GERMANS DOWNPLAY SUGGESTIONS OF SPLIT ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001823

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GM KV UNMIK
SUBJECT: GERMANS DOWNPLAY SUGGESTIONS OF SPLIT ON KOSOVO

Classified By: Political Counselor Jeffrey Rathke for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) Summary: German opinion on Kosovo is moving in the
right direction. Recognizing the unlikeliness of a positive
outcome to the Troika process, officials at the Chancellery
and Foreign Office have underscored to us that they are
working toward the broadest possible support within the EU
for Kosovo independence in the absence of a new UNSC
Resolution. Senior Chancellery officials have begun to
prepare legislative opinion, engaging key Bundestag members
on the unlikeliness of a UNSCR and the need for Germany to be
a leader within Europe on the issue. Contrary to suspicions
voiced in other EU capitals, we have heard unanimously that a
split within Chancellor Merkel's Grand Coalition along party
lines is not emerging. There is the possibility that some
German politicians across the spectrum might be susceptible
to last-minute gambits by Russia or Serbia to drag out the
Troika process; however the Chancellery indicates it would
oppose any proposals that could extend more than one month
beyond the December 10 Troika report to the UN Secretary
General. End summary.


2. (C) Recent reporting from Vienna and USEU suggests that a
perception may be forming in some EU capitals that Germany
could go wobbly on Kosovo because of differing views within
the parties that make up Chancellor Merkel's Grand Coalition
(CDU/CSU - SPD). We have explored this possibility with the
Chancellery, Foreign Office, and senior staff in the CDU/CSU
and SPD Bundestag caucuses (and also used the opportunity to
encourage Germany to demonstrate to its EU partners its
steadfastness). The response has been consistent across the
board: denial that there is any substantive difference
between the CDU/CSU and SPD on Kosovo. Comment: We consider
this significant, since officials here often are quick to
cite coalition difficulties to justify German reluctance to
take bold foreign policy steps. We have heard this
explanation often in response to our efforts to generate
greater German contributions in Afghanistan, for example.
End comment.

Chancellery Optimistic on EU's Ability to Act
--------------


3. (C) Chancellery senior-director-equivalent Norman Walter
told us the German government fully expects the Troika
process to fail. Walter said Germany wants it to be clear at
the end of the process that the responsibility for failure is
on the Serb and Russian side. He said that National Security
Adviser Christoph Heusgen and others on the Chancellery staff
have begun engaging members of the Bundestag (especially the
Foreign Relations Committee) to prepare them for the
likelihood that a UNSCR will not be achievable and that
Germany, the EU, and NATO will have to find a way forward
without one. According to Walter, the Foreign Relations
Committee did not object to this message, which he said gives
him some optimism about the Bundestag's ability to support a
flexible German/EU response to a unilateral declaration of
independence.


4. (C) Walter said that, if the Troika process fails, Berlin
would expect a prompt unilateral Kosvar declaration of
independence following the December 10 report to the UNSYG.
The Chancellery would expect U.S. recognition soon
thereafter, followed by an EU response that might take days
(hopefully not weeks, he said) to coordinate. The Chancellery
is optimistic that a sufficient degree of unity can be
achieved among the 27 to allow the EU to act decisively.
Walter said Germany had heard from the Romanians recently
that Bucharest would not block EU action (although Romania
probably would not recognize Kosovo). Berlin expected the
Slovaks to behave similarly, and Walter thought Spain would
come around to that position. Greece and Cyprus would be the
toughest nuts to crack, in his opinion.


5. (C) Walter said that, in the absence of a UNSCR, he
expected the Bundestag to be less concerned with the politics
of a unilateral declaration of independence than with the
legal aspects of a continued German presence in Kosovo (NATO
and EU). The absence of a UNSCR would encourage the Left
Party to challenge the legality of German participation in
KFOR before the Constitutional Court . Contacts on the SPD
staff were more relaxed, however, telling us that they did
not expect a UNSCR, that they anticipated a challenge in
court, but that this did not shake the SPD's view of the
issue.

No CDU - SPD Split, but Some Reluctance in All Camps
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6. (C) There are still doubts among a minority of
legislators from both coalition partners, In particular,
prominent SPD members Hans-Ulrich Klose and Gerd Weisskirchen
reportedly are worried about the potential for violence after
a unilateral declaration of independence. Such voices could
spark a deeper debate about German and European policy in
Kosovo, but at present SPD staff expect the caucus to
coalesce in support of Foreign Minister Steinmeier (who is
soon to ascend to the Deputy Chairmanship of the SPD).


7. (C) Some German politicians may be vulnerable to an
11th-hour attempt by Serbia or Russia to drag out the Troika
process by putting tantalizing but vague ideas on the table
close to the December 10 deadline. Hans-Joachim Falenski,
senior foreign policy staffer in the CDU/CSU caucus, told us
he thought deputy caucus leader Andreas Schockenhoff and
others would feel obliged to allow more time to negotiate if
a proposal were made that seemed remotely reasonable. We
posed this scenario to Walter in the Chancellery, and he said
Germany might be willing to entertain an additional thirty
days of discussions if a plausible last-minute proposal were
put on the table. But Germany would insist on a rapid
conclusion and not allow discussion to drag out endlessly.


8. (C) Comment: Leaders in the German political
establishment have not yet staked out a public position on
how they would respond to the failure of the Troika talks or
a unilateral declaration of independence, but it appears they
are moving toward a position that will recognize independence
and will work hard toward the greatest possible degree of EU
solidarity.

TIMKEN JR