GERMANY AND MISSILE DEFENSE: STRATEGY FOR DEFUSING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000576 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2022 TAGS: PREL MARR GM SUBJECT: GERMANY AND MISSILE DEFENSE: STRATEGY FOR DEFUSING DEBATE Classified By: DCM John Koenig. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) Ref: Berlin 492 ¶1. (C) Summary. Discussion of missile defense (MD) in Germany may become trapped by partisan domestic political interests. Social Democrats (SPD),suffering in the polls and without any major issues to distinguish themselves from the conservatives (CDU/CSU),seem to see an opportunity to reassert their position as the party of "peace" by opposing U.S. plans for MD deployments in eastern Europe. SPD leaders have made statements ranging from outright rejection to deep skepticism. Mindful of public skepticism about U.S. defense policy, Chancellor Merkel and the CDU/CSU have been slow to defend U.S. plans. Neither side has shown much interest in holding a fact-based debate about U.S plans and how they fit into broader, ongoing Alliance and European MD activities. If this trend continues, it could affect bilateral relations in other areas (Afghanistan, Iraq) and the study of MD options in NATO. Mission will remain engaged with both allies and opponents on the German political scene to help shift the German debate from general and emotive terms to the specifics of U.S. plans and their impact. Key interlocutors will include SPD party officials, Bundestag members, and academics linked to the party; CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesmen; and Chancellery officials. Secondary interlocutors include SPD officials and activists at the state level. End Summary. Background -------------- ¶2. (C) The MD debate in Germany is largely about domestic political concerns, although many politicians have tried to portray it as a "European" issue. The SPD, whose rank and file is increasingly unhappy with the domestic and foreign policy of the Grand Coalition, is confronting a substantial rebellion by its left wing: a third of the SPD Bundestag caucus voted against both the deployment of German Tornadoes to Afghanistan and the government's health care reform package. The CDU/CSU has stolen the SPD's thunder on traditional issues such as child care and dealing with immigrants. The SPD (consistently under 30 percent in polls) has been unable to find an issue with which to fight major upcoming state elections in early 2008. An Emotive Issue to Exploit -------------- ¶3. (C) Seen from the SPD's perspective, opposition to even limited MD deployments, which the party has long opposed, offers it an opportunity to reassert itself as the party of peace and disarmament -- in opposition to the U.S. This message resonates with German voters and is credited with winning the 2002 election for embattled Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. (It is worth noting that the SPD stance on MD is driven by Party Chairman Kurt Beck, not by Foreign Minister Steinmeier. Steinmeier, while respected by the SPD rank-and-file, is neither a member of the Bundestag caucus nor a party activist: he is more technocrat than politician. While Beck and SPD headquarters have supported Steinmeier in general in public, Beck has made clear that he does not consider himself constrained by the Government's position.) ¶4. (C) The MD story broke just as the SPD Presidium approved a draft position paper on arms control, disarmament and missile defense, which, while not rejecting MD outright, linked MD to arms control steps and urged a dialogue between NATO and Russia on the issue. SPD Chairman Kurt Beck has led the charge against MD, using emotive and generalized language such as his March 18 statement opposing a "new arms race between the U.S. and Russia" in Europe and "new missiles in Europe." SPD General Secretary Hubertus Heil said, with regard to the planned U.S. deployments, "we reject them in their present form." Others, including MFA Parliamentary State Secretary Erler, have offered similar comments. Foreign Minister Steinmeier appears to be seeking a middle ground between his party and the Chancellery's more open approach. In a March 18 Op-Ed, he took a skeptical view of MD, acknowledging the legitimacy of the U.S. need to defend against missiles, but asserting that the demands of disarmament are "our highest priority." ¶5. (C) The SPD's opposition to U.S. MD plans has been challenged increasingly in recent days. But Chancellor Merkel has been preoccupied with her own EU Presidency agenda, and initially saw the MD issue as a potentially damaging distraction. She and the CDU/CSU have, with a few exceptions, focused on process rather than substance, calling for a dialogue within NATO and with Russia on the program. BERLIN 00000576 002 OF 002 The lone contrarian in the SPD Bundestag caucus has been Deputy Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Hans-Ulrich Klose, who has spoken publicly about the benefits of MD. The CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman, Eckart von Klaeden, has repetedly attacked the SPD's position, focusing on thereal threat from Iran and the need for skepticis about the Russian opposition to MD. CSU MdB Kal-Theodor zu Guttenberg has attacked the SPD diretly for making the issue a political football and thereby playing into Russian hands. Former Chief of Defense Klaus Naumann accused unnamed politicians (clearly implying Beck and the SPD) of "almost unbelievable ignorance." ¶6. (C) Media and editorialists have followed the story closely, focusing more on the SPD's attempts to build its profile and support on the back of the MD issue, rather than on the merits of MD. The media have published several stories about the technology involved, but are largely focused on the political dimension. This is a generally positive development, as it underscores the political, rather than substantive issues that are driving the SPD's position. Impact -------------- ¶7. (C) We have begun to see a backlash against the SPD leadership's populist opportunism. Nevertheless, the SPD's handling of this issue could portend more long-lasting problems for German-American relations. Part of the SPD leadership's strategy appears to be to revive the blanket criticism of U.S. policy heard in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2002, which could have implications for our ability to work with the Grand Coalition on Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. With the Bundeswehr's Afghanistan mandate up for renewal in the fall and unpopular in the SPD and public at large (in a recent poll by Der Spiegel, 57 percent of respondents favored withdrawing German soldiers "soon"),the SPD's MD policy could be the opening in a larger campaign aimed at distancing the SPD from the CDU/CSU by focusing on foreign policy disputes. Mission is also concerned that despite the good will of the Chancellor and the conservatives, the overall tone of bilateral relations as well as possibilities for international cooperation generally could suffer if the CDU/CSU are unable to reach a MD settlement with the SPD that does not impinge on U.S. security interests. Mission Plan -------------- ¶8. (C) We are adjusting our strategy with these factors in mind. Visits by senior Washington officials, such as the March 15 visit by LTG Obering and the expected March 28 visit by DoD U/S Edelman, will remain critical to post's approach to MD. We are focused on: a) a forward-leaning presentation of the facts to the SPD leadership and to persons and organizations with influence on the party leadership; b) engagement with key CDU/CSU figures to arm them with these facts and encourage them to steer the discussion in Germany toward security policy; and c) engagement with the Chancellery to press the government for a more supportive stance on MD as a component of security policy and on the specifics of U.S. deployment plans in eastern Europe. ¶9. (C) Our media strategy focuses on the facts, especially on the Iranian threat and the USG's transparency with our NATO Allies and Russia. By emphasizing the facts, rather than the domestic politics, we seek to avoid being instrumentalized by the SPD and others in the internal debate -- an outcome that might please them only too much. ¶10. (C) Our public diplomacy on MD will reflect post's suggestions in reftel and will pay special attention to the SPD, using the resources of the Embassy and Consulates General to reach out to local SPD organizations and state-level politicians to explain U.S. policy and deliver the facts on the lengthy process of MD consultations in NATO and with Russia that proceeded the eastern Europe deployment announcement. Persistence will be necessary. Given the widespread skepticism about MD and the absence of any decision-forcing event, the duration of this domestic debate will be determined mainly by partisan political calculation and the attention-span of the German public. KOENIG