CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS NEW MUSLIM COORDINATING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000796 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2022 TAGS: SOCI KISL GM SUBJECT: CONTROVERSY SURROUNDS NEW MUSLIM COORDINATING COUNCIL REF: DUSSELDORF 10 Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) Summary. Reftel reported the planned establishment of a Muslim Coordination Council (KRM) by Germany's four largest Muslim religious organizations. The Council would serve as an umbrella organization representing German Muslims belonging to or otherwise associated with the four organizations. It would liaise with the German federal, state and possibly local governments on religious issues. The organizations announced the formation of the new Council on April 10, unexpectedly quickly. Since then, positive and negative commentary has issued from the political left and right, from the media, from Christian authorities, and from segments of the Muslim community. In fact, the new Council has yet to complete many formalities needed for its own establishment and faces several years at least of additional legal steps before it can claim equal legal status to officially established Christian or Jewish groups. Whether the new group can hold together under the strains accompanying its birth will be the first test of its viability. End Summary. Not Ready for Prime Time -------------- ¶2. (U) As reftel reported, even though the four organizations reached agreement on the basic rules of the new KRM, they have yet to develop the organization's full charter. This is necessary before the KRM can be registered as an association in German law. After that, the KRM would have to apply for status as a "corporation in public law," which would grant it certain rights, such as offering religious education (now offered as a privilege, not a right) or establishing military and hospital chaplaincies. The conditions for granting such status would take the new organization several years to fulfill, and some KRM-affiliated persons have created a backlash by arguing that "Corporation" status should be granted very quickly. ¶3. (C) Mounir Azzaoui, the former spokesman for the Central Council of Muslims (one of the four constituent organizations) told us that he thought the April 10 announcement was a mistake The organization itself does not know enough about its future plans and structure to respond to the many questions it now faces. He attributed the premature announcement partly to pressure from within the organization and from outside it (the German government has long hinted that it would like to see the establishment of a single Muslim religious partner). In addition, he criticized the lack of professionalism and personnel in the KRM and its parts. At a forum on Muslim organizations in Europe, the new spokesman of the KRM, Ayyub Axel Koehler, did not respond to questions about plans for the charter, but did say that the KRM was established "with the intention of establishing an independent religious community which would then be able to enter into agreements with Germany's states." On the margins of a recption April 19, Koehler told us he had not expected the level of interest and comment that followed the April 10 announcement. (Note: Relations with religious communities are a state responsibility in Germany.) The announcement was also not coordinated with the German federal or state governments, who have reacted positively, but cautiously. Questioning the KRM's Legitimacy -------------- ¶4. (U) The focus of comment, largely critical, from the majority ethnic German community has been the KRM's lack of representativeness and its religious character. Critics question the KRM's legitimacy because the four organizations together represent only an estimated 60-80 percent of mosque communities, and only 15-30 percent of persons with a Muslim heritage are registered members of those communities. KRM responds with three points. First, it is wrong to consider all persons with a Muslim background as Muslims for religious purposes (indeed, some studies have shown that as many as 50 percent of persons from Muslim countries are non-practicing or consider themselves as secular or cultural Muslims. Such persons have no reason for joining a religious organization and could not be represented by it. Second, Muslim religious practice does not involve any formal process of affiliation with a mosque/religious community and it will take some time for Muslims to absorb this religious/legal aspect of German practice. Third, as the new Ditib Chairman told CG Dusseldorf on April 18, since neither Christian or Jewish umbrella religious organizations can be said to represent all who call themselves Christian or Jewish or the breadth of religious views within them, Germans cannot expect the Muslim organization to meet a higher standard. However compelling BERLIN 00000796 002 OF 003 these arguments may be, we also expect figures from the majority community to continue trying to make the KRM more "representative" out of concern that the organization is too conservative or out of a desire that it take on a greater role in the social integration of all persons of Muslim heritage. ¶5. (U) The criticism of the KRM and its constituent parts as "not religious" is more difficult to understand. Some may derive from a misunderstanding of Islam and an expectation that, like the Christian churches, it should have a (hierarchical) structure of religious leadership. Others appear to believe that the KRM is a sort of lobby or pressure group for Muslims, but that it does not (or in the future will not) structure Muslim religious life. Still others have said that because the KRM is composed of organizations, rather than natural persons, it would not fit the German legal definition of a religious organization. These arguments, however, seem to lack a solid legal foundation. In several cases, German courts have ruled that the organizations or their affiliates involved in the KRM are religious organizations. Real Issues -------------- ¶6. (C) #1 Turkey: Ethnic Turks make up about three quarters of Germany's Muslim population. Ditib, by far the largest Muslim religious organization, is an affiliate of the Turkish Ministry for Religious Affairs. Because of its size, it will enjoy veto power over Council decisions, which Arslan confirmed to CG Dusseldorf at their meeting. Two of the other three organizations, the Islamic Council and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers, are also primarily Turkish. Ditib presents a potential legal problem, according to the Azzaoui, who said that Interior Ministry sources have told him that as a foreign-affiliated organization, Ditib's right to participate in a German religious organization is questionable. The greater problem, described to us by Berlin's Commissioner for Integration, Guenter Piening, is the potential that the KRM could, because of Ditib's influence and because two of the other three member organizations are largely Turkish, could end up pursuing a Turkish nationalist agenda, rather than the integrative development of a German Islamic identity sought by the German government and very many Muslims. We believe this is a serious concern: While Ditib has relaxed somewhat its anti-integration stance, it continues to be tightly tied to Ankara. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's April 16 comments in Hanover, regarding education for ethnic Turks in Germany, "first teach Turkish and then see about German," are telling. ¶7. (C) #2 Professionalism and Openness: We see these as linked. It is not surprising that Muslim religious organizations would be religiously and socially conservative. What is surprising is the extent to which their leaderships and staff are culturally isolated and consequently ineffective in dialogue with the larger German society. At its most extreme, this can lead to advocacy of parallel societies for Muslims and other Germans. In most KRM organizations, support for separate social lives for boys and girls is still favored. Except for the Central Council of Muslims, all the other organizations are led by first generation immigrants and operate their organizations in a traditional and non-transparent way. Ditib is actually headed by an Ankara-designated official of the Religious Affairs Ministry, elected (i.e., confirmed) in a managed vote by Ditib's constituent communities. He carries the title of "Counselor of Embassy for Religious Affairs." Significantly, Ditib asked if we could give the Turkish Embassy a seat in Secretary Rice's February roundtable with German Muslim SIPDIS leaders. We declined, and the Ditib representative confined himself to reading verbatim a lengthy statement, presumably cleared by Ankara. ¶8. (C) #9 Rising Expectations: The establishment of the KRM has boosted expectations among the Muslim community, as seen by calls for early "corporation" status for the group. Managing these expectations will be a major task and if not handled carefully, could undermine the Council's own legitimacy and viability as well as push some younger Muslims to reject the legal, constitutionalist approach of the conservative but moderate and decidedly non-violent mainstream. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The establishment of the KRM is an important and positive step forward, but, because of the way it was launched, much German skepticism/opposition, and internal problems, its success is not assured. The KRM will need BERLIN 00000796 003 OF 003 considerable support from the German government (primarily the Interior Ministry) and from established Muslim organizations in Europe and (we hope) the United States to overcome these. We are particularly concerned about Ditib's and the Turkish government's role: we have the impression that Ankara's soul would prefer to maintain its authority over the Turkish community, but its mind recognizes that opposing political assimilation is a long-term burden for Turkish-European relations. TIMKEN JR