EXPORT CONTROL BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN GERMANY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000219 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOC FOR BIS A/S CPADILLA/MDIPAULA-COYLE STATE FOR PM/DDTC AND EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017 TAGS: ETTC EINV GM SUBJECT: EXPORT CONTROL BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN GERMANY AND DOC ASSISTANT SECRETARY PADILLA REF: 06 PARIS 7705 Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta , for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Christopher Padilla met a range of German export control officials and industry representatives December 1, 2006, to discuss export control issues. Assistant Secretary Padilla and his German interlocutors discussed 1) the U.S. Government's proposed China licensing policy rule, 2) implementing the UNSCR 1718 sanctions on North Korea, 3) establishing a working-level dialogue regarding thermal imaging and night vision technology, and 4) concerns over the diversion of dual-use commodities through the UAE, particularly Dubai. The Germans made mostly positive comments about the U.S. proposals and suggestions. End Summary. -------------- Meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -------------- ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla first met German MFA officials Michael Witter, Deputy Director General for Economic Affairs, Goetz Lingenthal, Office Director of the Export Control Division for Dual-Use Goods, and Jan Freigang, Desk Officer in the Export Control Division for Conventional Arms. A/S Padilla began by noting in December 2003 the 33 members of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) agreed on a Statement of Understanding (SOU) that requires member countries to take appropriate measures to ensure a government authorization is required for exports of non-listed, dual-use items for military end uses in destinations that are subject to a binding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) arms embargo or any relevant regional or national arms embargo. The USG is drafting two regulations to implement this SOU: one specifically for China, and one for all the other countries subject to arms embargoes. In both regulations, the Department of Commerce will require a license for otherwise uncontrolled goods and technologies when the exporter knows that the export has a military end use. ¶3. (C) The Commerce Department decided to implement a separate regulation toward China (published in proposed form in July 2006 and to be finalized in early 2007) to address better the unique U.S.-China bilateral economic and political �0A;relationship. It has been long-standing U.S. policy, A/S Padilla noted, to encourage legitimate civilian high-technology trade with China while restricting exports that could contribute to the country's military modernization. The proposed China rule both addresses U.S. commitments under the 2003 Wassenaar Arrangement SOU and further clarifies this long-standing U.S. policy. Importantly, the proposed rule does not impose a broad military "catch all" on exports to China. Rather, A/S Padilla pointed out, it will impose new licensing requirements on 47 specific items and technologies that could be incorporated into Chinese weapons systems. (Note: A/S Padilla shared the list with Witter. End note.) Assistant Secretary Padilla urged the German Government to work with SIPDIS the USG to ensure that the Chinese military could not obtain such systems from other Wassenaar countries, as it is the USG's view that the export of these technologies and their incorporation into weapons systems undermines the EU arms embargo. He urged Germany implement similar controls as part of its WA commitments. ¶4. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla said the China regulations would also include a new authorization for validated end users (VEU),or trusted customers. This authorization would allow the export without a license of certain controlled items to specified, pre-vetted end users. The trusted customer concept could greatly facilitate civilian commercial trade with PRC end-users who have an established record of engaging only in civil end-use activities. The Department of Commerce and other relevant agencies will evaluate prospective validated end users on a range of factors, including history of compliance with U.S. export controls and agreement to periodic visits by USG officials. ¶5. (C) Commerce hopes to include a list of initial candidates that could be eligible for VEU status when the regulation is published in early 2007. The VEU concept has the potential to remove from the licensing system several hundred routine licenses to China, worth hundreds of millions of dollars. If successful, the program could be expanded to other countries. ¶6. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla then noted that the second regulation will implement a military end-use control to other countries against which the U.S. maintains arms embargoes. These countries include Afghanistan, Belarus, Myanmar, Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Haiti, Iran, Liberia, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. The Assistant Secretary noted that this regulation will apply to all items SIPDIS included on the Commerce Control List and that the regulation would be published in interim final form later in 2006. The USG will report on this regulation at the meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement the following week. ¶7. (C) Witter noted Germany favors increased transparency concerning military denials in the WA and hopes to see progress in this regard in 2007, which is an assessment year, despite previous Russian obstructions. Witter said the German Government agrees with the USG concerning arms exports to China. He stated Germany applies stricter standards for embargoing items of military use to China than the EU regulations provide. Concerning dual-use items, Witter said the German Government scrutinizes export applications on a case-by-case basis to ensure no German-origin items that could be used militarily are sent to China. Witter supported the idea of presenting the military catch-all provision to the WA. He said that any changes to the arms embargo on China must be made in collaboration with WA partners. In the end, though, Germany will follow EU regulations on dual-use items. As for other WA issues, Witter said that Germany favors increased transparency concerning military denials, partly because Russia held other issues hostage over military denials. ¶8. (C) Turning to North Korea, A/S Padilla noted that on November 13 the USG submitted its report on implementation of UNSCR 1718, which calls for sanction on North Korea because of its test of a nuclear device. This report included the list luxury items that the USG was banning for export to North Korea. The U.S. list does not include food items or those used by ordinary North Koreans, as President Bush has made it clear that the U.S. would not use food as a weapon. Instead, the U.S. list included items used by Kim Jong-il and items he uses to award elites for their loyalty. For example, the motor scooters that many North Koreans use for transportation are not on the U.S. list, while Harley-Davidson motorcycles, too expensive for all but the most politically well-connected, are. The USG does not want the UN to debate a common list of luxury items, since such a process would be time-consuming and would provide an excuse to delay UNSCR 1718 implementation on more important provisions concerning the export of armaments, dual-use items, and other service items to North Korea. ¶9. (C) Witter said that the European Commission was close to reaching consensus on the list of luxury goods that EU members would ban from exporting to North Korea. He recommended that all parties to UNSCR 1718 should keep their lists of banned luxury goods informal. Otherwise legalistic wrangling over harmonizing the different lists could delay the process and perhaps prevent a finalized list from being realized. ¶10. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla then turned to the issue of thermal imaging cameras, the controls on which are particularly important given the variety of military and potential terrorist uses. Thermal imaging cameras provide significant advantage in the areas of targeting, surveillance, and force mobility, and Commerce issues more licenses for thermal imaging cameras than for any other item. Civilian uses, however, for thermal imaging cameras have grown considerably and are now used for such civil end-uses as search and rescue, firefighting, and maintaining high voltage lines. ¶11. (C) The EU countries combined imported the highest number of U.S.-origin thermal imaging cameras, accounting for approximately 65 percent of all export applications. Assistant Secretary Padilla noted some concerns over the export of certain cameras from EU countries, citing British-origin sensitive night-vision equipment that had been recovered from Hizballah fighters during the recent war in Lebanon. Not all thermal imaging cameras are equally capable, and major exporting countries should coordinate to decide which low-end cameras should not require export controls and which high-end ones should have stricter controls. ¶12. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla proposed a working-level dialogue among U.S., French, British, German, and Swedish experts to focus on sharing best practices and other information related to the licensing and enforcement of exports of thermal imaging cameras. The dialogue could specifically address licensing conditions, controls on the most capable items, concerns related to specific end users, transshipment concerns, and enforcement actions that relate to EU entities. Assistant Secretary Padilla proposed organizing the first meeting in Europe during the first half of 2007. ¶13. (C) Witter said Germany has very strict export controls based on the technical specifications of thermal imaging cameras. He said low-end thermal imaging systems are not listed, while high-end systems are either on military lists or dual-use lists. Witter stated the German Government is open to discussion on revising the technical standards for controls. He also said his government was willing to work with Israel to determine the source of some thermal imaging equipment that had been used by Hizballah against Israel. ¶14. (C) Turning to illicit diversion, A/S Padilla briefed Witter on USG concerns about the diversion and proliferation of dual-use items transitting the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE lacks an export control system but is a key regional transshipment hub. The USG has found evidence of diversion of goods controlled by multilateral regimes routinely diverted from Dubai to Syria or Iran. UNSCR 1540 obligates all member states to criminalize WMD proliferation and to establish effective export controls and strong enforcement measures. In its December 2004 report on UNSCR 1540 implementation, the UAE Government (UAEG) committed to enacting an umbrella export control law in the "very near future." The USG has worked with the UAEG since 2001 on capacity building, but the UAEG has not made progress on establishing an export control system. It has said for over a year that its draft law has been delayed in the legislature. If the UAE makes no progress by January or February 2007, the USG may impose more restrictive licensing on the UAE. Assistant Secretary Padilla said it would be useful for the German Government to influence the UAEG concerning the latter's failure to pass an export control law, consistent with UNSCR 1540, 1696, and 1718. ¶15. (C) According to Witter, the German Government shares the USG analysis that the UAE, particularly Dubai, is a transshipment hub for goods for Iran. Although he said he understood the USG's growing impatience with the UAE, he counseled against taking stronger action. He said confrontation with the UAE would be counterproductive and that Germany favors giving the UAE more chances to develop better export controls and to implement them. He cited an EU pilot export control outreach program with the UAE being run by the German Federal Economic and Export Licensing Agency (BAFA). He urged the USG to give more time to the UAE to improve its export control record, although he was uncertain about how much influence Abu Dhabi could exert on Dubai. Lingenthal cited a bilateral meeting in Dubai the previous week between German export control officials and UAE counterparts as evidence that at least the higher working levels of the UAEG are interested in export controls and cooperation. Like Witter, Lingenthal counseled supporting the progress that the UAE has made concerning export controls. -------------- -------------- Meeting with Federal Export Economic and Licensing Agency -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla's second meeting was with BAFA President Bernhard Heitzer and Juliane Willmann-Lemcke, Deputy Office Director of BAFA's Press and Public Relations Division. Padilla briefed Heitzer on USG concerns regarding illicit diversion through the UAE, implementation of UNSCR 1718, and on the proposed night vision dialogue. During the meeting, Heitzer discussed BAFA's outreach programs on behalf of the EU with Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, and the UAE. Heitzer mentioned that Dubai posed more of a challenge for the EU export control outreach program than the other Emirates. According to him, Dubai lacks a coordinated system of export control, and not all of its export control officials are equally interested in the issue. Willmann-Lemecke added that the UAE in general, however, seemed enthusiastic about BAFA's training programs, with some officials saying that they would like to create a BAFA equivalent. ¶17. (C) Regarding UNSCR 1718, Heitzer said Germany will not apply sanctions on the DPRK unilaterally, but will follow EU regulations to implement UNSCR 1718 once they are issued. He agreed that it would be counterproductive for the UNSC to negotiate a harmonized list of luxury goods to be sanctioned. Concerning thermal imaging equipment, he said that it would be advisable for BAFA experts to forge a consensus with counterparts from at least four like-minded WA partners before raising the issue in a WA plenary. Heitzer said that the thermal imaging equipment that ended up with Hizballah was lower-end technology. -------------- Meeting with German Industry Representatives -------------- ¶18. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla next discussed the future of export controls with members of the Federation of German Industries (BDI). The BDI members responded favorably to the idea of a "trusted customer" approach to licensing, in which end users with a good record would not need to have so much scrutiny applied to them on license applications. The BDI members discussed export control lists at length, recommending that lists of proliferation-related entities should be harmonized within international organizations, such as the OECD or NATO. -------------- Meeting with the Economic Ministry -------------- ¶19. (C) Assistant Secretary Padilla's last meeting was with officials from the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi): Guenther Sproegel, Office Director of the International Export Control Regimes, Christof Wegner of the Export Control of Conventional Military Equipment Division, and Dirk Berg of the Export Control of Dual-Use Goods for Conventional Military Equipment Division. Padilla briefed them on the proposed China policy rule, implementation of UNSCR 1718, the proposal for a night vision technical dialogue, and diversion concerns for the UAE. ¶20. (C) Wegner said except for France EU member states had little interest in discussing the end of the arms embargo on China. According to him, the German Government prefers the status quo, versus lifting the arms embargo or expanding it. Wegner said the EU only declared an embargo on lethal weapons or lethal delivery systems; otherwise, each EU member state decides what to license. Wegner noted Germany subjects all military goods for China to licensing. Sproegel added that if the USG ever has information some dual-use technology could be applied to weapons, it should share it with the German Government. The German Government could then disseminate the information or list the technology, because some German exporters may not recognize the military use otherwise. Berg noted BAFA carefully screens all license applications to export civil aviation-related goods to China. Even though Chinese firms participate in Airbus A-350 production, and therefore receive aircraft commodities from Germany, BAFA will deny licenses if it determines that the goods in question have a military use. Sproegel and Berg both said that BAFA consults the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in such cases. ¶21. (C) Sproegel agreed it would be counterproductive to try to have the UNSC harmonize the different lists of luxury goods subject to sanctioning under UNSCR 1718. Sproegel said Germany exports almost nothing to North Korea, except for some food items. Even before passage of UNSCR 1718, the German Government reviewed only three license applications in 2006 to export dual-use chemicals to the DPRK. The German Government denied licenses in all three cases, according to Sproegel. ¶22. (C) Sproegel also acknowledged the challenges Germany faces in conducting export control outreach in the UAE. Sproegel said the German Government delivered a message to Abu Dhabi the week before, that if the UAE Government did not make tangible progress in producing an adequate export control system, then the UAE will not receive any sensitive technology from Germany in the medium term. What Germany expects from the UAE is the establishment of a licensing authority and some way to determine and investigate end users, according to Sproegel. He also said that because the German Government recognizes that the UAE is a transshipment point for sensitive technology to Iran, BAFA is very cautious about approving licenses for listed goods to the UAE. Germany's goal is to prevent the export of any military-listed goods to Iran. Sproegel suggested the USG and German Government work together in Abu Dhabi to help the government there develop the appropriate export controls. ¶23. (C) Berg said some German firms complain about the WA controls on thermal imaging equipment. He suggested that lower-end infrared equipment need not be so tightly controlled and that technical experts from WA partners should discuss the parameters of what should be controlled. ¶24. (C) Sproegel raised Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) issues with A/S Padilla. Sproegel noted, for instance, that PSI partners have different standards of jurisdiction when it comes to halting exports. He said PSI partners need to formulate interception clauses or else modify laws and suggested that the USG help those who need it. He also said some partners are unwilling to stop shipments once under way because of concerns that the exporter will demand compensation. Sproegel identified the lack of compensation provisions as a challenge for PSI partners. He also said the German Government is concerned about shipments of non-listed items that are still sensitive in nature to undesirable end users. He asked whether PSI covers those scenarios. Sproegel ended by advocating that Germany and the United States and other like-minded partners collaborate more closely in all international export control regimes. ¶25. (U) This message has been coordinated with BIS Assistant Secretary Padilla. SIPDIS TIMKEN JR