USD/P EDELMAN'S MARCH 28 CONSULTATIONS IN BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BERLIN 000700 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL NATO MOPS GM PL EZ RS AF SUBJECT: USD/P EDELMAN'S MARCH 28 CONSULTATIONS IN BERLIN ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND AFGHANISTAN REF: BERLIN 604 Classified By: DCM JOHN KOENIG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Edelman, accompanied by Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Deputy Director Maj. Gen. Anzalone, visited Berlin March 28 to hold consultations on missile defense and Afghanistan with senior officials in the defense and foreign ministries and at the chancellery. USD/P Edelman also met with senior parliamentary leaders of both government parties (CDU and SPD) and held a press roundtable with journalists to address concerns about what an MD system would entail, following up on MDA Director Lt. Gen. Obering's visit the week before. USD/P Edelman emphasized the planned MD system is completely defensive in nature, poses no threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent, and would be completely compatible with NATO MD plans. While welcoming continued consultations in NATO concerning the U.S. MD deployment, USD/P Edelman made clear that the U.S. did not plan to submit its program to NATO for endorsement or approval. He also stressed that the U.S. MD deployment ought not be delayed or slowed down to allow the NATO MD program to catch up, given the urgency of meeting the emerging threat from Iran and 20 other countries developing a ballistic missile capability. Every German interlocutor, including those from the SPD, acknowledged that the Russian reaction so far had been irrational and exaggerated, but urged the U.S. to continue to engage Moscow on this issue. USD/P Edelman agreed, but stressed that the Russians should not be given a "droit de regard" over the deployment of the MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic. ¶2. (C) On Afghanistan, the Germans stressed the importance of giving more emphasis and visibility to the reconstruction effort. This was important not only to ensure success of the mission, but also to maintain public support for German participation in ISAF. USD/P Edelman said the U.S. has always supported a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan and strongly discouraged talk about a "Taliban spring offensive," which gave undeserved legitimacy to what was nothing more than a stepped up terrorist campaign against innocent Afghan civilians. End Summary. U.S. Message on Missile Defense -------------- ¶3. (C) In his meetings with government officials and parliamentarians, USD/P Edelman noted that President Bush had decided early in his tenure to broaden MD beyond the initial concept of a national system (NMD) so that it could cover America's friends and allies as well the U.S homeland. This was in line with a long-standing position that the defense of the United States should not be de-coupled from that of Europe. President Bush had also decided early on that individual components of the MD system should be deployed as soon as possible rather than waiting, perhaps for years, until the whole system was ready. As a result, by the time North Korea had prepared a Taepodong missile for launch last year, the U.S. already had a rudimentary MD system in place to protect Hawaii and Alaska against a possible strike. This provided a defensive option short of military pre-emption to deal with the threat. The planned U.S. deployment of ten interceptors to Poland and the associated radar to the Czech Republic would enable the U.S. to extend this MD coverage to forward-deployed U.S. forces as well as American friends and allies in Europe. In explaining U.S. plans and responding to questions throughout his visit, USD/P Edelman made the following points: -- The planned MD system in Poland and the Czech Republic is intended to provide forward-deployed U.S. forces in Europe, as well as America's friends and allies, with protection against missiles emanating from the Middle East, particularly Iran. This new system is not necessary for the defense of the U.S. homeland. That is already provided by existing MD facilities in Alaska and California. -- Even if one assumes that the Iranians will never intentionally fire a missile at Europe, the Iran missile threat is not just a U.S. problem. Iranian missiles fired at the U.S. would pass over Europe and in the event of malfunction or failure, could hit Europe. BERLIN 00000700 002 OF 005 -- The system is completely defensive in nature. Contrary to the nuclear-tipped missiles that the Russians use for their ABM system around Moscow, the interceptor missiles of the U.S. MD system carry no warheads at all, but rely on the kinetic energy released by the high-speed intercept to pulverize incoming missiles. The Russians have been invited to Ft. Greely, Alaska to examine the interceptor site there. The U.S. would also be amenable to opening up its MD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic to Russian inspection, subject to the agreement of the host governments. -- The ten planned U.S. interceptors pose absolutely no threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent, which consists of hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads. In any case, the proposed interceptor site in Poland is too close to launch sites in Russia to engage ICBMs headed for the U.S. It is disingenuous of the Russians to claim that this would be strategically destabilizing. -- While the U.S. is willing to engage Russia to address its concerns about deploying the MD system to Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia should not be allowed to exercise a "droit de regard" over its former Warsaw Pact allies on hosting MD interceptors or radars. While the U.S. decision about where to deploy MD facilities is based on technical grounds, the Russian objections are purely political. -- While the U.S. system will defend against strategic missile threats, it does not address short and medium-range missile threats, and does not cover all of southern Europe. Therefore, it is still necessary for NATO to go forward with its own MD programs to complement the U.S. coverage. The two should be completely compatible and interoperable. -- While the U.S. welcomes continued consultations in NATO concerning the U.S. MD deployment, the U.S. does not plan to submit its program to NATO for endorsement or approval. -- To the degree that the NATO MD program and U.S. MD system need to be in sync, that should be accomplished by accelerating the NATO effort. The U.S. MD deployment ought not be delayed or slowed down, given that the Iranian missile threat to Europe and U.S. forces based there could materialize by 2015 or earlier. -- Far from undermining ongoing negotiations with Iran, going forward with the U.S. MD deployment will make the Iranians (and the 20 other countries developing long-range ballistic missiles) think twice about whether it is worth pursuing this capability. -- Because the U.S. MD system intercepts missiles in mid-flight in outer space, very little debris would reach the ground. Modeling indicates that most debris would burn up during re-entry into the atmosphere. DefMin Jung stresses consultations in NATO, with Russia -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Defense Minister Jung (Christian Democratic Union) emphasized that the CDU wanted to send a clear message that Germany stands with the U.S. on MD, but noted that it has a "problem" with its coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD),some of whom were engaging in the same kind of rhetoric used in the run-up to the Iraq war. This situation was being exacerbated by Russian criticism of U.S. MD plans, as exemplified in the op-ed by FM Lavrov, which had appeared just that morning in the German newspaper Handelsblatt. Jung said he is keen to avoid a split in Europe over MD. He thought the best way to avoid this possibility was to discuss the issue within NATO and to continue to reach out to the Russians to assure them that the system was not oriented against them. MFA State Secretary Eickenboom did not think the Russians were genuinely concerned about the ability of the U.S. MD system to degrade their strategic deterrent or to pose an offensive threat, but were simply reacting to the location of the system in what they considered to be their backyard. ¶5. (C) USD/P Edelman agreed that the Russian objections were based purely on political considerations, noting that in previous consultations, the Russians had preferred locating the interceptors in the UK rather than Poland, even though BERLIN 00000700 003 OF 005 that would be make Russian ICBMs fired at the U.S. more vulnerable to being intercepted. USD/P Edelman emphasized that it would set a bad precedent to recognize that the Russians have a veto over the sovereign decisions of the Polish and Czech governments on MD. CDU MPs supportive, but cite public opinion challenge -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Three leading CDU parliamentarians on foreign and defense policy -- Bernd Siebert, Karl Lamers and Eckart von Klaeden -- agreed with the U.S. threat perception of Iran and expressed support of the U.S. MD effort, while acknowledging that it would be an enormous challenge to bring the German public around to this point of view. Siebert noted a recent poll which shows that Germans consider the U.S. (48%) to be a greater threat to peace than Iran (31%). Van Klaeden said the German public did not realize that Germany could very well become a target of Iran by, for example, providing assistance to Israel. He thought it was also not well understood that the planned U.S. deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic was solely for the protection of Europe and forward-deployed U.S. forces, and not for the U.S. homeland itself. Lamers, expressing strong support for the MD deployment, said the CDU would make the point in its pronouncements that MD offered the promise of achieving deterrence through defensive weapons rather than, as during the Cold War, offensive ones. Continued skepticism from the Social Democrats -------------- - ¶7. (C) Deputy SPD Caucasus Chair Walter Kolbow questioned whether the U.S. MD system would actually work, claiming that technicians from EADS -- European Aeronautical Defense and Space -- had their doubts. Even if it did work as advertised, he said his party was "not convinced" that MD is "the right answer to a threat that does not yet exist." Kolbow noted the Two-Plus-Four Treaty had contained assurances to the Russians that no "strategic systems" would be stationed on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, insinuating that the U.S. MD system would run counter to that understanding. Kolbow also raised the issue of cost, but conceded that it was "your money." USD/P Edelman stressed that the planned MD system is based on proven technology and that the threat is not limited only to Iran, but includes 20 other countries that are developing ballistic missile capabilities. He also underscored the defensive nature of the U.S. system and the fact that it supports counter-proliferation efforts by raising the cost of pursuing ballistic missile technology. SPD critic sees U.S. MD as counter to NPT goals -------------- -- ¶8. (C) MFA State Minister Gernot Erler (SPD),who had given a newspaper interview just the day prior critical of U.S. MD plans, acknowledged that the Russian reaction had been "a bit irrational," driven by what he thought was an effort to regain respect after the humiliation of the Cold War. He agreed that Moscow could not feel genuinely threatened by MD. Nonetheless, Erler thought it was important to see how the Russians could be brought on board to accept MD. Erler also noted that while the MD issue is still be studied at NATO, the U.S. is going forward with its European-based system. He asked if the two systems could be combined, insinuating that the U.S. MD project should be slowed down to allow the NATO effort to catch up. Finally, Erler linked the planned MD system with the recent modernization of nuclear weapons by France, UK and U.S. to argue that the nuclear powers were not abiding by their disarmament obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). He claimed that this was frustrating the non-nuclear powers, including Iran, causing them to ask: why should I follow the NPT if the nuclear powers do not? ¶9. (C) USD/P Edelman agreed with Erler's evaluation of what is driving Russian behavior and the need to continue to consult the Russians on MD, but emphasized that at the end of the day, the Russians could not be allowed a "droit de regard" over the location of the MD facilities. He welcomed indications that the NATO Secretary General wants to accelerate NATO MD efforts, but underscored that the U.S. MD project ought not be delayed or slowed down to allow NATO to BERLIN 00000700 004 OF 005 catch up, given the emerging threat. On the NPT, USD/P Edelman explained the U.S. reliable replacement warhead (RRW) program did not involve the creation of new nuclear weapons, as Erler implied, but rather just the replacement of old, decaying warheads to insure that the U.S. stockpile remained safe and secure. He noted that MD actually served the goal of counter-proliferation by raising the cost of pursuing ballistic missile technology. Chancellery welcomes President's outreach to Russia -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) USD/P Edelman's last meeting of the day was with National Security Advisor Heusgen, who expressed support for U.S. MD plans and offered suggestions for moving forward. He opined the Russians were not concerned about the capabilities of the U.S. MD system per se, but rather viewed it through their outdated Cold War lenses. They saw MD as part of a greater plan (along with the deployment of U.S. troops to Romania and Bulgaria, NATO's outreach to Ukraine and Georgia, and NATO air patrols in the Baltic states) to encircle and isolate them. Heusgen welcomed President Bush's commitment in a DVC the day before with Chancellor Merkel to discuss the matter with Putin to help assuage Russian concerns. He reported that President Bush in the DVC had also expressed a readiness to share U.S. MD technology with the Russians, going "one step further" than MDA Director Lt. Gen. Obering had gone during his visit to Berlin the week before. Heusgen praised this openness and transparency as exactly the right approach to take. Heusgen also emphasized that at the upcoming series of NATO ministerials, it was important to discuss how the U.S. MD system could be linked together with NATO MD plans. Finally, he said that German experts still had some technical questions about how the MD system would work and would benefit from further consultations with MDA. ¶11. (C) USD/P Edelman agreed that reaching out to the Russians was important, but it was an open question whether the Russians really wanted to be engaged. He repeated his warning from earlier meetings that the Russians not be given a "droit de regard" over their former Warsaw Pact allies. He also said it was also important that the Russians and the German SPD conduct the MD debate "at a serious level," based on the real facts and not half-truths. USD/P Edelman welcomed further expert-level consultations and suggested that German experts visit MDA in the U.S. Discussion of Afghanistan -------------- ¶12. (C) USD/P Edelman also briefly discussed Afghanistan with Defense Minister Jung, MFA State Minister Erler, SPD Deputy Caucus Chairman Kolbow and SPD parliamentarian Niels Annen. While a challenge is still pending before the Constitutional Court to the planned deployment of the Tornadoes, Jung said he was still planning to send the aircraft to Afghanistan April 2 and to transfer them to ISAF command April 9. Jung noted that he had recently visited Afghanistan and had come away convinced about the importance of closely linking reconstruction efforts with security in order to win the hearts and minds of the population. Military efforts alone would not be enough. On that score, he expressed appreciation for the recent U.S. commitment to significantly increase the amount of reconstruction and development aid to Afghanistan. ¶13. (C) Erler hit on the same theme, noting that in order to maintain public support for ISAF, "greater visibility" had to be given to the reconstruction work. While a majority of SPD parliamentarians had recently voted in favor of the deployment of the Tornado reconnaissance aircraft to Afghanistan, it had not been easy. Erler expressed interest in expanding cooperation on police training in Afghanistan, but also complained about U.S. Police Support Teams (PSTs) being deployed without sufficient consultation. He hoped to have police cooperation addressed in the U.S.-EU Summit declaration. Annen confirmed that Germans were concerned that Afghanistan was beginning to look more and more like Iraq, and they were increasingly pessimistic about the ability of the situation there to be solved through military means. Kolbow noted the difficulty in sustaining almost 10,000 German troops in out-of-area missions, including ISAF, in the midst of a military transformation effort that will not be complete until 2010. BERLIN 00000700 005 OF 005 ¶14. (C) USD/P Edelman emphasized that the U.S. did not view either Iraq or Afghanistan as purely military missions and was not approaching them in that way. He noted he had just been in Afghanistan two weeks ago for a U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership meeting and found that the situation there was better than most people thought. He agreed that defeating the insurgency was not just about hunting down high-value targets, but taking a comprehensive approach, including training the Afghan National Army and police and providing reconstruction and development assistance. The U.S. administration had demonstrated its commitment to this approach in its $11.7 billion supplemental request to Congress. ¶15. (C) USD/P Edelman also noted that training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) was going strong and ANA units were acquitting themselves well in combat, but there were not enough of them. The police training effort was "clearly behind," notwithstanding the EU's welcome commitment to contribute 160 additional police mentors, and "needs to catch up." Within NATO, it was important to "cross-level" the amount of reconstruction assistance so that every Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) would have a minimum baseline of financial resources to support projects in its area of responsibility. USD/P Edelman strongly discouraged talk about a "Taliban spring offensive,"which gave undeserved legitimacy to what was noting more than a stepped up terrorist campaign aganst innocent Afghan civilians. ¶16. (U) USD/P Edlman has cleared this cable. TIMKEN JR