IRAN: AMBASSADOR URGES POLDIR AMBUEHL TO STEP BACK \

2007-02-16 11:28:00 07BERN158 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113|07BERN130 VZCZCXRO0021\ OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\ DE RUEHSW #0158/01 0471128\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ O 161128Z FEB 07\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3709\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000158 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ STATE FOR P - U/S BURNS \ STATE ALSO FOR NEA, ISN, EUR \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2017 \ TAGS: PARM KNNP PTER ETTC IR SZ SUBJECT: IRAN: AMBASSADOR URGES POLDIR AMBUEHL TO STEP BACK \ \ REF: A. BERN 130 \ ¶B. BERN 113 \ \ Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \ \ -------------- \ Summary \ -------------- \ \ 1.(C) Ambassador Coneway advised Swiss State Secretary of \ Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl today that Swiss efforts to \ persuade Iran to return to negotiations were being \ misinterpreted in the press and risked sending mixed messages \ to Iran, especially given Switzerland's status as U.S. \ protecting power. Ambuehl countered that there was a value \ to having a neutral, disinterested party like Switzerland \ deliver the tough message that Tehran is isolated and must \ suspend enrichment. Ambuehl stressed that Bern viewed \ Washington as its "most privileged" partner on Iran and that \ his office made a point of briefing the Embassy soon after \ the recent meetings. The Ambassador underlined that having \ forewarning of high-level Swiss-Iranian contacts would help \ avoid misunderstandings. Ambuehl agreed to consider the \ Ambassador's points and noted that he was scheduled to speak \ to U/S Nick Burns later in the day. End summary. \ \ -------------- \ The Relative Merits of Engagement or Silence \ -------------- \ \ 2.(C) The Ambassador met with State Secretary Ambuehl on \ February 16 at Ambuehl's invitation to discuss recent Swiss \ meetings with Iranian officials (reftels) and to convey USG \ concerns that Swiss actions might be misinterpreted. Swiss \ DFA Americas Desk officials Yvonne Baumann and Urs Hammer, as \ well as Embassy Poloff, joined the meeting. The Ambassador \ cited the varying reports found in the Swiss and \ international press about what the Swiss were up to, \ including reports describing the Swiss activity as a \ mediation initiative. While the USG trusted Ambuehl's \ description of what was discussed in the meetings, the \ Iranians were presenting a different interpretation in their \ statements, official and unofficial. Clearly, Swiss efforts \ were being used by the Iranians and misinterpreted by the \ press. \ \ 3.(C) Ambuehl asserted that Iran well understood that \ Switzerland was acting on its own behalf, not as a proxy for \ the United States. The Swiss had numerous dialogue partners, \ including the Europeans, Russians, Chinese, and Iran's \ neighbors. These outreach efforts were helpful, in that \ Switzerland, as a neutral, disinterested party, could tell \ the Iranians what they would not believe from members of the \ P5 plus 1, namely that no country is happy with what is going \ on in Iran and that Tehran is absolutely isolated on the \ nuclear issue. Ambuehl stressed that he had been very firm \ with Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and with Deputy \ Foreign Minister Sa-id Jalili that Iran had to stop the \ rhetoric and provocation and offer concessions to resolve the \ impasse. Ambuehl said he believes they were listening. \ \ 4.(C) Looking forward, the Ambassador observed that, since \ Switzerland position was now well known, now would be an \ opportune time to rest. Tehran knew what it needed to do to \ begin negotiations. Swiss silence would speak louder than \ words. Certainly, Iranian officials might reach out to the \ Swiss, but it would be helpful if Switzerland itself did not \ pursue more dialogue. Sanctions were starting to bite and \ international pressure was getting to Iran. The \ international community needed to allow the P5-plus-1 track \ to have an effect. \ \ 5.(C) Ambuehl replied that Switzerland fully respected the \ leading role of the P5 plus 1. Were the United States to \ begin talking directly to Iran, Washington would certainly be \ in the driver's seat. Indeed, Ambuehl said he would \ recommend that the USG take this step. Until that time, it \ was his view that there was merit in repeatedly reminding \ Tehran of the international community's unanimous concerns. \ He well understood USG worries about Switzerland being \ "instrumentalized" or used to split the international \ community. Moreover, Ambuehl said that it was his impression \ -- and that of IAEA head Mohammed Elbaradei -- that \ Switzerland was more firm on the imperative of full \ suspension and locating a nuclear consortium outside of Iran, \ than were some of the European members of the P5 plus 1. \ \ -------------- \ No Surprises \ -------------- \ \ BERN 00000158 002 OF 002 \ \ \ \ 6.(C) On the subject of transparency, Ambuehl told the \ Ambassador that he viewed the United States as a privileged \ partner. Following every meeting with Iranian officials, his \ team had briefed the Embassy even before other members of the \ Swiss cabinet. The Ambassador thanked Ambuehl for his \ consideration, but encouraged him to notify the Embassy prior \ to such meetings, to avoid misunderstandings. It was awkward \ to have learned about Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey's meeting \ with Larijani from a Swiss press inquiry to the public \ affairs section. Ambuehl appeared receptive to this proposal. \ \ 7.(C) Ambuehl mentioned that his deputy, Ambassador Tony \ Thalmann, would be leading a delegation to Tehran to engage \ in a long-scheduled human rights dialogue (the planned visit \ had already been briefed to the Embassy). Ambuehl said that \ Thalmann did not have the intention to meet with nuclear \ officials, but the Iranian government was liable to change \ plans at the last minute. \ \ 8.(C) Finally, Ambuehl said that he looked forward to his \ telephone call with Under Secretary Nick Burns later that day. \ \ -------------- \ Comment \ -------------- \ \ 9.(C) Ambuehl has a mandate from FM Calmy-Rey to maintain \ dialogue with all of the key parties in the Middle East, \ including Iran. Our repeated warnings to Ambuehl regarding \ the risks of this outreach can influence how the Swiss go \ about this dialogue, but probably not stop it altogether. \ Urging a "moment of silence" may be the most reasonable \ approach at the moment, particularly in view of the upcoming \ February 21 UN Security Council deadline. \ CONEWAY \