KOSOVO: SERBIA WEEKLY UPDATE (4/16-4/20)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000533 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY- CLASSIFIED BY ADDED SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/17 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL PHUM KPAO SR SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SERBIA WEEKLY UPDATE (4/16-4/20) BELGRADE 00000533 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 B&D REF: BELGRADE 489 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (U) This cable summarizes notable events relating to Serbia and Kosovo. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Summary: The first half of the week was dominated by GoS reactions to a mischaracterization of remarks by U/S Burns in testimony before Congress, while the second half of the week was devoted to fawning coverage of the visits of a gaggle of Foreign Ministers, notably Russian FM Lavrov - which local press portrayed as a focusing of global attention on the Kosovo issue (but which was in fact a long-planned Ministerial of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Commission). The GoS has embarked on a vigorous media campaign designed to convince Serbia and potential UNSC voters that the Serbian-Russian call for continued negotiations has scuppered the Ahtisaari plan. Meanwhile, the UNSC announced a fact-finding mission headed by Belgium will visit Belgrade and Kosovo April 26-28. ¶3. (c) Analysis - Serbia's Kosovo Counter-Offensive: Each in their own way, Kostunica and Tadic are continuing their anti-Ahtisaari Plan counteroffensive. Belgrade is full of the news that the UNSC is coming to restart "real" negotiations on Kosovo's future. The German Ambassador has been crucified in public and in government protests to Berlin over his statements that were supposed to be private, but weren't (ref). The Under Secretary's reiteration of what has been a consistent USG policy on Kosovo was (some say willfully) misrepresented and immediately pounced upon by the PM's office. The atmosphere created by the political elite is one of continued denial, obfuscation, deception, confusion, and a certain volatility. This looks to be the way Kostunica wants it, and to a lesser degree it is not totally unwelcome to Tadic either. Both have been warning us that our "one-sided and precipitous" action on Kosovo independence would shake the democratic foundation of Serbia, so now they claim it is happening. We can expect all of Serbia's leaders to heat up their victimization rhetoric in the coming weeks, to play up any real or perceived cracks in Contact Group or UNSC unity, to excoriate anyone who challenges their claim that there is another way out of the Kosovo morass, and to treat any high-level visit to the country as proof positive that new negotiations have begun. End summary and analysis. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶4. (U) PM Kostunica told local media April 16 that the arrival of a UNSC Mission in Kosovo would be an important first step in launching new negotiations by a new international envoy, adding that the Belgrade authorities are preparing and closely cooperating with Russia for the arrival of the mission. ¶5. (U) President Tadic told Kai Eide in a meeting in Belgrade April 17 that independence for Kosovo was unacceptable and that Serbia was committed to stability and peace in the region. Tadic stressed that Serbia would use diplomatic means to defend its state interest, and that a solution for Kosovo must be based on compromise acceptable to both sides. Kostunica used the Eide visit to underscore that the upcoming UNSC mission represented the first step in starting new negotiations on Kosovo with a new international mediator, and praised the impartiality of Eide's previous UN reporting on standards implementation - feeding media speculation that Belgrade is pushing for Eide to replace Ahtisaari in a continued negotiation process. Eide subsequently denied in Pristina that he would replace Ahtisaari, reminding the media that the reason for his visit to Serbia was to brief Pristina and Belgrade on a NATO foreign ministers' meeting scheduled the following week in Oslo. ¶6. (U) Belgrade electronic media quoted Chinese Vice Premier Hui Liangyu April 18 as urging respect for Resolution 1244 and a negotiated settlement arrived through talks between Belgrade and Pristina, and opposing an imposed Kosovo solution and setting deadlines. In his talks with Hui, PM Kostunica stressed that Serbia highly appreciates China's position on Kosovo, and insisted that it is possible to find a negotiated and viable settlement for Kosovo which is substantial autonomy within Serbia. Tadic, meanwhile, reiterated for media that Serbia would strive by diplomatic and legal means to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. ¶7. (SBU) At a Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Ministerial Conference in Belgrade April 19, Tadic said that the process of determining the future status of Kosovo must be finalized "in a European way, with the protection of Serbia's territorial integrity and meeting the needs of the province's citizens." He stressed that while Serbia will not recognize Kosovo's possible independence, it remains committed to European values and further European integration. According to visiting EUR DAS Bryza, Tadic's further remarks that Kosovo could have "precedential" consequences elicited a smirk and mild shaking of the head from Russian FM Lavrov, who was in BELGRADE 00000533 002.4 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY POLLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 B&D attendance. ¶8. (SBU) As part of Serbia's "diplomatic offensive", FonMin Vuk Draskovic met with South African President Mbeki and his counterpart Zuma April 13. Draskovic reported to Serbian media that the South African officials stressed that countries' territorial integrity was guaranteed by the UN Charter which must be respected. For details of the meeting, see Pretoria 1361. FLAP OVER U/S BURNS' STATEMENT -------------- ¶9. (U) Belgrade media have given wide coverage to the reaction of the Serbian Government to a mischaracterization of U/S Burns' speech at the Council of Foreign Relations in Washington April 17. Shortly after the remarks were publicized, the GoS and President Tadic issued formal statements that any unilateral recognition of the independence of Kosovo will be a brutal violation of the UN Charter, UN Resolution 1244 and international law, and warned that Belgrade will reject this recognition as invalid and a direct interference with Serbia's internal affairs. The GoS, Tadic's staff, and the media all had misinterpreted the statement, claiming that U/S Burns had endorsed USG unilateral recognition of a Kosovar Albanian unilateral declaration of independence. ¶10. (U) U/S Burns' statement that his remarks were mischaracterized were later carried in the press as well, and the Ambassador corrected the Serbian government's misinformed statement at a previously-scheduled appearance at the Independent Journalists' Association (NUNS),saying that U/S Burns clearly said that the U.S. would work in the UNSC to support the supervised independence of Kosovo and that the U.S. wanted Kosovo's independence to be agreed within the framework of UNSC. The Ambassador has since used other opportunities, publicly and privately to express our concern over precipitous GOS and media reactions without the facts. LAVROV'S VISIT -------------- ¶11. (U) Russian FM Lavrov's visit was widely covered in local press, which focused on his meetings with Tadic and Kostunica. His statements to press following the meetings reiterated Russia's commitment to continued negotiations and respect for implementation of UNSCR 1244 - the provisions of which he said had been completely unfulfilled. He insisted that an imposed solution for Kosovo is absolutely unacceptable, commenting that this was not the first time the U.S. had had "its own view" on an issue. Lavrov said after his meeting with Kostunica, and later in an interview with state television, that Ahtisaari's plan has collapsed, as it did not take into consideration the interests of one of the parties, adding that Russia has prepared constructive initiatives in response to the plan that could lead to a resumption of talks on Kosovo and the devising of a solution acceptable to Belgrade and Pristina. He added that it was "blackmail" to advance arguments in favor of accelerating a Kosovo decision lest security be jeopardized and a new wave of violence precipitated, noting pointedly that KFOR was well-equipped to handle outbreaks of violence, and that if it did not, any resulting violence would be solely KFOR's fault. ¶12. (U) Kostunica repeated the "blackmail" argument in public remarks with Lavrov after their meeting, adding that the UNSC would not abandon principles that it had been guided by in adopting 1244 in ¶1999. He claimed that the UNSC would respect its fundamental document which guarantees the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and from which Serbia could not be exempted. President Tadic said following his meeting with the Russian FM that Serbia is prepared to take on its share of responsibility for stability in the Balkans, and expects legally correct treatment on the Kosovo issue in the UNSC. After meeting with Lavrov, Tadic said that the UNSC mission should also visit the Serb enclaves to enable the mission to assess the implementation of res. 1244. ¶13. (C) Advisors to Tadic and Kostunica made themselves unavailable for additional readouts from the meetings. Russian Ambassador to Serbia Aleksander Alexeev, meanwhile, told the Ambassador Tadic and Kostunica had portrayed identical positions in every regard during their meetings with Lavrov. The Kostunica meeting, he said, focused more heavily on planning for the upcoming Security Council visit to Belgrade and Pristina, which Alexeev said would have to include a healthy dose of visits to Serb enclaves to allow UNSC Permreps to get a "full picture" of the situation on the ground. He said partition was not raised, and Russia did not intend to explore it unless and until the GoS formally proposed it. He also noted that the delegation had been struck by the strength, in particular, of Kostunica's conviction to stay the course of current Serbian policy. ¶14. (c) Alexeev assured the Ambassador that Lavrov did not promise a veto to either Tadic or Kostunica. In fact, he said Lavrov made it clear that Russia would take a "wait and see" attitude towards developments in the UNSC, and would be willing to work with the BELGRADE 00000533 003.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 B&D Council on a resolution that accorded to international legal principles. In particular, Laexeev said Russia would be ready to discuss specific status-neutral issues including decentralization, protection of patrimonial sites, returns, freedom of movement, and security. He said Russia wanted to work with the U.S. and EU constructively on a resolution that would be palatable to both sides. Alexeev said inclusion of language on Kosovo as a precedent was not necessary, perhaps even unwelcome, since such language would be counter to objective reality - separatist groups elsewhere in the world would see Kosovo as a precedent for using threats of violence to gain political ends no matter how the UNSC chose to characterize it. Later, speaking in a strictly personal capacity, Alexeev floated the concept of a resolution that enumerated restrictions to Kosovar sovereignty, to include armed forces (e.g., no force deployable outside Kosovo under a Kosovar flag),foreign policy, and a seat in the UN. ¶15. (U) Serbian wire service Tanjug reported April 20 that after Lavrov's declaration that Ahtisaari's plan has collapsed, the U.S. announced a continuation of "serious consultations" with Russian top level representatives. Quoting a "U.S. State Department source," Tanjug reported that while the U.S. understands Russia's concern, it regards Ahtisaari's plan as the only possible solution to the Kosovo problem and talks are being held on this issue. In fact, Tanjug had inaccurately linked Department-issued guidance on Kosovo and the Russian position into a U.S. reaction to Lavrov's statement in another example of media inventiveness supporting the GOS party line. NEGOTIATING TEAM SHAKE-UP (?) -------------- ¶16. (C) Leon Kojen, Tadic's appointee to the GoS Kosovo negotiating team, resigned abruptly on April 17, citing frustration over parallel negotiations he claimed were being conducted by members of Tadic's staff (namely foreign policy advisor Vuk Jeremic) with a handful of European states, including notably Austria. Jeremic has not denied the claim, and in fact it looks to be true - Jeremic is a consistent policy shopper. At the same time, Kojen has long harbored resentment towards the clique of thirty-somethings who seem to run policy in the Presidency. Moreover, a divide appeared between Kojen and Tadic just prior to the resignation over Kojen's role in interfering with Orthodox Church reconstruction work in Kosovo. Kojen's previous close relationship with Kostunica and the GoS' decision not to accept his resignation simply means that Kojen will in future carry a Kostunica badge rather than a Tadic one, with no difference in substance on the Kosovo issue. OTHER DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES -------------- ¶17. (c) The Ambassador met with Albanian deputy FM Edith Harxhi at the latter's request April 19. Harxhi, in town for the BSEC ministerial, also met with FM Draskovic, but did not meet Tadic or Kostunica. Drawing on extensive recent experience in Kosovo (she said she spent the better part of the last five years in Pristina), Harxhi offered several intriguing insights: She said less than one percent of Kosovo Albanians have an interest in joining with Albania, noting they are "super-focused" on attaining independence, and have no interest in giving that up by merging with any other state once they get it. She also wryly noted that Pristina might very well have better-established institutions of government than Tirana, having had the benefit of European assistance without the detriment of decades of post-socialist baggage. ¶18. (c) Harxhi maintained that the specter of Kosovo Albanian violence against Kosovo Serbs has been exaggerated, saying the greatest wish of most of the population - Albanian, Serb, or other - is simply to get on with their lives. She noted that Kosovo Albanians regularly travel to and through Gracanica for shopping and other reasons, without molestation, and said one can hear Serbian spoken in cafes throughout Kosovo. She pointed out that neither the Kosovo-Macedonia nor the Kosovo-Albania borders are unstable - only the Kosovo-Serbia line, which she attributed to the lack of a defined status. She also said the Kosovo Albanian leadership needed to spend less time in world capitals and more time in town hall meetings throughout Kosovo, explaining to common citizens of all ethnicities what the Ahtisaari plan will do for them and showing through concrete measures their own commitment to protect and respect minority populations. ¶19. (U) British Lord Russell Johnston has been reelected president of the CoE political committee on Kosovo. According to the Head of Serbian delegation Aligrudic, although the Serbians attempted to prevent Johnston's reelection, the outcome was expected. Aligrudic added that Johnson had at the January meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of CoE (PACE) presented a report supporting Kosovo's independence, however in the resolution adopted by PACE the word independence was removed. ¶20. (U) Belgrade media, citing the Itar-Tass news agency, reported BELGRADE 00000533 004.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY POLOFF IAN CAMPBELL FOR REASONS 1.4 B&D April 17 that Russian President Putin assessed that the UNSC Mission should determine the implementation of UNSCR 1244, including the return of refugees. Independent media service B92, meanwhile, reported that the U.S. and EU will put pressure on Russia to accept a UN plan that would give independence to Kosovo and will communicate a message to this effect at the Contact Group meeting in Moscow. The main argument will be that they, not Russia, will have to deal with violence that would break out as a result of delaying the Kosovo status solution. ¶21. (U) Serbian daily Danas reported April 19 that Dutch ambassador to Serbia Ron Van Dariel said while he understood the complexity of the situation surrounding the Kosovo issue, his government supported the efforts made by Ahtisaari. He also said that new talks wouldn't solve the problem, and stressed that Serbia and Kosovo needed a quick and clear outcome because delaying the process would not help the future development of either side. ¶22. (U) Belgrade media reported a Reuters interview with Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer where he said that it was necessary to find a formula to implement the essence of Ahtisaari's plan but not to humiliate Belgrade. The media focused on the part that the Chancellor was working with the Serbian President and his people to find a formula that would implement Ahtisaari's plan and also be good for Serbia and Kosovo. Following an urgent call from Tadic requesting a clarification, Gusenbauer's spokesman announced that Reuter's made an incorrect assessment when it reported that the Chancellor was discussing the independence of Kosovo with Belgrade. Austrian FonMin Ursula Plasnik told a news conference in Belgrade April 18 that Austria supports Ahtisaari's plan for Kosovo and denied "a new initiative" for the province. The Austrian Ambassador to Serbia echoed this sentiment in a call to the Ambassador the same day. ¶23. (U) EU High Rep Spokeswoman Gallach said April 17 that EU supports the process of resolving the Kosovo issue within UN and reaching a consensus for the adoption of UNSC resolution on the status of Kosovo. Top EU diplomatic officials told BETA that unilateral recognition of Kosovo is what the U.S. wants to avoid as well. Responding to a question regarding their reaction if the potential UNSC resolution is blocked, EU diplomats said that they certainly do not want this to happen but the danger of unilateral recognition would rise dramatically in case of such a blockade. ¶24. (U) European diplomatic sources reportedly told BETA April 18 that while they understand that Serbia's politics is being burdened by the Kosovo issue, they pointed out that the Kosovo status solution should not be linked to Serbia's association with the EU. They added that it would be a mistake to think that the EU was making EU membership conditional on the solution on Kosovo status and tragic, if Serbia's progress towards Europe is derailed because of the Kosovo issue. ¶25. (U) Speaking at a seminar organized by the Crisis Management Initiative organization in Helsinki, UN Envoy Ahtisaari stated on Tuesday that he hopes that the UNSC will make some kind of decision during spring. He also hinted at the possibility of delay, saying that the obstacle for Kosovo independence has not been so much the opposition of Serbia, as uncertainty on how Russia, a permanent member of UNSC, will act in the matter. RTS reported Rohan's statement that Kosovo will be given the status of independence by the end of May, adding that the UNSC fact finding mission would be collecting evidence for two to three days, after which its report would be reviewed by the UNSC and put to a vote. He also said that the Russian representatives would realize that blocking Kosovo's independence was destabilizing the entire Balkan region. POLT