A/S FRIED'S VISIT TO SERBIA YIELDS FEW SURPRISES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000310

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/17
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SR
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S VISIT TO SERBIA YIELDS FEW SURPRISES


Classified by: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4
(b,d)

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Ambassador Fried used his March 5-6 visit to
Belgrade to focus Serbia's leadership and youth on the
country's long-term future as a Euro-Atlantic partner. The
A/S encouraged both Tadic and Kostunica to take strong
measures to give Serbia a European future regardless of the
Kosovo outcome. He congratulated them on Serbia's PfP
invitation and reminded them of the responsibilities that
being an aspiring NATO member entails -- including full
cooperation with the ICTY -- while stressing U.S.
willingness to help throughout the NATO accession process,
if Serbia were interested and willing to do its part.
Tadic voiced readiness to seize Serbia's European future
whatever the outcome of Kosovo's status. Kostunica
appeared content to hunker down and complain. End Summary.

KOSOVO: TADIC PRAGMATIC, KOSTUNICA RETRENCHING
-------------- -

2. (C) In separate meetings with President Tadic, PM
Kostunica, and outgoing FONMIN Draskovic on March 5, A/S
Fried encouraged his interlocutors to look past the
immediate aftermath of the Kosovo negotiations and to bring
Serbia into a Euro-Atlantic future. He underscored that he
did not expect them to welcome or even endorse an
independent Kosovo, but did expect them to accept its
reality and focus on the best interests of the Serbian
people. He noted that many of Serbia's proposed amendments
to the Ahtisaari plan -- for instance, the references to
Serbia negotiating post-status security arrangements
directly with the UN -- were simply not workable. Fried
encouraged both Tadic and Kostunica to go to Vienna on
March 10 for the final Elephant Round of negotiations armed
with practical suggestions to optimize the protection of
the Kosovo Serb community under the Ahtisaari plan; serious
proposals would get a serious hearing. He warned them not
to count on a Russian veto in the UNSC and emphasized that
only a UNSC resolution would guarantee an international
presence in Kosovo that could protect Kosovo Serbs from
Albanian extremist violence and longer-term pressure.


3. (S) Tadic -- expectedly forward-looking and wishing to
appear cooperative -- stressed that he could not publicly
endorse independence for Kosovo but that he would continue
to negotiate and would not support acts of violence. He
distanced himself from the tactics of his Vienna
negotiators, saying that they had a narrow mandate and were
captives of domestic public opinion. Tadic (protect)
assured the A/S that he would go to Vienna on March 10 and
floated the idea of making international oversight of
Serbian religious and cultural sites in Kosovo a permanent
arrangement. He did not ask for a postponement of the
Vienna talks, and he did not mention either partition of
Kosovo or even a Serbian entity within Kosovo. He said he
had not spoken with the Russians about a UNSC veto and is
not counting on such an outcome.


4. (S) Above all, Tadic -- who tacitly acknowledged the
impending loss of Kosovo -- stressed that he would strive
for a European future after Kosovo had been resolved. The
A/S told him that Euro-Atlantic integration is attainable
for all Serbs and that Tadic, as a well-respected and
forward-looking Serbian patriot, is the only leader capable
of bringing his country into NATO and the EU. He reminded
Tadic that the U.S. supported him but could only do so
much; the drive for a Euro-Atlantic future must come from
Belgrade. At the end of their one-on-one discussion
following the meeting, Tadic noted that the international
community should have made Kosovo independent in 1999,
"when Milosevic was in power."


5. (C) Kostunica was dour, though not hostile. He said
that Serbia would continue to insist on its territorial
integrity and would at the final Elephant Round offer
nothing but a principled defense of Serbia's continued
sovereignty over Kosovo. While paying lip service to
Serbia's European future, he spent most of the discussion
attacking Ahtisaari, using his customary legalistic
arguments. He accused Ahtisaari of bias toward the
Albanian side, of solely pursuing a "solution" rather than
a compromise, and of overstepping his mandate by attempting
to redraw Serbia's borders. He repeatedly invoked the UN
Charter and its purported protection of Serbia's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, stressing that a
compromise would only be possible within that framework.
He complained that Serbia is now facing a Kosovo Albanian
perception (vice reality) that Kosovo will gain
independence, which he claims makes it difficult for

BELGRADE 00000310 002 OF 003


Belgrade to negotiate with Pristina.


6. (C) The A/S urged Kostunica to think of Serbia's
European future and not to destroy the chances for Kosovo's
Serb community to continue to live there. Kostunica did
not give much of a response, except to say that Serbia
would defend its principles. He complained that if UN 1244
had been fully implemented, the Kosovo Serb IDPs would have
been able to return to and integrate within Kosovo long
ago. A/S Fried told Kostunica that the most recent case of
intimidation of Kosovo Serbs was at the hands of other
Kosovo Serbs: extremists who forcibly broke up a moderate
Serb meeting in Gracanica the previous weekend. The
extremists seemed to enjoy Serbian government backing,
which must cease. Kostunica, surprised, defended the
intimidation as "just politics, as in Belgrade."


7. (C) Draskovic pushed the "one Serbia, two systems"
proposal he promulgated last week, likening Kosovo to
Cyprus or Taiwan. Like Tadic, he seemed well aware of the
reality of Kosovo's impending separation from Serbia, and
he told the A/S that he fears popular support for Euro-
Atlantic integration will plummet when Kosovo becomes
independent. A/S Fried applauded Draskovic's historic role
as a Serbian patriot, but noted that such a "One Serbia"
approach would not be feasible. Ambassador Polt stressed
that the U.S. is counting on Draskovic to lend his
powerful, popular voice to the Serbian people and encourage
them to embrace a European future.

RELATIONS WITH NATO
--------------

8. (C) Both Tadic and Draskovic thanked the A/S for the
U.S.'s support for Serbia's admission to PfP. Tadic
repeatedly emphasized that NATO membership is a high
priority for him and that the inclusion of all Balkan
countries in NATO would be critical for regional stability.
The A/S stressed that Tadic's letter had convinced the
Secretary to support PfP for Serbia because she trusted

SIPDIS
Tadic's judgment that PfP would help the pro-Western forces
in Serbia. (Kostunica made no references to PfP or NATO
during his discussions.)


9. (C) The A/S reminded Tadic of the two obstacles between
Serbia and NATO: ICTY fugitive Ratko Mladic and a clear
consensus within Serbia in favor of joining NATO. Tadic
acknowledged that only 35-40 percent of Serbs held a
positive view of NATO but opined that most Serbs think it
is important to join NATO even if they dislike the
organization. The A/S offered to work with Belgrade on a
NATO accession strategy, emphasizing that these plans have
worked well for all countries that have requested them. He
promised Tadic that Serbia would not be left out but
stressed that Belgrade's full support for and cooperation
in that accession plan would be crucial.


10. (C) Tadic said he was pleased with what he had been
able to accomplish so far on defense reform and had
insisted to Kostunica that defense reforms must continue
under the new government. He asked for increased IMET
funding so that Belgrade could proceed with these reforms
as quickly as possible. Ambassador Polt replied that
Belgrade must demonstrate marked progress on issues like
implementing the SOFA and GLOC and cooperating with the
ICTY before we could make a robust argument for additional
IMET funding.

ICTY
--------------

11. (C) Tadic told the A/S he hopes to push through
parliament a resolution condemning the Srebrenica massacre
and maintained that cooperation with the ICTY, including
Mladic?s arrest and transfer to The Hague, will top his
agenda in the new government. Although he is displeased
with the lack of movement on ICTY cooperation under the
outgoing DSS government, Tadic said that in last week's
coalition talks, both DS and DSS had agreed on the
importance of fulfilling Serbia's obligations toward the
ICTY. Tadic stressed, however, that full ICTY cooperation
would not be possible until a government is in place.
Kostunica also briefly mentioned ICTY cooperation,
acknowledging that it was essential for Euro-Atlantic
integration, but he made no explicit reference to Mladic.

NEW GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS
--------------

12. (C) Tadic said that he expects a stable government to
be formed in mid-March and would encourage a coalition with
DSS, Mladjan Dinkic's G17 Plus, Cedomir Jovanovic's Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP),and all minority parties -- though
he acknowledged that this arrangement is unlikely given the

BELGRADE 00000310 003 OF 003


refusal of DSS and LDP to work together. Kostunica
expressed satisfaction with the elections, adding that he
is looking ahead to the municipal, provincial, and
presidential elections later this year. He also indicated
approval of the new constitution, saying that it
establishes a modern, democratic framework for the laws
Serbia is trying to pursue.

COMMENT
--------------

13. (C) Tadic and Kostunica are clearly wearied by the
Kosovo process, with Kostunica grasping at straws with his
legalistic arguments and Tadic just wanting the process to
be over. We should look to March 10 as an opportunity to
take reasonable Serb proposals, if Tadic makes them (and he
might have to make them offline),so that Ahtisaari can
stand before the UNSC and honestly say that he took every
reasonable, workable proposal he got from either side. Of
course, Tadic may not be able to present even those
suggestions he raised informally with the A/S. And even if
he does and Ahtisaari incorporates them, Kostunica will
trash the agreement (and Tadic will not be willing to
defend it). Still, we knew that no Serbian politician, or
at least not a leading one, would accept the package. So
the best we may be able to achieve is an honest set of
proposals.


14. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Fried.

POLT