POWER STRUGGLE DEEPENS BETWEEN SERBIAN MUSLIMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000288 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 TAGS: KISL KPAO KIRF PGOV PREL SR SUBJECT: POWER STRUGGLE DEEPENS BETWEEN SERBIAN MUSLIMS REF: 06 BELGRADE 678 Classified By: POLOFF Ian Campbell, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Serbia's new Law on Religion has brought to the fore long-simmering tensions within Serbia's Islamic community (IC). Serbian Islamic leaders are deep into negotiations over unification, but with separate ideas about where the centralized administrative authority should be based, and about whether they should come under the ultimate spiritual authority of the Supreme Council (Riyaset) of Sarajevo or have independent spiritual authority. We remain engaged with both sides, counseling dialogue over confrontation. End Summary ¶2. (U) A new Law on Religion, signed by President Tadic in April 2006 (despite international objections),has become a major irritant in a long-standing leadership struggle between the Belgrade and Novi Pazar factions of the Serbian Islamic community. Article 19 of the law states that "No religious organisation may be entered into the Register whose name contains a name or part of a name expressing the identity of a Church, religious community or religious organisation which is already entered in the Register or submitted an application for entry first." As such, only one organization may be called the "Islamic" community, which means that the IC must pick one name and one leader in order to gain recognition for and registry of their religion. The Belgrade IC and the Sandzak IC have differing ideas on how to structure the IC in Serbia, and to whom to look for leadership. ¶3. (U) The Sandzak IC (which has the majority of Muslims in Serbia),led by Mufti Muamer Zukorlic, would like to create an IC that consists of four meshihats - Sandzak, Belgrade/Central Serbia, Presevo Valley, and Vojvodina ) which would remain part of the Sarajevo Riyaset. The four meshihats would be governed by a Supreme Assembly, based on the proportion of believers in each, with a president who would handle mainly administrative issues. Zukorlic insists that the supreme leader be from the Islamic community of Bosnia, and that all Muslims in Serbia be referred to as "Bosniaks." (4) (C) Zukorlic was appointed by, and owes allegiance to, the head of Bosnia's IC, Reis-i-Ulema Mustafa ef. Ceric. Zukorlic currently has a voting position in the Bosnian Riyaset, which is headquartered in Sarajevo. He claims the relationship is only spiritual, but as a voting member of the board this is clearly not the case. ¶4. (U) The Belgrade IC's most recent proposal is to form a Riyaset in Serbia that would be equal to and independent of the other riyasets in the region. It would consist of four meshihats, and would hold elections for the Reis of Serbia. Belgrade seems willing to accept that the Reis may be held by the Sandzak. Under this proposal, Belgrade Mufti Hamdija Jusufspahic insists on having an independent Islamic Community of Serbia with only an observer's position in both the Sarajevo and Pristina Islamic Communities. He believes the members of the Islamic Community should be referred to as "Muslims" since not all of the believers are Bosniaks (some are Roma, Albanians, Ashkali, and Serbs). Belgrade previously proposed a similar arrangement, but wanted a coordinating body to be in charge during the transitional period of 2-3 years, with the head of the coordinating body rotating among the communities. This proposal was rejected by the Sandzak community, with the basic problem being the requirement that Sandzak lessen ties with the Bosnian Riyaset. ¶5. (C) The Belgrade IC currently controls all of the municipalities in Serbia, except for the Sandzak ) where most Serbian Muslims live. Sandzak leaders have been strongly hinting that they will provide funding to those that support them, in order to convince believers to sign their initiative. They claim to have signatures from all municipalities except Belgrade and Mali Zvornik. Both sides are trying to get more deputies in the Assembly on their side. Belgrade recently consulted with Reis Ceric in Sarajevo regarding its plan, but did not receive any open support. This is not surprising, as Reis Ceric often speaks publicly about the Bosnian IC's spiritual unity with its Sandzak "brothers." ¶6. (C) Zukorlic has been hard at work soliciting international and local support for his position, including from President Tadic and Rasim Ljajic. Zukorlic also met with the German Ambassador to Belgrade to request support, as Germany currently holds the EU presidency and is also home to many Bosniaks. In a recent visit to Novi Pazar Jusufspahic publicly met with Novi Pazar's controversial mayor, Sulejman Ugljanin, who gave support for unification of the communities, but did not give explicit support to either side. The outgoing Minister of Religion, a DSS member, has excellent relationships with Belgrade, but at this moment he and most other politicians are carefully avoiding public offers of support. ¶7. (SBU) In a meeting on January 29, Belgrade initiated the establishment of the Serbian riyaset. The meeting was actually a unilateral session of the Islamic Community of Serbia (Belgrade) where representatives from 52 municipalities formally initiated establishment of the Riyaset of the IC of Serbia. This meeting was a response to the announced "unification session" initiated by the Sandzak IC. On the other side, discussions were held in early February in Sarajevo between the Bosnian IC and the Sandzak leadership. Belgrade was not invited to this event. Following these meetings, the Assembly of the IC of Serbia (i.e., the Belgrade faction) on February 19 formally named Jusufspahic "acting reis'ulema," effectively a unilateral declaration of independence by the Serbian IC. Zukorlic backers immediately denounced the appointment and declared it illegal. ¶8. (C) The local security community has voiced concern to us that in its struggle to find support, the Sandzak IC, through its close ties to the Bosnian Riyaset, might bring its practitioners in contact with extremist elements in Bosnia, most of whom live outside Sarajevo. This danger should not be overstated, as Reis Ceric and the Bosnian IC have repeatedly condemned extremism and recently formed a commission to investigate the phenomenon in Bosnia. However, it is a remote possibility. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: We have excellent relations with both sides, and have repeatedly met with both sides individually and encouraged them to work out their disagreements through dialogue and compromise. The Embassy's Iftar in October, 2006, afforded us an opportunity to demonstrate support for moderation and cooperation with both Muftis together. Despite our encouragement for compromise, both sides see the contest as a zero-sum game and are unlikely to bridge their differences in the near term. Meanwhile, the spiritual fight is turning increasingly political, with Zukorlic receiving support form Ljajic and Jusufspahic reaching out to Ugljanin ) whose "independent" supporters voted to appoint Jusufspahic on February 19 as representatives of the Sandzak Muslims. ¶10. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Sarajevo. POLT