would travel any time and would ask for no more \ than an hour. The meeting could allow Ambuehl to share in \ greater depth the Iranian reaction to the Swiss proposal and \ provide the Department an opportunity to reinforce the USG \ position on Iran with the Swiss. End comment. \ \ -------------- \ Text of Swiss Paper \ -------------- \ \ 7.(SBU) Following is the text of the Swiss non-paper passed \ to Larijani: \ \ Guiding Principles and Mechanism to Relaunch the Negotiations \ \ Step 1: Informal Talks \ \ The parties will hold informal talks in order to agree on the \ following guiding principles which will serve as a basis to \ relaunch negotiations: \ \ ¶1. In order to create the necessary confidence: \ \ -- Iran will suspend all its enrichment-related activities as \ required by the UNSC and the IAEA and to be verified by the \ latter; \ \ -- The P5 plus 1 will simultaneously suspend the \ implementation of the UNSC sanctions and will ensure that the \ Iranian nuclear issue will not be considered by the UNSC, but \ that the file will be returned to the IAEA. \ \ The parties will agree on the date of the entry into force of \ this double suspension, which will last until the end of \ negotiations in step 2, but no longer than six months unless \ otherwise agreed. \ \ ¶2. Iran will adopt a policy of maximum transparency in its \ cooperation with the IAEA. To this end, Iran will present a \ timetable to the IAEA with a view to resolving all remaining \ outstanding issues. \ \ ¶3. The P5 plus 1 recognize and affirm Iran's right to \ peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV of the NPT \ and in accordance with Articles II and III of the NPT. The \ modalities ensuring Iran's access to nuclear energy for \ peaceful purposes, as well as the timing and modalities of \ the exercise of certain aspects of this right, namely the \ sensitive part of the fuel cycle, will be agreed in the \ negotiations under step 2, in conjunction with the \ confidence-building measures that need to be undertaken in \ Iran. \ \ Step 2: Negotiations \ \ As soon as the commitments regarding the double suspension \ and the time-table are implemented, step 2 begins. \ \ The parties will enter into negotiations in good faith with \ the aim of achieving a comprehensive settlement ("package") \ including nuclear issues and non-nuclear areas, such as \ economic cooperation, international security, and political \ dialogue, with a view to streamlining and strengthening \ cooperation between the P5 plus 1 and Iran. \ \ The three guiding principles and the mechanism for \ relaunching the negotiations will be incorporated in a joint \ declaration signed by the P5 plus 1 and Iran. \ \ End text of Swiss paper. \ CONEWAY \