THIRD G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS' GROUP (NPDG)

UNCLAS BERLIN 001019 SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR ISN, EUR, WHA, CAN, EAP/J SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC GM JA RS CACM UK FR IT SUBJECT: THIRD G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS' GROUP (NPDG) MEETING IN BERLIN, MAY 14, 2007 REF: A. BERLIN 834 ¶B. BERLIN 791 ¶C. BERLIN 376 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The third G-8 Nonproliferation Directors' Group (NPDG) meeting under the German G-8 Presidency took place May 14 in Berlin. The delegates reviewed a German-produced draft statement on nonproliferation for the June G-8 Summit in Heiligendamm but were unable to reach consensus on the wording of the text. The delegates essentially did agree on language concerning Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs and on India's efforts to strengthen its nonproliferation regime. The delegates agreed to a number of changes in the draft text, many of which were requested by the U.S.; but consensus was not reached on key U.S. priorities, specifically the U.S. proposal to extend and expand the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP),and language maintaining the G-8 moratorium on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. The delegates did not reach consensus on the EU's desire to be included in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Because consensus was not reached on these and other issues at the meeting, the German Chair offered to revise the German draft with bracketed language as necessary and re-circulate it. (Note: the follow-on draft was circulated May 15. End note.) The German Chair suggested that the G-8 Sherpas or possibly even ministers would have to forge consensus language on the key outstanding issues. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) German Chair Ruediger Luedeking, MFA Deputy Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, began the meeting by asking for input on the draft Heiligendamm Statement on Nonproliferation. After delegates voiced complaints or made suggestions concerning the first few paragraphs, the U.S. delegate, DAS Andrew Semmel, stated the U.S. proposal to extend the GP for an additional 10 years beyond 2012, to commit an additional USD $20 billion for the 10-year extension, to expand the GP geographically to countries other than Russia and Ukraine, and to expand the scope of projects to address new and emerging WMD and missile threats globally. British Delegate Paul Arkwright said the UK supports "some elements" of the U.S. proposal and urged that the G-8 Summit Declaration on Nonproliferation acknowledge that the threats posed by materials of mass destruction will continue beyond the GP's final year of 2012 and that the G-8 will address the threats beyond that date. Russian Delegate Anatoliy Antonov repeated Russia's argument that the G-8 should not consider GP extension and expansion until all the current commitments to destroy Russia's chemical weapons stocks, to finish dismantling Russia's decommissioned nuclear submarines, and to secure radiological materials in Russia are fulfilled. Antonov reiterated Russia's complaint that only a small percentage of the pledged funds have actually been spent on GP projects in Russia and said that more needs to be done to make the process more efficient. Because the other delegates failed to support all elements of the U.S. language on the GP's extension and expansion and because the G-8 Sherpas and the GPWG had not reached consensus on the U.S. proposal, the German chair said he would not include the language in the new draft of the Nonproliferation Statement that he was producing. (Note: The text of the U.S.-proposed language on the Global Partnership was included in Luedeking's cover letter circulated with the text of the revised statement May ¶15. End note.) ¶3. (SBU) DAS Semmel observed that several other G-8 partners were sympathetic to the idea of expanding the GP geographically and programmatically and that the U.S. proposal was divisible into its component parts. DAS Semmel notified the other delegates that he expected Secretary Rice to issue a ministerial letter on GP expansion during the week of May 21 and then make the proposal at the May 30 G-8 Ministerial Meeting. ¶4. (SBU) The delegates discussed the recently completed Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna, observing that Iran hijacked much of the time by arguing over procedural matters. Nevertheless, the NPDG delegates wished to stress that the NPT PrepCom meeting concluded successfully, paving the way for a productive 2010 Review Conference later in the year. ¶5. (SBU) In the paragraph on ENR transfers, other delegates did not agree to the U.S. attempt to insert language effectively retaining the moratorium agreed to in previous G-8 Summit statements. Canadian Delegate Michael Blackmore stated that he was under strict instructions not to agree to a continuation of the moratorium. He suggested that the longer the moratorium continued, the more it began to look like a ban and that this is unacceptable in the case of states that strictly adhere to their nonproliferation obligations. The German Chair and Japanese Delegate Takashi Nakane also stated that their governments could no longer support a continuation of the moratorium. ¶6. (SBU) Delegates agreed on most of the language to deplore Iran's failure to meet its obligations under UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747. In addition, delegates essentially agreed to insert language supporting the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea's nuclear program and condemning its October 2006 detonation of a nuclear device. DAS Semmel persuaded the delegates to drop Japanese language to condemn North Korea's record of abductions, arguing that although the U.S. and the G-8 are sympathetic to Japan's position, such an issue is out of place in a statement on nonproliferation and could complicate further the six-party deliberations. ¶7. (SBU) Luedeking repeated his suggestion that the U.S. and Russia allow EU institutions to join the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GI),at least as observers. He inserted bracketed language in his text to request EU institutions to join. His argument was that the EU is not an international organization but a supranational organization over the member states; therefore, to admit it into the GI would not set a precedent for other international organizations to join. EU Council Delegate Annalisa Giannella echoed Luedeking's comments, and EU Commission Delegate Lars-Erik Lundin noted that the Commission signed the IAEA Additional Protocol on behalf of the EU because some EU member states lacked the competency to sign it on their own. The EU delegates suggested that the same principle should apply for the GI. Japanese Delegate Nakane said if Russia's and the USG's goal is to increase participation in the GI, then they should accept EU institutions. Russian Delegate Antonov responded that Moscow and Washington wanted each EU member state to agree to the GI Statement of Principles first before the two would consider allowing EU institutions to join, and then only as observers. Luedeking responded that some EU members could not join the GI on their own because they cannot fulfill the conditions in the absence of EU membership. DAS Semmel repeated the concept behind the GI is that sovereign states -- but not international organizations -- will participate in activities jointly. He requested the EU Commission finish its paper on GI participation and said it needed to be submitted to Washington and Moscow for study before any other action could be taken. ¶8. (SBU) The German Chair ended the meeting by suggesting a mid-November date for the next NPDG meeting. He also said he would revise the draft and circulate it May 15 for review. After receiving input from the delegates, he will rewrite the draft for submission to the G-8 Sherpas. If the NPDG-level delegates are unable to reach consensus, then the Sherpas may be able to, Luedeking noted. ¶9. (U) This cable was coordinated with DAS Semmel subsequent to the delegation's departure. TIMKEN JR