VINCA NUCLEAR INSTITUTE: CAS STAFFING, VIND

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000236 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR OES/STC DOE FOR BRIAN WAUD, GREG HERDES, DOUG DAHL, AND IGOR BOLSHINSKY UNVIE FOR IAEA SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ENRG KNNP PARM EAID OTRA SR SUBJECT: VINCA NUCLEAR INSTITUTE: CAS STAFFING, VIND PROGRAM, AND OTHER UPDATES REF: A) 05 STATE 215031; B) 05 BELGRADE 1980 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy has been informed by Vinca Nuclear Institute direction that the Department of Energy (DoE)-built Central Alarm Station (CAS) will be staffed in the near future. After the institute and the Ministry of Interior (MUP) reached an agreement on CAS staffing, Vinca identified individuals to staff the CAS and scheduled training to begin around February 20. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to identify funding for the Vinca Institute Nuclear Decommissioning (VIND) program, and preparations for the repackaging and transportation of the spent fuel are underway. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Staffing of the CAS: During a meeting at Vinca on January 23, Vinca Director Dr. Jovan Nedeljkovic informed Econ Chief and ESTH officer that a compromise had been reached with the MUP on staffing of the CAS. MUP police officers would remain at the institute, but some would be pulled from gate duty to patrol the compound, while others would help man the CAS (MUP had planned to remove police officers from the institute completely.) Vinca agreed to designate some of its staff to also man the CAS. The Director believed that the Ministry of Science would fund part or all of salaries for those who staff the CAS. Below is the staffing schedule agreed upon by Vinca and the MUP: (V = Vinca employee; P = MUP police officer) 0700-1500: Reactor buildings: In use by Vinca staff CAS: 1 V and 1 P Gates: 1 V and 1 P each gate Mobile: 2 P 1500-2300: Reactor buildings: Closed at 1500 CAS: 1 V and 1 P Gates: 1 V and 1 P each gate Mobile: 2 P 2300-0700: CAS: 1V and 1P Gates: 2 P each gate. Gate towards Belgrade shut at 2300; gate towards village of Vinca remains open all night. Mobile: 2 P On weekends, the institute is closed, and staffing is handled as with the night shift. ¶3. (SBU) Dr. Milan Orlic, who was hand picked by the new Director to be his Assistant Director, also handles security at Vinca. ESTH officer met Orlic during a site visit on February 6, and he and the �0A;Director both repeated their conviction that training would begin very soon. On February 13, the Director telephoned ESTH officer to inform her that final CAS equipment checks would take place on February 16, and that training would begin on February 20. CAS staffing has been a long-term priority for Post (Reftel b),and ESTH officer has been pushing the issue since shortly after arrival at post in March ¶2005. In July 2006, the Ambassador wrote the Ministers of Science and Interior to encourage the two to cooperate in reaching a solution. IAEA Pushes on Security -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On February 24, ESTH officer met with Miroslav Gregoric, Section Head, and Pierre Legoux, Physical Protection Specialist, from the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security (ONS). The ONS officers were likewise keen to see the CAS staffed, and informed ESTH officer that they had driven home that point during a meeting held with the Vinca Director the day before. IAEA's VIND program manager Mike Durst made the same point. They claimed that staffing of the CAS had also been one recommendation from the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) survey they conducted early in 2006. ¶5. (SBU) The ONS officers said that they were disappointed in the Director's timeline for CAS staffing; they were sure that the "weeks" that had been promised, already too long of a delay, would in fact become "months." They told ESTH officer that if there would be a significant delay in re-opening the DoE contract to fund training for CAS staff, then the IAEA would fund the training itself (although the preference was for DoE to pay, to leave the IAEA funds for another project). Claims from the Vinca DIRECTOR that CAS staff could not begin work until a new government was formed are questionable; the ONS officers were informed by the Ministry of Science and Environmental Protection (MOS) that as soon as the Director signed the annual contract for Vinca staff, Ministry money would be forthcoming. ¶6. (SBU) The ONS officers said they had pointed out the fact that no rules of engagement for the police had yet been determined, and questioned what the officers would do if they do found someone trying to illegally access sensitive buildings. The ONS officers also criticized the lack of "housekeeping" at the facility, with miscellaneous debris scattered about the rooms, citing it as a problem not just for physical safety, but also radiation protection. Other complaints included the lack of safety and security culture on site at the Reactor "A" (RA) building when steel cut from the fuel pool was being offloaded, and the lack of a clearly marked control point where all who exit must stop for a radiation contamination check before leaving. Additionally, Vinca is apparently not a "critical asset" under the law on critical assets to be given priority protection by the state in case of an emergency, whereas embassies, for example, are. VIND program slowly moves ahead -------------- ¶7. (SBU) VIND program: During a meeting on January 22, IAEA officers Mike Durst and Ira Goldman informed Econ Chief and ESTH officer that they had learned from the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) (via a letter and a personal meeting in Belgrade) that the EU intended to provide some funds for the VIND program. The Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) came into force on January 1, 2007, to cover all projects funded in countries with candidate and potential candidate status, and Durst said the EU officials indicated that, from one particular EUR 20 million fund, as much as EUR 5.4 million had been earmarked specifically for the VIND project, to cover transport of spent fuel from Vinca to Russia. However, they were advised in a meeting with the Belgrade EAR office that funding may not be available before 2008. Durst and Goldman intend, therefore, to push for bridge funding in the meantime. Durst and Goldman also said that they would seek a donation from Norway or other interested parties to pay for the environmental remediation projects demanded by Russia, which account for $3 million of the $19.5 million in spent fuel reprocessing costs. They also continue to seek G-8 Global Partnership funding from Canada, funding from other European nations, and increased funding from DoE. They hope to schedule another donors' conference later this year. ¶8. (SBU) According to the IAEA officers, in addition to the U.S. promise of funding and equipment for the VIND program, the UK and Hungary will donate equipment and in-kind services, and Slovenia has promised regulatory expertise and perhaps a cash donation. It is anticipated that the total donations will soon reach more than USD 1 million, thereby reducing the amount of overall project dollars required. To help with fundraising, ESTH officer has, at the request of IAEA officers, individually approached representatives from a number of Belgrade-based missions to give an informal briefing about the project and encourage donations. ESTH officer held meetings with Japanese, Israeli, French, and South Korean diplomats. ¶9. (SBU) Durst and Goldman informed Embassy officers that the contract for repackaging and transport of the fuel rods was signed with a Russian company in September 2006. Preparations were ongoing, and they expected that transportation could take place in approximately 24-36 months. Incidentally, the radiation leak in the spent fuel pool is greater than was originally believed. Steel structures in the pool are being removed in preparation for repackaging operations. The contamination and dose levels observed are several times higher than anticipated; this implies that the fuel leakage may be much higher than the 30 percent predicted. GOS Control over Vinca Strengthened -------------- ¶10. Because of the problems experienced in convincing the GOS to fully implement the CAS project, Econ Chief and ESTH officer inquired about how the Vinca Director General was chosen, and whether the position came under the ultimate authority of the Government of Serbia (GOS). Vinca is a semi-autonomous institute, earning approximately half of its budget from private, commercial activity, and the MOS had indicated that it had little control over the Director. ¶11. However, a new law governing scientific institutions in Serbia was passed in 2006. During the January 23 meeting, new Director General Nedeljkovic informed Embassy officers that 70 of the 400 scientists at Vinca are elected to the institute's Scientific Advisory Board, and that this board chooses the new Director. The scientific board's decision is presented to the institute's managing board, comprised of four members of Vinca and four employees of the MOS, who must confirm the choice, which is then presented to the MOS. The MOS has final authority, but its policy is generally to agree with the managing board's recommendation, the Director said. The Director serves a four-year mandate, and is free to run again in the next elections. The Managing Board can dismiss the Director before his mandate expires for various specified reasons, such as poor performance. Incidentally, Nedeljkovic, an optical chemist by education, received his PhD from Clarkson University in upstate New York, and worked for seven years at Argonne National Laboratory. ¶12. Comment. As we understand results of the February 9 conference call, DoE and other Washington agencies are now willing to go forward on providing equipment for the VIND program, given positive movement on CAS staffing. We endorse such a move, as well as continued USG involvement in helping to round up sufficient funding to cover total costs of the VIND project. We will keep tabs on the CAS staffing and other security issues to make sure the GOS is doing its part. End comment. POLT