SCENESETTER: SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT TO BERLIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000114 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY MICHAEL CHERTOFF E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2017 TAGS: KHLS KJUS PTER PGOV PREL GM EU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT TO BERLIN Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Mr. Secretary, your visit to Berlin will enable you to seek solutions to our bilateral and U.S.-EU challenges with a government and with a Minister who see things a lot like we do and who have the will and the authority to improve the status quo. Our key suggestions for your January 26 discussions are: -- to underscore your interest in a successful and meaningful outcome from the U.S.-German Working group on Counterterrorism Information Sharing, -- to encourage Germany to use its EU Presidency to agree to a new framework for U.S.-EU cooperation related to law enforcement, which would pay immediate dividends in the Passenger Name Records (PNR) negotiations. Minister Schaeuble - Bold Actions -------------- ¶2. (C) Last fall, Interior Ministry staff said their main objectives for the EU Presidency were modest; they wanted to follow through on previous EU action plans. At the January 14-16 EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) informal Ministerial, however, Federal Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble left no doubt he would seek to use Germany's EU Presidency to push for new advances. Ministers agreed in principle to create an EU-wide network of police databases -- expanding the "Pruem" agreements Germany initiated with six of its EU neighbors. Ministers also agreed to closer cooperation to fight illegal immigration and to establish a framework for JHA polices until 2010. Germany launched the first ever "Tri-Presidency" with Portugal and Slovenia -- the next holders of the EU Presidency -- thereby ensuring a continued, active role for Germany for the next 18 months. ¶3. (C) Schaeuble brings the same activism to Germany's domestic policies. In recent weeks, Germany enacted Schaeuble's legislation to create a multi-agency, state/federal terrorist database at the German NCTC (known by its German language acronym "GTAZ"). Germany also passed his proposal to give law enforcement and security agencies more and better access to financial, cell phone, and travel data. Schaeuble in recent days sought a constitutional amendment to allow the shooting down of hijacked airplanes and a law to address possible terrorist attacks from the sea, as a way to end legal challenges to government's ability to act if confronted with an attack like 9/11. He also said German authorities should be allowed remotely to search personal computers, reasoning that if German police can search a terrorist suspects' home, read his mail, and eavesdrop on his phone calls, why should they not be allowed to look into his PC if a court agrees? Schaeuble clearly recognizes the gravity of the terrorist threat, knows the value of connecting the dots, and thinks big. He is out ahead of the rest of the Merkel government. Some coalition politicians and civil libertarians oppose his proposals in a country that prides itself on the strength of its data privacy laws and other legal safeguards, and that -- for good reasons -- has not forgotten the Nazi and Stasi crimes of its 20th century past. ¶4. (C) We should capitalize on Schaeuble's vision and motivation to resolve issues in ways we and he would both want. When you met Schaeuble in Washington in September you said the U.S. sought an agreement with Germany like Pruem. When you see him here, the Bilateral Working Group that Schaeuble told his staff to set up will have met twice and discussed a draft text. The first step may be to agree to enable instant transatlantic hit/no hit fingerprint and possible DNA checks. Just six months ago, some on both sides of the Atlantic thought this would be impossible. But the Working Group should be empowered to do more. Even if HSPD-6 style information sharing is a bridge too far for this first round, it's an offer we have made and it's likely that Schaeuble himself sees the value of German agencies being able to do on-line name-checks against the U.S. Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). ¶5. (C) Schaeuble should also agree that Germany should share its lists of the limited number of terrorists it is watching within the country or whom it prevents from entering. He recognizes that by pooling our knowledge we reduce the chances of successful terrorist attacks. If he cannot move his bureaucracy to open the way to this kind of biographic data sharing in the first series of U.S.-German Working Group meetings, then he should urge such progress in subsequent BERLIN 00000114 002 OF 003 rounds. The need to exchange operational information regading pending counterterrorism investigations contiues, including the need to exchange identifying ata of subjects and their connections abroad, toensure we are both aware of potential threats, trrorists, and terrorist facilitators. It is essenial to reach such an agreement and also for Germn Services, which fall under Schaeuble's ministry,to believe they have the support of the Government and the Ministry to share such information with their American law enforcement and intelligence counterparts. ¶6. (C) We may begin PNR negotiations only weeks after your visit. Schaeuble will understand your arguments and examples of the value of the data. A better objective than just a good PNR agreement is a new PNR framework as you wrote in your fall Op-Ed. Even better might be a new U.S.-EU framework addressing security and data protection, as you and Attorney General Gonzales discussed at the Washington EU Troika late last year. Schaeuble is one leader who will grasp how useful such an achievement should be. The German EU Presidency should enable Schaeuble to help shape an agreement that suits his desire for real results and his commitment to counterterrorism. Limits to German Actions -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite all of Schaeuble's good intentions, the environment in which he must work is not easy. -- The Bundestag's Investigating Committee, set up and spurred on by the opposition parties, is looking into allegations of renditions (e.g., al Masri),supposed involvement by the German intelligence agency in sharing information with us in the war in Iraq, and the claimed abuse in Afghanistan by German troops of Murat Kurnaz, a Turkish citizen/German resident who returned in 2006 from Guantanamo. Former Interior Minister Schily, whom you will meet, testified to the committee last December that former U.S. Ambassador Daniel Coats met with him and discussed the al Masri case in 2004. You may want to tell Schaeuble that you are aware of the impact of the Parliament's Committee on his Ministry and its subordinate services and that the U.S. appreciates Schaeuble's recognition that it should not negatively affect U.S.-German counterterrorism cooperation. Kurnaz testified January 19 in a public hearing of the Bundestag's defense committee which is also examining the case. -- The German media portray the PNR (and ATS) and SWIFT programs as evidence on an alarming U.S. hunger for data. Rarely do articles mention the shared U.S.-German goals of preventing terrorism while respecting data privacy. No newspaper lists U.S. safeguards; America is seen as a data privacy "No Man's Land" as MOI Director General Gunter Krause told Paul Rosenzweig in December. It would be useful for Schaeuble and others to hear your commitment to respect data privacy concerns. On PNR in general, the Germans think the most that may be achievable is to extend the present agreement. -- You should also be aware of German government concerns that after it passes us derogatory information, its nationals and legal residents could be "watch listed" and denied entrance to the U.S. German officials are particularly concerned that such entry refusals could somehow be publicly traced back to Germany. Our negotiators will likely need to clarify the extent of U.S. intended use of German data. The Majed Shehadeh case in paragraph 11 is an example of this problem. Your Other Meetings - Zypries, de Maiziere -------------- ¶8. (C) Especially with Justice Minister Brigitte Zypries -- a Social Democrat and a protege of Otto Schily -- you should be the first to mention data privacy and how important it is to the United States, to DHS, and to you personally to adhere to proper safeguards as well as other legal limits in the war on terror. Zypries occasionally opposes, including publicly, some of the more controversial proposals from Schaeuble -- a Christian Democrat. Justice Ministry staffers tell us some of her rhetorical objections are designed to score domestic political points, but her ministry's traditional role is to champion civil liberties. In her October meeting with visiting Attorney General Gonzales, for example, Zypries expressed clear reservations about the Military Commissions Act. MOI contacts tell us of their sparring with MOJ staff who seek to limit the breadth of MOI's counterterrorism laws. BERLIN 00000114 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) After Zypries you will see Chancellery Chief of Staff de Maiziere. You should use this meeting to get a broad sense of what kind of partner the German government will be and where Chancellor Merkel plans to take the EU and the G-8 under Germany's Presidency. When he met visiting Director of National Intelligence Negroponte in November, de Maiziere said the U.S. should not consider the Bundestag's Committee hearings or other German public debate and conclude that Germany did not agree with the U.S. on the fight against terrorism. De Maiziere told Negroponte the U.S.-German "Pruem" negotiations are an example of precisely what we should be doing. You should mention that the U.S. is prepared to engage in even deeper cooperation -- it will be useful for the Chancellery to give Schaeuble whatever backing it can. As Commissioner of the German Federal Intelligence Service, de Maiziere is aware of sensitive threat reporting. Muslim Engagement -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Thank you for agreeing to discuss DHS and USG policies with prominent Muslim Germans. Muslim integration in German society is a hot topic here; Schaeuble launched a series of "integration summits" with Muslim community leaders last fall. Like many U.S. embassies, we have been actively engaging Muslim communities in Germany for some time. One new program Embassy Berlin initiated is "Windows on America," which offers fact-finding trips to the U.S. for Muslim teenagers and other youth from immigrant backgrounds in Germany, who do not typically have opportunities to travel to the U.S. In 2006 we started "Policy Dialogues" for visiting U.S. officials to discuss U.S. policy with Muslim Germans. One such speaker, the USAID chief in Kabul, explained to Muslim Germans the extent of U.S. civilian reconstruction in Afghanistan (a viewer of German news might presume all U.S. activity there is military). You should expect a critical but polite audience, some of whom will have flown in from elsewhere in Germany for the meeting. They will appreciate your willingness to engage with them, but may mention rumors or actual experiences of DHS policies allegedly "targeting" Muslims. Recent German news reports spoke of a German Muslim married to a U.S. citizen who DHS held in Las Vegas for four days "for no reason." Even if we are not able to say all we'd like, though, we can dispel myths, consider the suggestions of these community leaders, and thereby improve our rapport with this important and growing segment of German society. ¶11. (C) (NOTE: In Dec 2006, ICE arrested FBI terrorism subject Majed Shehadeh in Las Vegas and he was detained for 3 days prior to being returned to Germany. The charter company he flew with only flies twice a week, hence the long delay. Legat/Berlin has not yet released any information to the German Government with respect to this detention, and is currently coordinating the release of applicable information with ICE, FBIHQ, and FBI Boston. End Note). TIMKEN JR