KOSOVO WEEKLY UPDATE: GOS EXPECTS RUSSIAN VETO BUT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000776 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR U/S BURNS, EUR A/S FRIED, EUR DAS DICARLO AND AMBASSADOR WISNER NSC FOR ANSLEY E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KBTS KPAO YI SR SUBJECT: KOSOVO WEEKLY UPDATE: GOS EXPECTS RUSSIAN VETO BUT PREPARES FOR DELAY REF: A. (A) ROME 1187 ¶B. (B) BELGRADE 310 ¶C. (C) BELGRADE 750 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) With Serbia's government back online, President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica are devoting their attention to the UN Security Council's next steps regarding Kosovo. This cable summarizes the week's notable events regarding Serbia and Kosovo and (in paragraph 8) provides post's analysis of GOS reactions to possible scenarios at the UNSC. UNSC: The view from Belgrade -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Tadic and Kostunica remain united on Kosovo policy with both leaders continuing to engage on the issue abroad and at home. On 5/29, Belgrade media reported that Kostunica would meet Russian President Putin in St. Petersburg during the International Economic Forum next week. Russian Ambassador to Serbia Alexeev told wire service FoNet on 5/30 that a meeting between the leaders is "definitely possible." The Prime Minister is as confident as ever that a new UNSC resolution allowing for Kosovo independence will fail, telling the press on 6/1 that he expects further international discussions on Kosovo status, as requested last week by the Serbian parliament to the UN Secretary General. ¶3. (U) PM Advisor Jankovic, in a lengthy interview with Serbian weekly NIN, protested against implications from the international community that Serbia and Russia's "intransigence" makes them "responsible" if there is violence in Kosovo. Likening the situation to the 1938 Sudeten crisis in principle, Jankovic said that "we are faced with an ethnic community...that threatens to resort to violence unless given territory...while an internationally recognized democratic country is being forced to pay the price of irresponsibility, cavalier attitude and cowardice of others." Jankovic claimed to have had "official and unofficial" talks that suggest "control was adequate and forces deployed to Kosovo are capable of preventing violence." Jankovic also warned that only a new UNSC resolution will keep EU countries united in favor of Kosovo independence. If NATO countries recognize a "self-proclaimed independent Kosovo," Jankovic said that Serbia's attitude "could only mean one thing -- that the military intervention of 1999 was not motivated by humanitarian reasons, but by an intention to redraw the borders of the Balkans." EU recognition in that case "would inevitably result in a change of sentiments" of many Serbians on the question of European integration. ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, President Tadic raised Serbia's objections to Kosovo independence in a visit to Rome and planned the same in a visit to Berlin. Serbian media reported that Tadic met with Italian PM Prodi on 5/29 and reiterated that any form of Kosovo independence is unacceptable to Serbia, and that Serbia "wants a compromise solution...acceptable to both sides." Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic also traveled to Rome this week and had similar discussions with his counterpart. Reftel A reported that Tadic and Jeremic both told the Italians that the Russians have promised to veto any UNSC that allows for Kosovo independence. ¶5. (U) In an interview with Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti, FM Jeremic made comments similar to PM advisor Jankovic's on Serbia's policy towards other countries which recognize Kosovo independence without a UNSC resolution. "Kosovo will continue to be an inseparable part of Serbia," adding that Serbia would "re-examine its relations (with countries recognizing Kosovo) taking care not to bring the country into isolation." ¶6. (U) The Radical Party (SRS) on 5/29 called for a "serious parliamentary debate" on Kosovo to "discuss the threats made by the EU, USA and other world powers that want to strip Serbia of its province." SRS general secretary Vucic called Tadic's support for joining NATO "damaging" for Serbia's relations with Russia which Vucic "expects to impose a veto at the UNSC." Russia, Vucic opined, "would not view (Serbia's desire to join NATO) as a friendly gesture." BELGRADE 00000776 002 OF 002 USG statements and activity -------------- ¶7. (U) Belgrade media reported the Ambassador's comments on 5/31 that he expects a solution to Kosovo status will be reached before the end of his mandate this summer. Local media also covered a Department spokesperson McCormack's comments that Kosovo cannot be reintegrated into Serbia and that both Kosovo and Serbia should have a European future. Reactions to UNSC next steps -------------- ¶8. (S) The following is our assessment of the GOS and local diplomatic representatives' reactions to three possible outcomes at the UNSC. - Scenario A: UNSC votes on resolution, Russia does not veto Clearly optimal for the USG, this outcome would bring finality to the GOS' years-long campaign to avoid and/or delay any change to UNSCR 1244's protection of Kosovo as part of Serbia. Tadic has told us privately (reftel B) that his first job after Kosovo status is resolved will be to rebuild Serbia's relations with the West. In this week's meeting with the Ambassador (reftel C),PM Kostunica said that he would "not oppose any UNSC resolution" and that the USG and Serbia would be able to "settle issues" over Kosovo without affecting the rest of the bilateral relationship. - Scenario B: UNSC votes on resolution, Russia vetoes Tadic and Kostunica expect this outcome and to them it would represent the full triumph of Serbia's Kosovo policy over the last year. The Radicals and other retrograde elements would cast Russia as a savior and advocate for closer ties at all levels. Despite the expected European unwillingness to act on Kosovo's unilateral independence declaration, European UNSC members, barring last minute reversals, would at least be on the record in support of Kosovo independence and the Ahtisaari plan, which would put us all in the same position in dealings with Belgrade. Quint Ambassadors tell us, however, that without a UNSC resolution, the EU taking over responsibility for post-independence administration would be virtually impossible. We would have to squeeze them hard, using our continued KFOR participation as a lever. - Scenario C: UNSC delays Kosovo status decision (either a status-neutral resolution or no new resolution) This also represents a major triumph for Serbia and Russia's Kosovo policy, and the GOS is already preparing for this eventuality with parliament's call for new talks and the Kosovo Ministry's mandate to form a new GOS negotiating team. Without clarity on next steps, Serbia's Kosovo policy would continue as before with renewed vigor. Belgrade will seize on any incident in Kosovo to keep building a case that Pristina is unfit to govern, that Serbs cannot live safely in Kosovo and that the international community has failed there. U.S. and IC credibility would hit rock bottom in future dealings with the GOS with no possible solution in sight. ¶9. (S) Comment: Serbian leaders are fully expecting either a veto or a delay at the UNSC, with either outcome giving them a massive victory and reason to entrench further against Kosovo independence. In Serbia, this is for us the worst possible outcome. We would be held accountable for events in Kosovo either under an emasculated ICO or a remaining UNMIK mandate that has no credibility and little power. We see virtually no chance of managing a renewed negotiating effort with the parties, the Contact Group, including the Russians, and no resolution of an increasingly volatile situation in sight. POLT