REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOV PRACTICES

UNCLAS BERN 001077 SIPDIS CIA FOR NCTC AND DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCKANE SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PREL CVIS ASEC KVPR SZ SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOV PRACTICES REF: A) 06 STATE 190832 B) 07 STATE 133921 1.(SBU) Post would like to submit responses to questions in STATE ¶133921. We have been as complete as possible but can approach the governments of Switzerland or Liechtenstein for further information if something in particular is required. We also note that while Liechtenstein and Switzerland's practices are similar and in some areas identical, the responses in this cable are focused on Switzerland. ¶A. WATCHLISTING ICE Attache/Bern does not interact with any Swiss agency maintaining any type of "watchlist." Such task is the responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration attach assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Belgium. ¶B. TRAVELER INFORMATION COLLECTION Air travelers have their passports scanned upon arriving and departing Swiss airports. Land border crossings, to include rail crossings, generally have identifying data manually entered into hand-held devices that are later downloaded into a migration data base. The information is collected by entities under the Swiss Office for Migration and Swiss Border Police. Obtaining border crossing information from Swiss authorities is difficult. Written and verbal requests for such information within the past six months have been ignored. However, Swiss authorities freely provide detailed information to ICE Attache/Bern on subjects being deported to the U.S., or have some type of U.S. connection. Passenger Name Records are collected from arriving commercial flights and shared with Swiss law enforcement agencies. Such information can be shared upon request pursuant to existing Customs Mutual Assistance Agreements. Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) has been effective in identifying wanted subjects who have an active NCIC (National Crime Information Center) warrant, TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communication System) subject lookout, and INTERPOL lookout. Recently, such information was used to aid Zurich Canton Police in identifying and arresting an individual wanted in Switzerland for a narcotics offense. ¶C. BORDER CONTROL AND SCREENING ICE Attache/Bern does not interact with the host government on software to screen travelers of security interest. Such interaction is done with TSA and the National Targeting Center (NTC) operated by the U.S. Customs and Border protection (CBP). However, APIS information from outbound Swiss flights bound for the United States are downloaded to queries in TECS, NTC data bases, and U.S. agencies maintaining watch list or no fly lists. ¶E. PASSPORTS Switzerland presently issues passports which are machine readable and have a digital photo (Model 03) as well as passports that contain a chip with biometric information on it (Model 06). However, there are older passports (Model 85) which are not machine readable and do not contain biometric information and are still in use. The passports of this type will expire on 12/31/2007 and they are not renewable. When Swiss citizens lose a passport the authorities will issue a replacement passport with full validity, that does not look any different from the outside nor does it have a different series number. If a person loses more than three passports within five years the Swiss will only issue another passport valid for two years. The personal data in Emergency passports is printed on laminated security paper. The emergency passports are machine readable, include a digital photo, but do not include a biometric chip. Model 03 (F1234567),model 06 (X1234567) and emergency passports (J1234567) have different series numbers, starting with different letters of the alphabet followed by a seven digit number. Post sees no widespread pattern of applicants obtaining new passports in order to hide evidence of prior travel. However, as many Swiss citizens have taken advantage and obtained new model passports, post does see many visa applicants with 'clean' passports as the newer models have only been issued since 2003. ¶F. FRAUD DETECTION The Swiss Federal Police and Swiss Office for Migration have reported passport fraud matters to ICE Attache/Bern. The Swiss Office for Federal Migration is persistent and will contact multiple sources regarding passport fraud, including INTERPOL and police agencies in other countries. In one case, the Swiss Federal Police submitted fingerprint exemplars for ICE Attache/Bern to compare on an immigration violation case. The prints were submitted to the Southwest regional Lab in Houston, Texas for analysis and comparison in both the immigration and NCIC data bases. Stolen Swiss passports and fraud trends are normally reported to Interpol by the Swiss Federal Office of Police. ¶G. PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY Transmittal of personal information to agencies outside Switzerland is severely restricted. Disclosure of personal data is governed by the Swiss Federal Office of Data Protection. Switzerland presently does not grant Freedom of Information Act rights (similar to that of the U.S.) to non-citizens/residents. ¶H. IMMIGRATION DATA BASES Computerized data bases with passport scanning capabilities are employed at Swiss airports. However, in practice, passports are normally scanned upon entry at an airport and are normally visually inspected upon departure. At land border crossings, passport data is normally captured when a vehicle and its occupants are subject to a secondary examination. Examination of all persons and vehicles crossing a Swiss land border is impractical and would adversely affect commerce. ¶I. WATCHLIST AND INFORMATION SHARING No available information. ¶J. BIOMETRICS Switzerland currently does not routinely capture biometric data at its ports of entry. Since September 2006, the Swiss government issues passports with electronically stored data. However, some of the older Swiss passports still in use contain no biometric identifiers. ¶K. IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE PARTNERS Swiss Federal Office of Police Swiss Federal Office for Migration Swiss Federal Office of Police, Service for Analysis and Prevention (SAP) Presently, the Swiss are not partners with the United States under the C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism). One of the main issues is the protection/disclosure of Swiss privacy data. Any such data sharing is precluded by Swiss law. However, the recent ratification of the Operative Working Agreement (OWA) does provide sharing of information at a law enforcement level as it relates to terrorism. But, ICE Attache/Bern has not yet been in a position or had the opportunity to share or receive any information pursuant to this agreement. The Swiss Federal Office of Data Protection is admittedly short-staffed but adequately safeguards the protection of privacy data pursuant to strict Swiss laws. The Swiss law does not specifically define terrorism per se, but select provisions of the Swiss penal code criminalize numerous offenses indicative of and associated with terrorism. ICE Attache/Bern, Switzerland 1) Please provide an inventory of what interagency efforts you have undertaken with State and Justice to increase our capacities at the Embassies and Consulates in detecting and eliminating document forgery. Liaison with the FBI Legat, Regional Security Officer, and Consul General have established an informal, but effective system of reporting document fraud to the ICE Attache/Bern. Issues relating to document and visa fraud are brought to the attention of consular officers and contemporaneously reported to ICE Attache/Bern. One such case involved an American citizen, who was suspected of passport fraud. The case was subsequently closed due to insufficient evidence, but was later re-opened by the U.S. State Department, Diplomatic Security Service based upon information developed by the Tulsa, Oklahoma Police department and ICE Attache/Bern. As a result of liaison efforts, cases pertaining to document and visa fraud are routinely reported to ICE Attache/Bern as a matter of standard procedure. Consular staff refer all document and visa fraud matters to their supervisor AND to ICE Attache/Bern. The majority of the reporting to date has dealt more with visa fraud than general document fraud. Within the past year, the following cases with multiple violators have been initiated based primarily on liaison efforts with the Consul General and regional Security Officer: CASE NUMBER VIOLATORS RESULT SZ16MT07SZ0002 2 Case ongoing. SZ16MT07SZ0003 1 Case ongoing SZ17FT07SZ0001 3 Case ongoing. Two people secondaried. SZ19HT07SZ0001 1 Case ongoing. SZ13FT07SZ0006 1 One individual excluded from the U.S. 2) Please provide an assessment of the level of FDUA trend analysis information sharing you would find appropriate for foreign government collaboration. Presuming there is some degree of sharing already taking place; provide an inventory of what foreign government information sharing you have done to date on fraudulent document trend analysis and with whom. Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit trend analysis and related training would be welcome by Swiss authorities. Trends should not be region or country specific but worldwide as Swiss Embassies and Consulates overseas frequently encounter visa, refugee, and document fraud and often consult with the Consul General on such matters. These cases are then referred to ICE Attache/Bern. All types of document fraud should be shared with Swiss authorities as they encounter many immigrants from Europe, Africa, China, and the Dominican Republic etc. Within the past year, the following cases have been worked with Swiss authorities: CASE NUMBER VIOLATORS RESULT SZ17FT07SZ0001 3 Case ongoing. Two people secondaried. Swiss Consulate/Tehran. SZ16CE07SZ0001 1 U.S. immigration violation. Swiss Federal Police Zurich Kantonspolizei Bezirksgericht Bulach Swiss Federal Office of Justice SZ09YL08SZ0001 1 Identity and passport fraud. Subject pending Swiss Office for Migration deportation from Switzerland. SZ09YL07SZ0003 1 Identity fraud-negative results. Swiss Office for Migration CBP SW Document Lab, Houston SZ02PK05MV0004 1 Bank account frozen pending MLAT. Swiss Federal Police CARTER