IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE \

2007-03-16 07:49:00 07BERN258 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO7217\ PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\ DE RUEHSW #0258/01 0750749\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ P 160749Z MAR 07\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3815\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE\ RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000258 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2017 \ TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM UNSC SZ SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS POLDIR AMBUEHL TELLS EUR A/S FRIED HE \ IS GOING TO TEHRAN \ \ Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \ \ -------------- \ Summary \ -------------- \ \ 1.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael \ Ambuehl told visiting EUR A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway on \ March 9 that he planned to visit Tehran the week of March 12, \ claiming that IAEA DG ElBaradei had encouraged Ambuehl to \ tell Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani that Iran was \ facing its "last chance." A/S Fried and the Ambassador \ cautioned strongly against the visit, noting that a Swiss \ visit could be misinterpreted and used by Iranian officials, \ particularly given Bern's status as U.S. protecting power in \ Tehran. Ambuehl assured the USG that his message would be \ identical to that of the UN Security Council and IAEA, namely \ that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities and accept \ its international obligations. Ambuehl's staff informed \ Embassy on March 12 that he was on his way to Tehran and \ would provide a readout immediately upon return. End \ summary. \ \ -------------- \ "Last Chance" Message for Iran \ -------------- \ \ 2.(C/NF) Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuehl met with A/S \ Dan Fried and the Ambassador on March 9 at Zurich Airport, \ joined by Swiss DFA Americas Desk official Urs Hammer and \ Poloff. Ambuehl told A/S Fried that he planned to fly to \ Tehran the week of March 12 to meet with Iranian Nuclear \ Negotiator Ali Larijani. Ambuehl said that he wanted to \ brief A/S Fried and the Ambassador in order to keep the USG \ fully apprised of Swiss activities, per Ambassador Coneway's \ request. His purpose, he said, would be to push Iran to \ accept the three "modalities" demanded by the UN Security \ Council and IAEA, namely: \ \ -- Suspension of all enrichment activities, with "no tricks;" \ -- Transparency with the international community; and \ -- Acceptance of rights and obligations as defined by the \ IAEA and UNSC resolutions. \ \ 3.(C/NF) Ambuehl said he had been encouraged to travel to \ Iran by IAEA DG ElBaradei, with whom he had spoken three \ times in recent days. ElBaradei told Ambuehl that he had \ spoken with Secretary Rice and suggested that "we have to use \ the Swiss" to urge the Iranians to abide by UNSC resolutions. \ Notably, ElBaradei had not conveyed what the Secretary's \ response (if any) was. In any event, Ambuehl would tell the \ Iranians that this was their "last chance." He acknowledged \ that a Swiss effort would have only a 30 percent chance of \ success, but described the visit as low-risk, high potential \ gain. \ \ -------------- \ Counterargument \ -------------- \ \ 4.(C/NF) Ambassador Coneway challenged Ambuehl to describe \ what if anything new the Swiss could tell the Iranians. It \ was a delicate time in the stand-off between the P5 plus 1 \ and Iran; silence would be the best policy by Switzerland. \ Moreover, Tehran would be unlikely to see this as a "last \ chance." A/S Fried told Ambuehl firmly that the USG had been \ concerned by some Swiss actions. Side initiatives could \ encourage the Iranians to game the unity of the international \ community. Bern's status as U.S. Protecting Power could also \ cause Iran to misconstrue Swiss actions. \ \ 5.(C/NF) Ambuehl insisted that his prospective visit would \ not undermine the P5 plus 1. His points would be exactly the \ points agreed to by the UN Security Council and supported by \ the IAEA. Iran's rebuff of the Swiss initiative would be \ recognized as further evidence of Tehran's intransigence. \ \ 6.(C/NF) A/S Fried reiterated that the international \ community had finally gained traction against Iran. It was \ important to let the pressure work. A/S Fried urged Ambuehl \ to make no firm plans until we could speak to officials in \ Washington. In any event, Ambuehl should make clear to the \ Iranians, if he does in the end go, that he did not speak for \ the USG. Ambuehl said that this went without saying. \ Ambuehl asked for understanding of the difficult situation he \ was in (we surmise this means the directive from Foreign \ Minister Calmy-Rey to engage with Iran on this issue). \ Options other than a flat "no" would be appreciated. A/S \ Fried and Ambassador Coneway agreed to get back to him as \ soon as possible. \ \ \ BERN 00000258 002 OF 002 \ \ \ -------------- - \ Ambassador Coneway's follow up call to Ambuehl \ -------------- - \ \ 7.(C/NF) Using points provided by P staff, Ambassador Coneway \ called Ambuehl that night with the message that the USG had \ made its opinion clear. There was nothing new in the Swiss \ proposal and the visit presented many opportunities for \ misinterpretation. The decision to go would be a sovereign \ Swiss decision to take. If Ambuehl chose to go, the \ Ambassador stressed, it must be clear that he was not acting \ on the USG's behalf. \ \ 8.(C/NF) Ambuehl's initial response was that he would \ consider the USG points. However, his diplomatic advisor \ Stephan Estermann called DCM on March 12 to announce that \ Ambuehl was on his way to Tehran and would provide a briefing \ upon his return. \ \ -------------- \ Comment \ -------------- \ \ 9.(C/NF) A/S Fried and Ambassador Coneway were very clear in \ their expression of concern about Ambuehl's planned travel to \ Tehran. However, it is obvious that the Swiss think there is \ at least the chance that the engagement of a "disinterested" \ non-member of the P5 plus 1 could offer Tehran a face-saving \ way to give into the UN Security Council - a belief \ apparently reinforced by ElBaradei. Ambuehl was noticeably \ uncomfortable not taking the USG's advice. But, there is \ little surprise in his decision to go forward with the visit, \ given the clear mandate he has received from Swiss Foreign \ Minister Calmy-Rey. \ CONEWAY \