DS FAILS FIRST TEST OF COALITION LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000925 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/17 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR NATO SR SUBJECT: DS FAILS FIRST TEST OF COALITION LEADERSHIP Classified by Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (c) SUMMARY: The recent tabling of the proposed PfP Presentation Document in a sub-Cabinet committee of the GoS may be an early indicator of the power relationships that will guide the new coalition government. Key DS ministers were either unwilling or unable to push the document (which had already been cleared by all relevant ministries) through the Cabinet in time for FONMIN Jeremic's proposed delivery of the document to Brussels on June 28. This episode, on the heels of other recent events surrounding the intelligence service and Kosovo policy, may well indicate that Kostunica will continue to call the shots without effective opposition from DS for the foreseeable future. End summary. ¶2. (c) In a June 19 policy planning meeting in the foreign affairs committee of the GoS Cabinet of Ministers, committee chair and Kosovo Minister Slobodan Samardzic unexpectedly rejected the proposed draft PfP Presentation Document, citing reservations about language referring to cooperation with NATO and the terminology "Euro-Atlantic." MoD officials up to and including DEFMIN Sutanovac were quick to inform the Embassy and to explain that the Ministry had done everything in its power to put the PD on the agenda for the regularly-scheduled Cabinet meeting to be held June 21, but said they could not overcome Samardzic's objections. ¶3. (c) MoD State Secretary Zoran Jeftic, a DS-allied reformist who attended the session of the committee, said Samardzic had not offered any coherent rationale for his opposition, and seemed to be simply acting out instructions, presumably from Kostunica or his advisors, to block the PD from moving forward. Jeftic noted that neither DEFMIN Sutanovac nor FONMIN Jeremic had attended the meeting to champion the PD, and Assistant MoD Dusan Spasojevic later told us that MFA had sent a Milosevic-era functionary to sit in on the meeting, who remained silent throughout the proceedings. ¶4. (c) Jeftic explained that the foreign policy committee (which is a rough approximation of a DC/PC) is responsible for clearing items to recommend to the PM to put on the agenda of the Thursday Cabinet meetings (he said there are three other such committees, including one for finance and one for legislation). The foreign affairs committee is chaired by DSS Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic, and also includes Energy Minister Popovic (DSS),Economy Minister Dinkic (G-17 Plus),Sutanovac, Jeremic, and Justice Minister Petrovic (all DS). ¶5. (c) Jeftic said that a majority in the committee can, in theory, override the reservations of the chairman, but that the chairman's approval is needed to move any recommendation onto the proposed agenda. He also said that, if a minister feels an issue is in the vital national interest, s/he can override the committee and propose the issue directly in the Cabinet meeting - but he conceded that the PM can table any issue he does not wish to discuss. Jeftic said he received no support from his DS and G17 colleagues in defending the PD, and he felt Jeremic would not force a confrontation in the Cabinet by proposing the item himself. ¶6. (c) The immediate practical result of this "procedural" snafu is that the PD will have to be internally renegotiated - apparently now with inputs from KOSMIN Samardzic - despite all relevant ministries having previously cleared the draft. At issue, at the very least, will be how Serbia defines its future relationship with NATO and its desire to engage with the "Euro-Atlantic" (vice "European") community. Also likely to get more scrutiny will be language referring to ICTY and direct and oblique references to Kosovo and Serbia's territorial integrity/sovereignty. As a result, FONMIN Jeremic will not, as promised, deliver Serbia's PD to Brussels later this week. ¶7. (c) The longer-term impact of this episode is disappointing, though hardly surprising. Passage of the PD was the first opportunity for DS to exercise what President Tadic touted privately and publicly as the key deliverable achieved by DS in the coalition talks - a majority voting position in the Cabinet. This majority was supposed to enable DS to push through any decisions it deemed critical to Serbia's future, even in the face of DSS (and potential G-17) opposition. Tadic, Jeremic and the DS have all made it crystal clear to us repeatedly in the past that a Euro-Atlantic future is their top priority. Yet this first engagement with DSS over an issue on which they disagree went unquestionably in favor of DSS. ¶8. (c) The unwillingness or inability of DS ministers to overcome Samardzic's objection (to say nothing of the inanity of giving him the chair of the foreign policy committee in the first place) tells us at least one, and possibly two important things: first, that DS either does not have or is unwilling to exercise the power it claims to have to force decisions in the Cabinet; and second, that they are unwilling or unable at this point to fight effectively for Serbia's Euro-Atlantic orientation. This episode comes on the heels of a Samardzic-driven "new plan" on Kosovo to which no one in DS, its ministries, or the Presidency was privy (septel),and follows shortly after Tadic capitulated on retaining DSS's Rade Bulatovic as the head of the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA) - an issue DS leaders BELGRADE 00000925 002 OF 002 previously said would bring down the government. Such interactions represent a weak showing by DS in the first months of the new coalition government, and are an indication that Kostunica will continue to call the shots in the new coalition until DS discovers someone who can match his tactical political acumen. POLT