MORE REALISM OVER KOSOVO OUTSIDE SERBIA'S GOVERNMENT

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000203 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV UNSC SR SUBJECT: MORE REALISM OVER KOSOVO OUTSIDE SERBIA'S GOVERNMENT CIRCLES ¶1. (SBU) Summary: At a working breakfast with Serbia's analytical community, the Ambassador, together with the French Ambassador, took stock of the Ahtisaari plan and the way forward on Kosovo. Ambassador Polt stressed that active participation in the next stage of negotiations is the only way to have an effect on the outcome, and that, contrary to popular belief, taking a seat at the table is not equivalent to acceptance of independence for Kosovo. Participants reflected long-term guarded optimism about the Kosovo outcome based on a faith in the maturity of the Serbian electorate, but acknowledged that Kosovo will remain political kryptonite in the short term. End Summary ¶2. (SBU) On February 9th, the Ambassador hosted a working breakfast attended by the French Ambassador, several respected journalists, politicians and NGO representatives from Serbia and from Kosovo. The focus of the meeting was on Serbia's response to the Ahtisaari plan and the upcoming negotiations. Both Ambassadors stressed that more time, namely a significant delay in the next stage of negotiations, is not in Serbia's interest. Several participants noted that a distinction needed to be made between "popular time" and "political time." Politicians may benefit from a delay as they can leverage the current situation to strengthen their positions in ongoing coalition negotiations - but an extension will not affect the way the final outcome is accepted by the general public. They also noted that Kostunica's current strategy of delay and refusing to meet with Ahtisaari may actually be backfiring as may people feel that Kosovo is being oversold in an attempt to distract them from more immediate concerns. ¶3. (SBU) A moderate Kosovo Serb political leader provided the view from Mitrovica, and stressed that his constituents were extremely tense and unsettled about the upcoming decision regarding final status. According to him Kosovar Serbs are mainly afraid of two things - a mass exodus from the region and the potential division of Kosovo (driven by Belgrade) which would primarily affect Serbs south of the Ibar River. He was also concerned about triumphalist Albanian outbursts affecting Serbs the day after independence was declared, and the role that Serbs would have in a future Kosovo government and in society as whole. ¶4. (SBU) He also expressed his hope that GOS leaders would appear on national television and urge the Serbs to stay in Kosovo and to work with their Albanian counterparts in a constructive way to ensure that their concerns will be reflected in the new Kosovo constitution. Unfortunately both he and the majority of the other breakfast guests conceded that the more likely reaction from Belgrade would be that Prime Minister Kostunica's DSS would work through their contacts on the ground to encourage Serbs to leave the region in order to drum up international concern over the ensuing humanitarian crisis. Both Ambassadors stressed that the international community would not abandon Kosovo Serbs, and that the KFOR troops would protect Serbs and Albanians alike, stating that the lessons of March 17th had been learned and that the response to any violence would be quick and decisive. ¶5. (SBU) The group also spoke about some recent articles and press commentaries that openly discussed the likelihood of Kosovo independence, one editorial in the pro-government daily Politika having posited that Serbia should accept the inevitable and to move forward with EU and Euro-Atlantic integration. Ambassador Polt asked if the pieces constituted the beginnings of a more honest public dialog of Kosovo status reality. The journalists in the group stressed that a realistic, forward thinking movement may be fermenting in some sectors of society. That said, although the public would not rise up in opposition to unconstructive government rejection of Kosovo status, Serbs would not go along with a renewed break with the Western community. ¶6. (SBU) This meeting was part of an ongoing series of efforts we are making in cooperation with other Quint Ambassadors and Embassies to elicit Serb voices in favor of the Ahtisaari proposal and at least unhappy acceptance of Kosovo reality. At the very least, this meeting provided a forum for a constructive and thoughtful conversation among people who help shape public opinion in however small a way. The general consensus was that the current political situation is a product of the time the GOS lost by not negotiating and engaging the international community smartly over the past year. There was hope that the current batch of reactionary politicians both in Serbia and in Kosovo would be replaced by a more moderate group once final status was achieved. POLT