SWISS DFA STATE SECRETARY AMBUEHL HEARS NOTHING \

2007-02-05 17:15:00 07BERN113 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 07BERN113|07BERN98 VZCZCXRO8313\ OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\ DE RUEHSW #0113/01 0361715\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ O 051715Z FEB 07\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3651\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0117\ RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2664 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 000113 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ STATE FOR P, EUR, ISN \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 \ TAGS: PARM PTER KNNP SZ IR SUBJECT: SWISS DFA STATE SECRETARY AMBUEHL HEARS NOTHING \ NEW IN TEHRAN \ \ REF: BERN 98 \ \ Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \ \ 1.(C) Summary: Tehran offered no new ideas to visiting Swiss \ State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael Ambuehl during his \ hastily arranged trip over the weekend. According to Swiss \ Iran specialist Guillaume Scheurer, Ambuehl had traveled to \ Iran hoping to hear the regime's ideas on how to climb down \ from the current confrontation. Instead, Iranian Deputy \ Foreign Minister Sa'id Jalili and Supreme Council National \ Security director Ali Larijani presented a defiant posture \ towards the United States, the UN Security Council, and \ unnamed regional neighbors. Scheurer thought Jalili and \ Larijani might be using the meeting to send a message to the \ United States, namely that the USG should offer a concession \ in compensation for its victory on the UN Security Council. \ Ambuehl advised the Iranians that they should avoid \ inflammatory rhetoric during the February 11 celebrations, in \ order not to escalate the current crisis. End summary. \ \ -------------- \ Hopes Unmet \ -------------- \ \ 2.(C) DFA Iran watcher Guillaume Scheurer invited DCM and \ Poloff to a briefing on Michael Ambuehl's February 3 visit to \ Tehran, as part of Ambuehl's efforts to keep the Embassy \ informed of Swiss activities. According to Scheurer, he and \ DFA nuclear disarmament official Jean-Daniel Praz accompanied \ Ambuehl. While Ambuehl and Jalili had made plans to \ follow-up on their December 2006 meeting, Scheurer described \ Jalili's invitation as rather sudden, since it was extended \ only a week prior. The invitation raised Swiss hopes that \ Iran might have something new to say about the nuclear or \ other issue, but the Swiss were disappointed. Ambuehl met \ with Jalili alone and jointly with Jalili, Larijani, and \ Sayaad Monfared. DCM welcomed Scheurer's assurances that \ neither the Swiss nor the Iranians raised the issue of Swiss \ mediation between Iran and the United States. \ \ -------------- \ Isolated and Defiant \ -------------- \ \ 3.(C) Scheurer said that Ambuehl offered his assessment that \ all countries were concerned about Iran's nuclear program. \ Those less concerned about a nuclear Iran were nonetheless \ worried about the crisis escalating. Iran is isolated, \ Ambuehl stressed, and needs to find a solution. Scheurer \ said that he was surprised that neither Jalili nor Larijani \ seriously contested Ambuehl's assessment. Larijani cited the \ fall 2006 NAM Summit support for Iran's right to a civil \ nuclear program, but otherwise did not push back. \ \ 4.(C) Rather, Larijani complained that the "U.S. blocked \ everything with a stupid pre-condition." Larijani cited a \ Persian proverb to argue that Washington was not serious \ about negotiations: "One can wake up one who is sleeping, but \ not one who is pretending to sleep." Both Larijani and \ Jalili expressed bitterness over the passage of the UN \ Security Council resolution. They countered (somewhat \ curiously) that, since the United States had one that round, \ it should offer Iran a concession, "so that the score would \ be one-to-one." The one proposal they offered was a return \ to the "Berlin Process." \ \ 5.(C) On a roll, the Iranian officials reviewed \ post-revolution history, portraying their country as faced \ with international pressure and threats from the beginning. \ "If these threats did not work 27 years ago, they will not \ work now." The Iranian people would reply with "one voice" \ to further UN sanctions. With a note of bravado, Larijani \ said that Iran was prepared for all scenarios, even military. \ "The U.S. would make a tragic mistake with bitter \ consequences," he said. Reminded by Ambuehl of the ill \ consequences facing Iran in this scenario, Larijani replied \ that Iran was also prepared for a "lose-lose situation." \ Ambuehl warned the Iranians not to exacerbate the tension by \ indulging in counterproductive rhetoric during the upcoming \ February 11 anniversary of the revolution celebrations. \ \ -------------- \ Touching on the Regional Angle \ -------------- \ \ 6.(C) Jalili offered little substantive response to Ambuehl's \ briefing of his recent trip to Lebanon and Syria (reftel). \ \ BERN 00000113 002 OF 002 \ \ \ Jalili welcomed Ambuehl's engagement with Syria and described \ Iranian hopes for an all-party Lebanese agreement, whereby \ the opposition (including Hizballah) would be allotted 11 of \ the 30 cabinet seats. He also alluded to Saudi-Iranian \ brokered discussions on a Fatah-Hamas stand down. On Iraq, \ Jalili merely charged that "some regional countries" were \ giving bad advice, leading the USG to believe Iran was \ supporting terrorism, when in fact it was those very \ countries who were doing so. \ \ -------------- \ Unresponsive on Swiss Protecting Power \ -------------- \ \ 7.(C) According to Scheurer, Ambuehl also used the occasion \ of the meeting to reiterate concerns about the security of \ the Swiss Embassy and SPP offices in Tehran. Jalili turned \ the Swiss concerns around, charging that Iranian Embassy \ employees in Bern were also concerned about the presence of \ Mujahedin e-Khalq members in Switzerland. \ \ -------------- \ Comment \ -------------- \ \ 8.(C) Perhaps the most notable aspect of Ambuehl's \ discussions in Tehran was the sense he and his Swiss \ colleagues felt that the Iranians were actually hoping to \ address the United States by proxy, given Switzerland's \ status as protecting power. If this was the case, there was \ little in the way of constructive proposals. While we \ welcome Scheurer's assurances that neither side brought up \ the notion of Swiss mediation, Ambuehl is determined to be \ helpful and will certainly look for opportunities to do so. \ That said, we have no doubt that Ambuehl understands the \ USG's views on such "helpfulness." \ CONEWAY \