GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001715 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017 TAGS: NATO GG PREL RS GM SUBJECT: GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP TO GEORGIA REF: A. STATE 1125337 ¶B. USNATO 479 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor John K. Bauman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Political Counselor raised Ref (A) points with MFA NATO Office Director Dirk Brengelmann and NSC-director-equivalent Detlef Waechter at the Chancellery. Their positions were essentially identical and appeared to be coordinated: Germany does not support a North Atlantic Council visit to Georgia in October. Brengelmann said September 10 that this remained Germanys position after discussions between Political Director Volker Stanzel and EUR A/S Dan Fried. ¶2. (C) Waechter and Brengelmann said the German position was firm. The reason was Russia -- it was the German interagency assessment that a NAC visit would be interpreted by the Russians as a "provocation" and that this would complicate efforts with Russia in other key areas such as the Kosovo Troika and CFE. PolCouns argued that, if possible Russian objections were the criteria, there would always be a reason for the NAC not to visit Tbilisi; Russia should not have veto power over the NACs travel schedule. Waechter said Berlin had looked at the pros and cons, and believed that a NAC trip was not as important as the Troika talks at this stage, and that the latter might be further complicated by a NAC visit to Georgia. ¶3. (C) Brengelmann asserted that the Georgians would take a NAC visit as a positive indication of Georgias prospects for gaining an early Membership Action Plan. PolCouns argued that the trip would not prejudice any Allys position on MAP. Instead, it would offer an opportunity to support positive trends in Georgia while also underscoring the importance of restraint and constructive engagement by Tbilisi. It was within the power of the NAC to ensure that the Georgians -- and the Russians -- got that message unfiltered. Brengelmann argued that NATOs ability to control the message effectively might be constrained. ¶4. (C) Comment: The German Government is demonstrating an unusual degree of interagency coordination on this matter. In Posts experience, the Chancellery is not normally so well informed on the details of NATO-related instructions. End comment. TIMKEN JR