COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING: BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000059 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/AGS, EUR/ERA, CA AND L DOJ FOR OIA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2016 TAGS: PTER KHLS CVPR PGOV GM SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM INFORMATION SHARING: BILATERAL WORKING GROUP MEETS REF: A. BERLIN 3456 ¶B. BERLIN 3435 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary. The three main results of the first meeting of the U.S.-German Working Group on Counterterrorism Information-Sharing were: (1) the U.S. will provide Germany with a draft bilateral agreement on enhanced biometric data-sharing in January; (2) the U.S. invited a German delegation to visit the Terrorist Screening Center, National Targeting Center, and National Counterterrorism Center in January or February; and (3) the U.S. agreed in principle to the German proposal for more information exchange between the FBI and their German counterparts on terrorist groups in Iraq, in part in order to lay the foundation for more biographic data exchange. The two sides agreed the Working Group would meet again January 23-24 on the margins of the U.S.-EU High Level Group on Justice and Home Affairs. A subsequent March or April meeting would be in DC and a text could be ready for ministers to sign by summer. The possible bilateral agreement would use as a model Germany's "Pruem" agreements with some of its EU neighbors. The Pruem agreements enable, among other things, instant hit/no hit access to another state's fingerprint and DNA data. End Summary. U.S.-GERMAN AGREEMENT MODELED ON PRUEM -------------- ¶2. (C) Head of the German Delegation for the first meeting of the U.S./German Working Group on Counterterrorism Information Sharing, which took place December 12 in Berlin, was Interior Ministry (MOI) Office Director for Police Information Systems, the BKA Law, and Data Privacy in Security Affairs Andreas Schultz. He explained Germany's principal goal was to facilitate information sharing with the U.S. under existing German law. German data privacy rules, as well as specific laws such as that governing the German Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (the "BKA"),prevented broad or batch sharing of data without a legal foundation. Schultz recalled that the Pruem convention core model is a hit/no hit system followed by data exchange on specific hits, and noted that pilot exchanges begun between Germany and Austria revealed 2300 DNA hits. Now officials on both sides have to initiate legal assistance requests to exchange detailed information. Initial bilateral fingerprint exchanges would begin in spring 2007, Schultz said. Given the success of the Pruem model and the Bundestag's agreement to it, Germany could enter into a similar agreement with the U.S., Schultz said. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Paul Rosenzweig said there was great U.S. interest in reciprocal DNA and fingerprint data sharing; Department of Justice Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Swartz agreed. Schultz said Interior Minister Schaeuble would be pleased to hear this news. ¶3. (C) Schultz clarified that Pruem envisions DNA data sharing for crime investigation and fingerprint data sharing for crime investigation and prevention. Pruem did not envision such data sharing for border entry controls, he said. Rosenzweig referred to DHS Assistant Secretary Baker's December 7 letter to MOI Director General Krause and clarified the U.S. sought te use of fingerprint data for border controls inspecial cases only, not routinely. Rosenzweig pointed out Pruem envisioned batch automated sharing of DNA data, but not fingerprints, and asked why. Schultz explained the German DNA database (of 500,000) was smaller and better automated than the fingerprint database (of 3 million). ¶4. (C) Both Swartz and Rosenzweig raised the prospect of expedited data sharing after a DNA or fingerprint hit; Schultz responded Pruem did not address post-hit data sharing in great detail. The Ministry of Justice representative on the German delegation referred to the ongoing ratification process of the bilateral and U.S.-EU agreements on mutual legal assistance and extradition as additional/alternative data sharing vehicles. HSPD-6 -------------- ¶5. (C) Schultz referred to the November 8 Homeland Security BERLIN 00000059 002 OF 003 Presidential Directive 6 delegation (ref B) and said Germany did not have a counterpart due to the constitutional separation of law enforcement and security services. The new Counterterrorism Database draft law, however, will address this issue and create a national database upon approval by the Bundestag. The new law specifically banned sharing information from the database with foreign governments, Schultz said, but could permit continued sharing of information with the individual German agencies who own the underlying data. Rosenzweig asked for access to the German lists of those banned from entry ("Einreiseverbotliste") and those who pose a threat ("Gefaehrderliste"). Swartz mentioned Pruem's article 16 ("Supply of information in order to prevent terrorist offenses") as a way for both sides to voluntarily provide information about small groups of individuals. Schultz said data sharing pursuant to Article 16 could include DNA and fingerprints, but Article 16 was for individuals, not groups or batches. Swartz highlighted the benefit to Germany if it provided the U.S. with information about a small group of individuals; then U.S. could inform Germany if U.S. agencies learned of their movements or actions. ¶6. (C) After Schultz mentioned German data privacy concerns, Department of State Office of Consular Affairs Chief of the Office of Policy and Public Outreach Alcy Frelick said the U.S. wanted to learn more about German data privacy needs, and wanted Germany to be comfortable with U.S. procedures. She invited a German delegation to Washington to visit the Terrorist Screening Center, National Targeting Center, and National Counterterrorism Center in January or February 2007 to see for themselves U.S. attention to data privacy concerns. Schultz said he agreed Germany did not know enough about the subject and accepted the offer. He called the precedent of the sharing of the U.S. Terrorist Screening Database during the 2006 Soccer World Cup a "special exception" based on Germany's overarching need to do all it could to provide security for the games. GERMANY REQUESTS INFORMATION ABOUT IRAQ JIHADISTS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Schultz lauded existing bilateral cooperation between the Legat/FBI and the BKA, but said it could be further improved by intensifying discussion about Iraq. Steffen Russ, BKA Office Director for Police and State Security, circulated a proposal which sought to deepen information sharing about the structures, financing, recruiting, travel, and the goals of different terrorist and insurgent groups. After some discussion about the need for such a new project, Schultz clarified that under German law it was difficult to share biographic and other personal information without a specific basis. Establishing a BKA-Legat experts' group on Iraqi terrorist groups would establish the sort of legal foundation Germany needs. Swartz said if the exchange were mutually beneficial, the U.S. had no objection. DRAFT TEXT / DATA PRIVACY -------------- ¶8. (C) Schultz offered to table a draft text focusing on DNA, fingerprints, Article 16, and data privacy. Swartz said the U.S. could also draft a text and try to table it in time for the January US-EU JHA meeting; Schultz agreed. Department of Justice Office of the Deputy Attorney General Chief Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer Jane Horvath pointed out the U.S. would be unable to comply with Pruem's Article 34 ("Level of data protection"). Schultz replied that Germany could not agree to a level of data protection lower than the EU data privacy rules and referred to Article 35 ("Purpose") and the principle that the owner of the data could refuse its transmission to third countries. Embassy Berlin representative pointed out that upon further review in Washington, U.S. agencies might determine to seek inclusion of other Pruem provisions other than those already mentioned; Rosenzweig and Swartz agreed. Schultz responded Germany understood U.S. priorities to be those articulated in A/S Baker's letter. NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (C) Summing up the meeting, Rosenzweig described the U.S. agreement to table a draft in January, the U.S. invitation for a German delegation to the TSC, the U.S. agreement in BERLIN 00000059 003 OF 003 principle to discuss Iraqi terrorism, the U.S. pledge to continue discussions in Washington in March/April, and the U.S. desire to have a text ready for Ministers to sign during early summer EU or G-8 meetings. Schultz agreed the proposal was ambitious but agreed. ¶10. (U) This cable was cleared by the delegation subsequent to their return to Washington. TIMKEN JR