SECOND ROUND OF US-GERMAN "PRUEM" DISCUSSIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000399 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER KHLS PGOV CVIS KVPR GM SUBJECT: SECOND ROUND OF US-GERMAN "PRUEM" DISCUSSIONS REF: BERLIN 59 ¶1. (SBU) Summary. German and U.S. officials resumed discussions of a data sharing agreement modeled on Germany's "Pruem" Convention for law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation in Berlin January 23. The German delegation said it had not had time to study the U.S. draft text or discuss it internally and was in a position only to give initial reactions and to ask questions. They appreciated detailed explanations for various articles, said that some issues would require intense discussion and that they hoped to get back to the U.S. in 4-5 weeks. Their comments/questions focused on areas of data protection, inclusion of terrorist screening information, lack of direct access to the U.S. DNA data base, and need for the referenced Annex on screening data and some definitions. At the next round of talks, the German side will seek U.S. clarification why it cannot accept the EU-centered data privacy provisions in Pruem. End Summary. Second Meeting of Working Group -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At the first meeting between the U.S. and German sides in December (reftel),the U.S. delegation offered to table a draft text. The U.S. side did so January 18, cautioning the German delegation at the January 23 discussions that the text should be considered a discussion draft. The German side advised that due to the limited time to prepare, their comments were preliminary and informal. ¶3. (U) German officials included officials from the Interior, Justice, and Foreign Ministries and the Chancellery. As before, the head of the German delegation was Andreas Schultz, the MOI Office Director for Police Information Technology. The U.S. delegation included DOJ, DHS, and State (including Embassy Berlin). ¶4. (SBU) The German delegation asked numerous questions about the U.S. discussion draft as the Working Group went article by article through the text. The issue of greatest concern for Schultz was data privacy. He explained that under German law, each new agreement has to include explicit data privacy provisions. Schultz added walking away from Pruem,s data privacy provisions would be very hard because all EU members who sign onto the Pruem Convention, "even Malta," are expected to comply. For the U.S. not to comply would cause "difficult debate" in the Bundestag. He proposed that at the next round of talks, the U.S. explain its objections to each of the Pruem data privacy paragraphs. ¶5. (SBU) DHS Acting A/S Rosenzweig explained the U.S. desire for an exchange of the fingerprints of those on the German List of those who pose a threat ("Gefaehrderliste") and those forbidden from entry ("Einreiseverbotliste") for screening purposes. Rosenzweig noted the value of such data, how several Pruem articles envision information exchange to combat common threats and that by carefully limiting the scope of the information exchanged we are, in effect, creating a case. Schultz said that Pruem did not include such provisions and that Germany was still determining its position on direct exchanges, but he could see the utility in such a relationship. The German delegation requested the USG provide a draft annex and a definition of "known or suspected terrorist" to inform further their considerations. ¶6. (SBU) Concerning fingerprints, Schultz noted that the U.S. draft text envisioned automated searching of fingerprint data conducted by a national contact point in order to facilitate an MLAT request. This provision is similar to the Pruem text, and so posed little difficulty outside of their data protection concerns. Concerning DNA, Schultz asked why the U.S. discussion draft did not allow for automated searches by one party of the other,s database. The U.S. delegation explained that the central U.S. DNA database is primarily made up of DNA information submitted by the states and managed by the FBI; provisions in U.S. law prevent direct access to the DNA database by anyone other than the FBI lab because a "hit" would also disclose the underlying DNA profile. Schultz observed that the Pruem Convention had prompted other countries to make investments in technology to enable foreign hit/no hit access. ¶7. (SBU) The German delegation circulated the Pruem BERLIN 00000399 002 OF 002 Implementing Agreement and explained that its provisions would address U.S. technical questions. The U.S. delegation explained that an eventual agreement text would not be a treaty and therefore not require Senate advice and consent. Schultz said the German government would have to submit the agreement to the Bundestag for formal ratification. Next Steps -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The German delegation said their formal review of the text would take another three to four weeks. Schultz pledged to propose a date for the next round of talks when he visited Washington February 6-7. Schultz said he was eager to see the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist Screening Center, and the National Targeting Center to learn more about the possibilities of increased information exchange. The two sides discussed the possibility of holding the next round of discussions via video conference, and holding the next formal round February 28 when the German delegation will be in Washington for other consultations. ¶9. (U) The U.S. Delegation cleared this cable subsequent to their departure from Berlin. TIMKEN JR