U.S.-EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS TROIKA AND LUNCH ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BERLIN 000161 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/ERA AND EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN GM SUBJECT: U.S.-EU POLITICAL DIRECTORS TROIKA AND LUNCH ON JANUARY 12 BERLIN 00000161 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In meetings with Assistant Secretary Dan Fried in Dresden January 12, EU Political Directors agreed on the importance of continued U.S.-EU coordination on Kosovo, specifically on the need to support UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari's plan and to resist Russian pressure that might delay or derail the process. Fried welcomed a proposed EU police mission to Afghanistan but said the USG hoped the EU could do more. Fried also stressed the need to strengthen regional cooperation by reaching out to Pakistan and Central Asia. Although Fried and German Political Director Michael Schaefer agreed the U.S. and the EU have a Russia problem, Schaefer said Europe needs to work with its largest neighbor. Fried stressed the important influence Europe has on its neighbors and the importance of reaching out to the other FSU states to curb Russia's most pernicious tendencies. Fried explained the President's initiative on Iraq. The Political Directors also discussed Israel/Palestine, Iran, Sudan and Somalia. END Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Dan Fried discussed Russia, Iraq, and Afghanistan with EU Political Directors (at 27) in Dresden January 12. In a follow-on troika meeting, Fried and counterparts discussed the Middle East, Western Balkans, European Neighborhood Policy, Central Asia, Sudan, Darfur, and Somalia. Kosovo ¶3. (C) German Political Director Michael Schaefer began the troika meeting by stating the Kosovo status issue is the most pressing problem facing Germany during the first half of its EU presidency. He reviewed the timeline that UN Special Envoy Marti Ahtisaari presented to EU Political Directors earlier that morning. Ahtisaari reportedly plans to begin the process February 2 by presenting his proposals for resolving the status issues. The proposals will not include an explicit recommendation on final status. Schaefer said Ahtisaari anticipates four weeks of thorough negotiations. Schaefer said Ahtisaari expects to incorporate suggestions from Serbia and Kosovo into the final agreement, which would be proposed in a new UNSC resolution in March. Schaefer suggested either the G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting (May 30th) 
or Summit (June 6-8) might be the place where a final political agreement is reached on Kosovo's status. Fried agreed that the G-8 would be a good forum to press the Russians. ¶4. (C) Fried endorsed the expected timeline and agreed with Schaefer that U.S.-EU unity will be essential to see the plan to fruition. Fried expressed appreciation for the EU's position that a new UNSCR is "absolutely necessary," but warned the desire for a new resolution may cause Russia to think they have us over a barrel. The EU stressed they had made it clear to Russia that Kosovo is a unique situation and that they consider a peaceful solution vital to European security interests. Robert Cooper, Director General for External Relations in the EU Council Secretariat, voiced concern about China's position on Kosovo. Schaefer speculated China will ultimately accept that Europe,s security interests in the region should prevail. Schaefer said he was more concerned that Russia will demand something for not standing in the way. Citing Russia's preference for the status quo, Schaefer said he did not expect Russian demands will involve frozen conflicts. He expressed concern that Russia will instead demand a more strategic concession, such as agreement to keep Georgia and/or Ukraine out of NATO. Fried and his EU counterparts agreed such demands have to be rejected strongly. ¶5. (C) Looking forward , Schaefer said a Kosovo ESDP mission would be deployed on the basis of a strong UNSCR mandate and in close cooperation with the United States/NATO. Schaefer anticipated that asking Russia to contribute might help make Russia a constructive stakeholder in the process. Cooper stated EU-NATO cooperation was better than usual on Kosovo with good progress on intelligence sharing and crowd control protocols. Fried said the U.S. is still considering whether to participate in the ESDP mission. He noted a KFOR force-level review might be possible six months after the status decision if all is going well. Schaefer said a BERLIN 00000161 002.2 OF 004 donors' conference would be convened after the final status decision is made. Fried speculated the Kosovo Albanians will remain patient as long as they see the international community seriously engaged in resolving the status question. All agreed that any use of the word "independence" in relation to Kosovo would need to be closely coordinated with Ahtisaari. ¶6. (C) On Serbia, Karel Kovanda, Political Director for the Commission, said Serbia would need some tangible benefit to ensure it did not overreact to Kosovo's increased sovereignty. Kovanda said the Commission believes negotiations on Serbia's SAA could restart once Serbia has a new government, though the EU will not conclude the SAA until Serbia demonstrates it is cooperating on ICTY. Fried and Cooper agreed that parties may delay forming a government immediately after the January 21 elections to avoid taking the blame for losing Kosovo. Schaefer said Serbian President Tadic had promised him that he would receive Ahtisaari February 2 and reported he had instructed Serbian officials to cooperate. Afghanistan ¶7. (C) Schaefer said the EU is expected to approve a police training mission in Afghanistan in the February General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) with anticipated deployment this summer. The exact size and scope of the mission has not been determined but Schaefer expected it would consist of 160 officers and include a judicial training component. Schaefer highlighted the need for a comprehensive solution that includes civilian and military components. Fried welcomed the police mission but said the USG hoped the EU would do more. He noted police are essential to Afghanistan's counter-insurgency efforts. Fried said the key to victory lies on the political side and promises made at the Riga summit must be fulfilled. In this way we can decisively defeat the Taliban in the field and keep the political initiative by extending Kabul's reach, providing more development aid, increasing counter-narcotics efforts, and reaching out to Pakistan. ¶8. (C) Fried said the government of Pakistan has a comprehensive framework to address instability in the region and is prepared to do more. He noted the limited EU-Pakistan relationship and hoped Brussels would reach out to Islamabad. Schaefer agreed the EU could do more and suggested U.S. and European specialists should meet before the Joint Control and Monitoring Board meetings at the END of January in Berlin. Schaefer and Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata, Italian Political Director, suggested the regional approach on Afghanistan should include Iran. Fried said the U.S. and EU should instead look to Central Asia, where Kazakhstan has shown an interest in becoming constructively involved. Russia ¶9. (C) While noting troubling trends in Russia's internal and external activities, Schaefer underlined Russia's importance to Europe and said Europe has no choice but to work with Russia. Schaefer speculated the Polish meat dispute would soon be solved, thus allowing negotiations on new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia to move forward. Schaefer expected the PCA would include language on energy security. Fried said the U.S. and EU have a Russia problem and the trend lines are not good. He noted the need for a serious election monitoring mission for upcoming elections, and suggested the U.S. and EU should work together to facilitate building a "southern" gas pipline to get gas from Caucasia and Central Asia to Europe without going through Russia. FSU ¶10. (C) On Moldova, Schaefer and Olof Skoog, Sweden,s Political Director, said the EU prefers to wait for a political solution before committing to a position on an ESDP mission to Transnistria. On Belarus, both sides cited excellent cooperation. Fried suggested it might be time to think about what kind of "down payment" we would demand if Lukashenko asked for Western help. In response to EU concerns that the Georgian leadership not aggravate the BERLIN 00000161 003.2 OF 004 situation, Fried said more pressure should be exerted on Russia while reminding Georgia that diplomacy is the only path to a solution. European Neighborhood Policy ¶11. (C) Kovanda described current thinking on the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP),including plans to increase funding by one-third over the next seven years and a focus on economic integration, good governance, visa facilitation, increased exchanges, enhanced regional cooperation, and dialogues on energy, transport, and the environment. Schaefer said ENP will now be more bilateral with a greater focus on the progress individual states have made in their relationship with the EU. The EU will work to strengthen its relationship with eastern neighbors since it already has a well-developed relationship with its southern neighbors. Schaefer named Ukraine as a model for this new intensified relationship. Fried acknowledged the EU's unwillingness to talk about future enlargement but advised the EU not to shut the door completely. The prospect of possible EU accession offers non-member states hope and could prevent them from precipitating crises in the region. Central Asia ¶12. (C) Kovanda said the EU plans to launch a new Central Asia strategy that could include elements of ENP, depending on progress in individual states. Under the new strategy, the EU would double its assistance budget for the region over the next seven years with 80 percent slated for bilateral programs and the remainder to regional ones. Schaefer said the focus on bilateral programs was based on expressed preferences of leaders in the region and the heterogeneous nature of these states. He said the EU is planning a troika meeting in the region with all five foreign ministers for March 28. Fried welcomed the EU's renewed interest, particularly since Russia is trying to reduce western influence. Fried reiterated the USG does not see this as a zero-sum GAME -- Central Asia will benefit from being open to all interested parties. Fried said patience, perseverance, and presence will pay off in the end. On Kazakhstan, both sides agreed on the need to develop benchmarks for GOK action before Kazakhstan assumes the OSCE CiO. The Europeans reacted favorably to suggestions for more consultations at the expert level, including discussing exchange programs. Iraq ¶13. (C) Fried laid out the assumptions and strategy behind the President's initiative, and stressed that success of the Iraq compact depends upon support from everyone. Schaefer expressed concern about the worsening humanitarian situation, adding an END to sectarian violence is key to political and economic reconstruction. John Sawers, UK Political Director, agreed with Fried that most of violence is concentrated in the capital. He said it is hard to engage Iran and Syria when they refuse to be constructive and stressed the importance of the Compact since economic indicators are moving in the correct direction. MEPP, BMENA, Iran ¶14. (C) Schaefer and Sawers praised the Secretary's trip to the Middle East and its focus on Israel/Palestinian affairs. On the EU side there was a shared belief that the Secretary should use the trip to support Abbas to prove to the Palestinians that cooperation will be rewarded. The EU side also stressed the need to revitalize the Quartet by strengthening U.S.-EU cooperation. Schaefer said Germany will use its G-8 presidency to promote the Forum for the Future, especially in terms of education. Schaefer noted EU Political Directors agreed the EU should increase efforts to promote civil society in Iran. The EU poldirs plan to develop concrete ideas for further consideration by EU foreign ministers at the February GAERC. Fried welcomed the initiative, described U.S. democracy promotion efforts in Iran, and welcomed more U.S.-EU cooperation. Schaefer expressed interest in U.S. Farsi broadcasting and internet activities. Sudan BERLIN 00000161 004.2 OF 004 ¶15. (C) Fried and EU counterparts agreed that the situation on the ground remains terrible, and that the AMIS had numerous failings. The EU budget outlook for supporting an extended AU mission is not good, so member state contributions might be needed. The poldirs agreed on the need to get those responsible for funding together as soon as possible. Both sides agreed more cooperation from Russia and China is needed. Schaefer said China is becoming more pragmatic on the issue. The EU poldirs admitted the EU may need to consider "negative measures" to pressure President Bashir to cooperate. Somalia ¶16. (C) U.S. and EU Political Directors agreed Ethiopian troops could not stay in Somalia long, and others must come in to avoid a vacuum. The EU prefers a UN Mission. As Cooper put it, recalling AMIS, "We cannot test the AU to destruction" On the January 11 air operations against al-Qaeda in Somalia, Schaefer expressed concern -- "but not criticism" -- about the timing and urged caution in the use of force. ¶17. (U) Participants: Mayr-Harting, Thomas AUT Deboutte, Jean-Marie BEL Poriazov, Valentin BGR Evriviades, Evripides CYP Povejsil, Martin CZE Plesner, Liselotte DNK Dezcallar, Rafael ESP Orav, Aivo EST Vierros-Villeneuve, Pilvi-Siskko FIN Vassilopolous, Stavros GRC Pataki, Zsolt HUN Montgomery, Rory IRL Jankauskas, Kestutis LTU Lucas, Sylvie LUX Klava, Ilgvars LVA Inguanez, John MLT De Gooijer, Pieter NLD Wisniewski, Rafal POL Bramao Ramos, Vasco PRT Dranga, Ovidiu ROU Benko, Bogdahn SVN Lajcak, Miroslav SVK Skoog, Olof SWE Sawers, John GBR Terzi di Sant,Agata, Giulio ITA Kovanda, Karel EU-KOMM Schmid, Helga EU-RS Cooper, Robert EU-RS Galbano, Bono EU-RS Schaefer, Michael GER Fried, Daniel USA Chase, Peter USA Koenig, John USA Wohlers, Larry USA TIMKEN JR