APRIL 18 MEETINGS PROVIDE VALUABLE CLARIFICATION

S E C R E T BERLIN 000813 SIPDIS SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CHANGE CLASSIFICATION) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2017 TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS NATO PREL GM RS SUBJECT: APRIL 18 MEETINGS PROVIDE VALUABLE CLARIFICATION ON MD ISSUES Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JOHN BAUMAN. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: A delegation from the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P) visited Berlin April 18 to respond to a long list of detailed questions from German technical experts and analysts regarding U.S. MD plans in Europe. The delegation also met with a handful of parliamentary staffers representing both parties in the governing coalition to clear up any lingering misconceptions about the MD system and U.S. intentions. Coming on the heels of recent consultations with MDA Director Lt. Gen. Obering and USD/P Edelman, this visit was extremely helpful in giving German working-level officials and experts a thorough understanding of how the European-based MD system will work and why it is key to maintaining the long-standing transatlantic defense link. In particular, the delegation provided very useful clarifications on politically charged issues like debris, noting that missiles aimed at the U.S. would be destroyed over the Atlantic Ocean and that the resulting debris would not fall on Europe. Debris would only be an issue for missiles fired at Europe itself. The Germans greatly appreciated having these detailed consultations before the April 19 reinforced North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings. While we continue to make headway in bringing elites around to our point of view on MD, we still have our work cut out for us with the German public at large: in a poll published earlier this week, only 17 percent of those surveyed thought it "made sense" to put Germany and a portion of Europe under the protection of an American MD umbrella. More than 70 percent thought it did not. End Summary. MEETINGS -------------- ¶2. (C) MDA Deputy for Engineering Keith Englander conducted a 2-1/2 hour briefing and Q&A session on U.S. MD plans in Europe for the benefit of some 20 experts from the German MOD, Intelligence Service (BND),MFA and Chancellery in Berlin on April 18. Accompanying Englander were MDA Deputy for International Affairs Nancy Morgan and Roger Davison, Principal Director of Resources and Plans in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The delegation also met separately for more than an hour with a handful of parliamentary staffers from the two governing parties (Christian Democrat Union and Social Democratic Party) who work for Bundestag members on the defense or foreign affairs committees. MD COVERAGE AREA -------------- ¶3. (C) Englander organized his briefing at the MOD around a long list of technical questions about the capabilities of the U.S. MD system that had been submitted in advanced by the Germans. Englander addressed doubts about the promised coverage of the MD system in Europe (a preliminary BND analysis reportedly concluded that only Iceland and Greenland would be actually covered) by noting that, contrary to common belief, the MD interceptor does not have to hit an incoming missile at exactly a 90-degree angle in order to destroy it. The angle of the strike can be significantly less than that and still achieve the desired result. On the margins of the meeting, a BND analyst said this was critical in understanding, for example, how a ground-based interceptor from Poland could interdict a missile fired from Iran against Madrid. Englander also reassured the group that the planned MD system would be capable of protecting everything against long-range threats within its coverage area-- this was not a point defense system in which, for example, only major cities would be covered. OPTIMAL LOCATION OF INTERCEPTORS AND RADAR -------------- ¶4. (C) The German MD representative at NATO, BG Ganser, noted that the NATO MD Feasibility Study had recommended placing interceptors in Romania and the associated radars/sensors in Bulgaria to maximize coverage of the European area. He wondered why the U.S. had not followed this recommendation. Englander responded that the European-based MD system had the dual function of providing redundant protection to the U.S. homeland (in addition to that already provided from MD assets based in Alaska and California) as well as extending MD coverage to U.S. forward deployed forces friends and allies in Europe. Based on those criteria, the optimal location for the MD system was Poland and the Czech Republic. Englander conceded that some of the southern NATO Allies (Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey) would remain uncovered by the U.S. MD system, but he explained in detail various options for covering these gaps with existing medium and short-range missile defense systems (i.e., THAAD, MEADS, Aegis, Patriot, etc.). He emphasized that the U.S. is committed to making the U.S. MD system and whatever national and/or NATO systems are s ubsequently deployed completely compatible and interoperable with one another. RELIABILITY AND TESTING -------------- ¶5. (S) In addressing questions regarding reliability, Englander noted that while each individual interceptor had about an 80-percent chance of successfully engaging an incoming missile, the U.S. system would routinely take "two shots," thereby increasing the overall rate of success to 95 percent. Englander reviewed in detail the battery of tests conducted on the system and while conceding a handful of failures, he pointed out that none was related to the design of the system. All were due to human error or to the malfunction of an ancillary component (like a retraction arm that failed to move upon launch of the interceptor). He also demonstrated that the tests had been conducted under realistic conditions, noting, for example, that in one, the interceptor had been able to differentiate among three different objects and to hit the right one. MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT DEBRIS -------------- ¶6. (C) Falling debris and a possible electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) from successful interception of missiles were raised as key concerns and as a justification for having a discussion at NATO on rules of engagement, but these were based on the misperception that missiles fired at the United States from Iran would be intercepted over European territory, thereby subjecting Europe to the resulting fall-out. Englander noted that, in fact, missiles aimed at the U.S. would be shot down over the Atlantic Ocean and that none of resulting debris would fall in Europe. Instead, relatively small amount of debris -- approximately eight inches in length -- would continue to travel forward a significant way due to inertial forces and eventually fall about 150 km short of the intended target of the missile. This means that debris would only be an issue for missiles fired at Europe itself or failed missiles intended for the U.S. None of the German interlocutors argued with the point that falling debris was hardly an issue if the alternative was getting hit by a possible nuclear missile. POLICY CASE FOR MD -------------- ¶7. (C) Richard Davison of USD/P outlined the policy case for deployment of the U.S. MD system, arguing that the main purpose was to ensure that the security of the United States and Europe remain coupled. If the U.S. and Europe continued to have different levels of MD protection, it could be exploited by an adversary bent on dividing the Alliance. Davison countered the concern about MD stimulating an arms race by pointing out that Iran and others have been developing a ballistic missile capability precisely because there have been no defenses against it. Deploying MD will raise the cost of pursuing this capability and should deter them from continuing to do. If deterrence fails, deployment of the MD system will offer a defensive option for dealing with the threat. Davison said the United States was determined not to let itself become "blackmailed" from fulfilling its security obligations by a rogue state with ballistic missiles holding a U.S. city hostage. LITTLE TALK ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANGLE -------------- ¶8. (S) Surprisingly, Russia was hardly mentioned in either session, apparently because most German interlocutors seemed to agree that the Russians were not genuinely concerned about the effect of the MD system on their strategic deterrent or that the MD sites could be used in nefarious way. Instead, Russian opposition was based on geo-political concerns about MOD CONCLUSION -------------- ¶9. (C) At the conclusion of the session at MOD, the deputy director for political military affairs and arms control, Col. Wiermann, noted that while the German government has "not yet made up its mind yet" on whether to support U.S. MD plans, "we'll probably get it anyway." He argued that Germany should accept the inevitable and welcome the "free defense" without quibbling over the probabilities of a successful intercept by the MD system. "We can't complain." Some defense is better than nothing. Wiermann said the only question is whether NATO will decide to take on MD itself, or just leave it to individual nations. If NATO decides to pursue MD, he thought the key issue will be how to ensure connectivity and data exchange with the U.S. system. Even if NATO as a body decides not to pursue MD, NATO will be the appropriate forum for discussing how to mitigate or handle some of the possible negative side effects, such as debris. Wiermann made clear that the MOD sees NATO as playing a critical role in providing political cover as the MD project moves forward. ¶10. (U) This message was cleared with the MDA. TIMKEN JR