IRAN: SWISS FM CALMY-REY MEETS WITH LARIJANI \

2007-02-13 11:16:00 07BERN130 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113 VZCZCXRO5924\ OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\ DE RUEHSW #0130/01 0441116\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ O 131116Z FEB 07\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3681\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000130 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ STATE FOR P, NEA, EUR, ISN \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017 \ TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL ETTC IR SZ SUBJECT: IRAN: SWISS FM CALMY-REY MEETS WITH LARIJANI \ \ REF: BERN 113 \ \ Classified By: DCM CAROL URBAN, REASONS 1.4 B/D \ \ -------------- \ Summary \ -------------- \ \ 1.(C) Swiss FM Calmy-Rey met with visiting Iranian nuclear \ negotiator Larijani on February 12 to review a Swiss 4-point \ proposal on how to resolve the nuclear impasse. Swiss \ officials disputed press reports that their effort comprised \ "mediation effort" or an "initiative," and emphasized the \ proposal's consistency with UNSCR 1737. Conditions included \ suspension of enrichment prior to talks; full cooperation \ with the IAEA (including the long-awaited timetable); \ transfer of all enrichment activities to a consortium; all \ followed by a comprehensive settlement on nuclear, economic, \ security, and political issues. Scheurer denied an Iranian \ news report that the Swiss had offered up the possibility of \ a partial suspension of enrichment activities. Larijani, for \ his part, told Calmy-Rey that she was even less flexible than \ the EU's Solana. The Iranians had little concrete to offer, \ but Scheurer said he detected a more "constructive spirit" in \ the discussion. DCM reiterated Washington's concerns about \ Swiss efforts, particularly in light of Switzerland's status \ as Protecting Power for the United States in Tehran. End \ summary. \ \ -------------- \ Swiss 4-Point Proposition \ -------------- \ \ 2.(C) Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani met with Swiss \ Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey in Bern on February 12 \ after attending the Munich International Security Conference, \ or "Wehrkunde," over the weekend. Larijani's aide Sayaad \ Monfarad and Deputy Foreign Minister Sa'id Jalili accompanied \ him. On February 13, Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs \ Iran expert Guillaume Scheurer invited DCM and Poloff for a \ briefing on the talks, in order to reassure the USG that \ Switzerland is abiding by the consensus reflected in UN \ Security Council Resolution 1737. Calmy-Rey, he said, \ bluntly told Larijani of Iran's isolation on the nuclear \ issue, its obligation to abide by UNSC and IAEA requirements, \ the present risk of escalation, and the imperative for Iran \ to be transparent and constructive in seeking a solution. \ \ 3.(C) Scheurer dismissed as "media spin" various press \ reports of a "Swiss Initiative" and "Swiss mediation." \ Rather, he said, FM Calmy-Rey (and State Secretary Ambuehl \ the previous week -- see reftel) had merely given Larijani a \ "proposition" to resolve the current impasse. The \ proposition's four points were as follows: \ \ ¶A. Before talks begin, Iran commits itself to suspend all \ enrichment-related activities and to act in accommodation \ with provisions of the Additional Protocol, pending \ ratification of the Iranian Parliament, and to go beyond \ these provisions when demanded by the IAEA; \ \ ¶B. Three weeks after the start of talks, Iran presents a \ timetable for resolving outstanding issues with the IAEA; \ \ ¶C. A concrete proposal will be devised concerning an eventual \ consortium, through which all further Iranian enrichment \ activities will be transferred; \ \ ¶D. As soon as the above steps are achieved, negotiators will \ consider a comprehensive settlement package which includes \ nuclear and non-nuclear areas, such as economic cooperation, \ international security, and political dialogue (akin to past \ EU proposals, according to Scheurer). \ \ 4.(C) Scheurer insisted that the Swiss proposal did not, \ repeat not, offer up a "partial suspension," as was reported \ by the Iranian news agency "Flash News" on February 12. He \ said FM Calmy-Rey had been angered when she read the Iranian \ spokesman's statement to Flash. Scheurer said that Calmy-Rey \ had raised the notion of a "temporary suspension," though she \ asserted that anything the Iranians did would have to be in \ compliance with the IAEA. \ \ -------------- -------------- \ Larijani's Reaction: Nothing Concrete, but a Better Spirit \ -------------- -------------- \ \ 5.(C) According to Scheurer, Larijani told Calmy-Rey she was \ even less flexible than Solana. He reiterated Tehran's long \ list of complaints about the West's lack of respect for Iran. \ He repeated his comments from Wehrkunde, asserting that, \ \ BERN 00000130 002 OF 002 \ \ \ whatever the past, Iran was currently in compliance with the \ IAEA and that Iran should not be punished for violations it \ had yet to commit. A potential consortium, he argued, must \ be in Iranian territory, not abroad. Suspension was \ unacceptable as a precondition, though it could be the \ subject of "pre-talks," which he envisioned lasting up to two \ months. \ \ 6.(C) Asked whether he heard anything new in the meeting with \ Larijani, Scheurer acknowledged that there was nothing \ concrete, but that the "spirit" of the discussions were more \ hopeful. The Iranians were more rational, less emotional \ than in previous meetings with the Swiss. Scheurer's \ impression was that the Iranian side desired a solution, but \ had little idea how to get there within their current red \ lines, especially their refusal to suspend enrichment \ activities. He gathered from Solana's people in Munich that \ they had the same impression. \ \ -------------- \ Washington's Concerns \ -------------- \ \ 7.(C) DCM thanked Scheurer for the briefing, but reiterated \ the USG's concerns that Tehran might confuse their activities \ with Switzerland's status as Protecting Power in Iran. She \ handed Scheurer the Department's guidance describing Iran's \ need to comply with the UNSC and IAEA. Scheurer said that \ Bern was aware of the USG's concerns, but insisted that \ officials always stressed to their Iranian interlocutors that \ they were not speaking for Washington. He was confident that \ Tehran understood this. \ CONEWAY \