DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION STILL POLITICAL FOOTBALL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000997 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SR SUBJECT: DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION STILL POLITICAL FOOTBALL REF: BELGRADE 785 BELGRADE 00000997 001.2 OF 003 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Special prosecutor for organized crime Slobodan Radovinovic has opened an investigation into the political background of late Serbian PM Djindjic's assassination in response to competing accusations between the LDP and the DSS over who bore ultimate responsibility for creating the conditions under which such a killing could take place. This latest episode will have little bearing on the Djindjic legacy, but it is a telling statement of the continued willingness of political parties to use the media and the courts as political tools in the absence of developed political institutions. END SUMMARY. LEGIJA SENTENCING OPENS NEW CAN OF WORMS -------------- ¶2. (U) One month after the Special Court (SC) in Belgrade handed down maximum sentences to the perpetrators of the March, 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic (ref),special prosecutor for organized crime Slobodan Radovanovic opened an investigation into the political background of the crime. ¶3. (U) Radovanovic announced that he had formed a special working group to investigate whether or not criminal or political interests had a role in the assassination. He vowed to arrest anyone found to have been part of any conspiracy associated with the PM's murder, highlighting that he would closely investigate the circumstances surrounding the illegal release from prison of a group of criminals from the "Zemun clan" who, with logistical support from the Serbian Interior Ministry's Special Operations Unit (JSO),later organized Djindjic's murder. Radovanovic further explained that his office would investigate the 2002 JSO "mutiny" to determine if it constituted a political challenge to the state or was merely a labor dispute. ¶4. (U) A formal investigation into the circumstances surrounding Djindjic's murder has been a long-standing request of the lawyers of the Djindjic family as well as of Djindjic's two closest associates - Cedomir Jovanovic, deputy PM in post-Djindjic's government (now an MP and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party),and Vladimir "Beba" Popovic, businessman and former chief of Djindjic's communications bureau. Jovanovic and Popovic have consistently maintained that the main instigators of the murder included PM Kostunica and his 
advisors. In her public explanation of the verdict in the Djindjic case, Judge Mesarevic specified that the panel of judges did not take up the question of the political circumstances surrounding the murder, as requested by Djindjic's lawyers, as it was not part of the original indictment. However, the judge encouraged the possibility of opening such an investigation and, if appropriate, convicting and sentencing individuals who might have ordered or inspired the crime. ANATOMY OF A CONSPIRACY: LDP VERSION -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Djindjic's closest allies, led by Jovanovic and Popovic, claim that the critical predecessor to subsequent events, notably the coordinated anti-government media campaign run by Kostunica advisor (and current head of RTS) Aleksander Tijanic and, ultimately, Djindjic's murder, was the 2002 JSO "mutiny." For 5 days starting November 8, hundreds of heavily armed, uniformed JSO officers staged protests, including blocking traffic in Belgrade November 11. The JSO demanded the replacement of top officials in the Interior Ministry and the State Security Agency. This "mutiny" was characterized by then-FRY President Kostunica as "a regular protest of dissatisfied state employees in their everyday gear," though many analysts and journalists saw it as a direct challenge to the PM's authority, with Kostunica's toleration of the mutiny and refusal to call out troops to intervene seen as tantamount to support for the mutiny against the PM. The incident ended with Djindjic accepting most of the JSO demands, including replacement of the director and the deputy of the State Security Agency. Zvezdan Jovanovic, who fired the bullet that killed Djindjic, was an active duty JSO commander when he shot the PM, while Milorad Lukovic "Legija," who organized the assassination, was the retired commander-in-chief of the unit. ANATOMY OF A CONSPIRACY: DSS VERSION -------------- ¶6. (SBU) According to Radovanovic, the initiative for investigating the political background of Djindjic's murder came from information produced as a result of the indictment and arrests of several individuals connected with a tobacco smuggling affair. In 2003, Serbian police opened an investigation, codenamed "Operation Network," of at least eight tobacco smuggling groups that were active in the Balkans in the 1990's. Most of these groups operated under the patronage of Milosevic's secret service and their illegal profits were used for financing the regime and the accumulation of BELGRADE 00000997 002 OF 003 personal wealth. The "Network" file had been in cold storage until early June, 2007, when police arrested eight persons and issued international warrants for a number of others. The most significant names that are still at large but connected with this case are controversial businessman Stanko Subotic "Cane" as a leader of one smuggling group (see bio notes at end) and Milosevic's wife and son Mira Markovic and Marko Milosevic as leaders of a second group. ¶7. (SBU) Immediately after the arrests of Subotic's business associates, some media re-opened stories about his connection with Djindjic. Former DOS Interior Minister, Dusan Mihajlovic, was identified by the media as the source who leaked information to Subotic on "Network" in 2003. In response, Mihajlovic attacked Popovic, who introduced Subotic to Mihajlovic, and accused Jovanovic of using his influence to secure the early release from prison of members of Zemun criminal clan in November, 2002, just four months before they killed Djindjic. Many of Serbia's main media outlets, including dailies Press, Kurir, Vecernje Novosti and even pro-government Politika, weekly Standard and NIN, and the public broadcasting service TV RTS have all given wide coverage to Mihajlovic's claims. COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Four years after the fact, and with the perpetrators convicted, Djindjic's assassination remains a powerful weapon to be used by all sides in the intensely personal power politics of Serbia. The democratic opposition (which includes many ex-Djindjic supporters and officials) saw the Legija conviction as an opening to pursue claims long held against the DSS and PM Kostunica for the role they believe Kostunica played in inciting the JSO to kill the then-PM. ¶9. (SBU) The DSS, in turn, has used the fortuitously-timed re-opening of the "Network" case to launch a vicious media campaign against Jovanovic and Popovic, personal enemies of high-ranking people in the DSS (the "Network" investigation also implicates former Montenegrin PM Milo Djukanovic, another DSS enemy). Some in the journalistic and analytical communities have remarked that this kind of media campaign resembles that against Djindjic and his government in 2002/03. They note that the indictment for the tobacco smuggling operation was on hold for almost four years, and so far is directed against only two out of eight smuggling groups. It is also suspicious, they say, that despite the repeated requests by Djindjic's lawyers to expand the investigation of the assassination to include the political background, the special prosecutor initiated the investigation only after Mihajlovic accused Jovanovic of connections with the Zemun clan. ¶10. (SBU) Tadic's DS, meanwhile, seems to be content to enjoy the show. The DS is certainly unlikely to leap to the support of their biggest political rivals in the LDP. Moreover, Tadic would be thrilled to have Popovic discredited, especially as rumors intensify in Belgrade that Popovic may be preparing to reveal "proof" that Tadic was an informer for the VBA while a prominent member of the student movement. ¶11. (SBU) It is unlikely that the investigation into the political circumstances surrounding Djindjic's assassination will produce concrete results. Radovanovic's objectivity is questionable, given that he was directly appointed by the BIA and the DSS to replace the original Organized Crime Prosecutor, the extremely capable Jovan Prijic. As so often before, this episode is another sad reminder of the willingness of political parties in Serbia - absent developed political institutions - to manipulate the courts and the media to act out personal vendettas. Getting to the truth of the Djindjic case will remain secondary to using it to damage political opponents. END COMMENT. BIO NOTES: STANKO SUBOTIC "CANE" -------------- ¶12. (SBU) According to available open sources and media, Subotic started his career in the Paris fashion industry in the late 1980's. With the assistance of the head of Serbian Intelligence Jovica Stanisic and the director of customs Mihalj Kertez - both close Milosevic associates - Subotic established in the 1990's a widespread cigarette smuggling ring involving Macedonia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Kosovo, and Croatia, with Serbia and Montenegro as final destinations. This is the same ring that former Montenegro PM Djukanovic was allegedly involved in. Part of the profit from the operation went to Stanisic, but Subotic also established good connections with the Serbian democratic opposition (DOS),especially with the Democratic Party and with people close to Zoran Djindjic. When DOS ousted Milosevic in October, 2000, and the state ceased its support for smuggling operations, Subotic legalized his activities, mostly through privatization of the two biggest chains of kiosks, which secured virtually the entire Serbian market of newspaper and cigarette distribution. It is something of an open secret that Subotic generously supported both post-Milosevic democratic governments, Djindjic's and Kostunica's. BELGRADE 00000997 003 OF 003 POLT