GERMAN RESPONSE U.S. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

S E C R E T BERLIN 002157



SIPDIS



NOFORN



SIPDIS, STATE FOR P,T, NEA/IR, ISN, EUR/AGS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017

TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PARM, GM, IR

SUBJECT: GERMAN RESPONSE U.S. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

ESTIMATE ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM



REF: SECSTATE 162558



Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Jeff Rathke for reasons 1.4

(b)/(d)



1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Post delivered demarches to senior

Chancellery and MFA officials on December 3. Both National

Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen and MFA State Secretary

Reinhard Silberberg considered the assessment to be

potentially "good news." Heusgen added that the Chancellery

will seek additional assessments from its intelligence

agency, and noted that the international community still had

reason for concern about Iranian intentions, its

unwillingness to disclose details of its nuclear programs and

its continued enrichment. Heusgen also noted some concern

about potential domestic political backlash, given the

Chancellor's recent work to persuade German companies to

withdraw from their Iran business dealings. Silberberg

detailed German agreement to EU sanctions against Bank Melli,

to be implemented by late January, calling the "new" policy a

signal of German willingness to go beyond

proliferation-related issues in application of sanctions,

coupled with continued reticence at more wide-reaching

measures for fear of harming the Iranian people. END SUMMARY.





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CHANCELLERY RESPONSE

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2. (S/NF) Ambassador delivered reftel points and nonpapers

to National Security Advisor-equivalent Christoph Heusgen on

December 3. Also present was Chancellery Senior

Director-equivalent for Security Policy and Disarmament Geza

von Geyr. Heusgen noted that he had just completed a telcon

on the same subject with APNSA Hadley. (NOTE: Heusgen

appeared still to be digesting his conversation with Hadley.

He was initially negative, but his thinking became more

positive and operationally focused during the conversation.

END NOTE) Heusgen noted that German intelligence he had seen

indicated a continued weaponization program; he has asked the

BND chief for a new assessment. The BND will also conduct

its weekly briefing on December 4 and will present their

latest assessment. He added that Germany will not publicly

react to the NIE.



3. (S/NF) Heusgen expressed concern about the timing of the

information and potential political fallout, particularly in

light of Chancellor Merkel's efforts to use moral suasion to

convince German companies to end investment in Iran. In this

regard, he noted that Chancellery Chief of Staff Thomas de

Maziere is scheduled to meet on Wednesday with German

Federation of Industry (BDI) chief Juergen Thumann and

leaders of German energy giant E.ON regarding their interest

in LNG in Iran. He added that DNI McConnell's scheduled

visit to Berlin on December 4 is timely.



4. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that we still need to be alarmed

about the Iranian intent and unwillingness to disclose their

program, particularly given their continued enrichment and

ballistic missile programs, evidenced by Iran's unveiling of

the Ashura ballistic missile last week. He noted that the

Chancellery will have to see to it that the public reaction

to the NIE is a moderate one and to ensure that the focus is

not only on the information on the Iranian nuclear weapons

program, but also emphasizes that the IAEA sees many open

points and that Iran has not abided by IAEA requests on

enrichment and coming clean on its activities thus far.



5. (S/NF) In terms of further UNSCR sanctions, von Geyr

added that in light of this information it will be harder to

get Russia and China on board; Heusgen indicated that

Kislyak's absence from the P5 1 Political Directors meeting

on December 1 meant that Russia's intentions regarding a new

UNSCR remain unclear. He once again repeated that he would be

seeking assessments from other foreign intelligence agencies

(naming the French) in addition to the NIE. It is necessary

to remain vigilant on Iran because of Iran's continued

failure to meet IAEA requirements, he said, as well as

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad's public threats

against Israel. In terms of sanctions, Heusgen added that

with this acknowledgment from the U.S., perhaps Iran would be

willing to suspend briefly. If this information is verified,

why don't the Iranians suspend enrichment as they do not need

it, he posited, having neither a weapons program nor power

plants that could use enriched uranium.



6. (S/NF) Heusgen noted that the Chancellery would work



with the MFA to develop a joint press line. Heusgen noted

that President Bush and Chancellor Merkel are scheduled to

discuss the topic tomorrow following Merkel's return from the

CDU Party Convention being held in Hannover. Heusgen

continued by repeating the German view on potential public

statements: The Chancellery does not comment publicly on

intelligence matters. If the news is confirmed it is good

news about this aspect of the Iranian program, but it is also

another reason to urge Iran to stop enrichment. Von Geyr

added that much must still be clarified by the Iranians; the

IAEA report shows many open points.





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FOREIGN MINISTRY RESPONSE

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7. (S/NF) DCM conveyed reftel points to MFA State Secretary

Silberberg, and left them as non-papers. Silberberg said it

was "good news" the US intelligence community had concluded

that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program due to

international scrutiny and pressure as of fall 2003 and had

not resumed the program as of mid-2007.



8. (S/NF) With regard to further steps against Tehran's

defiance of the Security Council, Silberberg went on, the

German government has agreed to move ahead with designation

of Bank Melli, though not immediately. Germany, France, and

the UK, he said, have agreed to work now toward a quick

resolution in the Security Council, and detect some positive

signs from the Russian side. If the UNSCR effort succeeds,

the sanctions it contains will nonetheless be weak, and the

EU-3 will seek to supplement them with EU measures by the end

of December, including the designation of Bank Melli. Asked

about the timeline for EU autonomous sanctions, including

designation of Bank Melli, should the Security Council fail

to pass a third sanctions resolution, Silberberg said this

could come at the end of January. He described his own role,

and that of the MFA, as "active" in securing agreement to

this approach from the ministries of finance and economy and

the Chancellery. Key elements of this "new" German policy

were (1) willingness to go beyond proliferation-related

issues in application of sanctions and (2) judgment that it

is "not yet" time for total economic and financial isolation

of Iran, as this would harm the Iranian people

disproportionately. Silberberg noted that debate continued

in the EU on possible designation of Bank Saderat, but

Germany believed that to do so now, in conjunction with

designating Bank Melli, would move too far in the direction

of a total embargo.

TIMKEN JR