Serbian Government Warns EUR/SCE Deputy Director about

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001674 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KBTS KPAO SR MW KV SUBJECT: Serbian Government Warns EUR/SCE Deputy Director about Consequences of Kosovo Independence Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Officials of Serbia's ruling parties warned visiting EUR/SCE Deputy Director Robert Silberstein on November 28 that U.S. recognition of Kosovo independence would destabilize Serbia and the region. Kostunica's key lieutenants went further, saying the GOS was planning a tough response (NFI),but the United States, not Serbia, would be responsible for any instability. We strongly rejected these assertions. A senior member of President Tadic's Democratic Party (DS) urged the United States to delay recognition of Serbia until after Tadic's reelection in order to ensure a democratic victory and preserve Serbia's path towards European integration. A vice president of Prime Minister Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) said that Serbia would not "exchange" Kosovo for membership in the European Union, and would instead choose closer partnership with Moscow. Meanwhile, both Albanian and Serbian leaders from the Presevo Valley took advantage of a DCM-hosted dinner to express concern that Belgrade was neglecting the region. In a trip through the south, local politics -- especially development and investment -- trumped the Kosovo question that has absorbed the Belgrade's attention. Post will continue to reinforce the message that it is a mistake for Belgrade to believe its own rhetoric and we will continue dialogue with constructive voices in Belgrade on consequence mitigation, especially in the south. End Summary. DS - Delay Kosovo Independence to Help "the Good Guys" -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) MFA Political Director Borislav Stefanovic told visiting EUR/SCE Deputy Office Director Robert Silberstein on November 28 that he expected U.S. recognition of Kosovo to damage U.S.-Serbian ties and to disrupt President Tadic's pro-Western national agenda. Stefanovic, who is close to President Tadic, said that the President's reelection was critical for the Democratic Party (DS) goal of a strong relationship between the United States and Serbia. In that regard, Stefanovic urged the United States, "the beacon of freedom," to delay Kosovo recognition until after the second round of presidential elections, which he expected would be on February 3, ¶2008. A delay in Kosovo's declaration would allow Tadic to avoid defeat. Silberstein said that there was no appetite in Washington for further delay and real disappointment in Tadic's leadership. Stefanovic argued that Tadic was "the most pro-Western leader in the region" and that Tadic's reelection would be "crucial and strategic" to keep Serbia on a Euro-Atlantic path. Tadic's reelection as commander-in-chief would also bring "peace and stability guarantees." Early U.S. recognition, Stefanovic said, risked a "doomsday scenario" of both an independent Kosovo and Radicals in charge of Serbia; Stefanovic warned, "do not underestimate our ability to screw up." Stefanovic noted that Serbia would respond vigorously to a Kosovo coordinated declaration of independence (CDI) and should not take Serbia's western direction for granted. For example, he noted that the Government of Russia promised Serbia two billion dollars of FDI over the next seven to eight years. Looking for Assurances of U.S. Support -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Silberstein said that Stefanovic and other leaders should think carefully about reactions to a Kosovo CDI, and that Washington would look to Tadic and the DS to lead Serbia past Kosovo and towards Europe, rather than espouse a policy of rejectionism and opposition. Stefanovic said that Washington's expectations failed to consider the political context and did not acknowledge Serbia's efforts to maintain regional peace. He complained about Washington pressure for Tadic to encourage the public to accept the loss of Kosovo -- something no Serbia leader could do. The late Prime Minister Djindjic "was assassinated for less," Stefanovic said. Stefanovic said that Washington never praised Tadic for taking "difficult" steps such as apologizing for the Srebrenica massacre. Nonetheless, Stefanovic promised that damage to Serbia's relations with the West was a "redline the DS would not cross." DSS: Kosovo trumps EU -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Officials from Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) said that keeping Kosovo was more important to Serbia than joining the European Union. Kosovo Ministry State Secretary Dusan Prorokovic, a self-described "Euro-skeptic," said that Kosovo independence would be bad for the region and would "impair the regional security framework," but would not necessarily hurt Serbia. He claimed that Russia and "other Eastern countries" would provide enough investment to compensate for possible disruptions in relations with the West. Prorokovic raised Bosnia, saying that Republika Srpska "would naturally become a national issue," if Kosovo declared independence. Insinuating that the Radical Party BELGRADE 00001674 002 OF 002 would benefit at the polls, if the democrats failed to address this issue, he said that political leaders could either respond to the will of the electorate or lose power to those who did. In a separate meeting, DSS vice president and parliamentary caucus chair Milos Aligrudic said that delay or suspension of Serbia's entry into the EU "was not the end of the world...but losing Kosovo was." If the United States recognized Kosovo, he warned, Serbia would become "anti-American". ¶5. (SBU) Echoing Stefanovic's theme of U.S. responsibility, Prorokovic said that U.S. "pro-Albanian policies...forced Belgrade's hand." Aligrudic said that U.S. "insistence" on Kosovo independence discouraged any real negotiations and warned that a Kosovo declaration could also void the Kumanovo military agreement, but that "with this [Serbian] government" there would be no military option. Southern Serbia: Keep Belgrade Involved -------------- ¶6. (U) For Presevo Valley Serbs and Albanians, local development issues trumped the Kosovo debate. At a DCM-hosted dinner with GOS, British, and OSCE representatives, November 28, Stojanca Arsic, the Serb former mayor of Bujanovac and Armend Aliu, an Albanian who runs a development NGO, expressed worry that Belgrade was neglecting their region. Arsic and Aliu drove six-hours (together) from Bujanovac to attend the dinner and were direct with their concerns to the senior officials of the GOS Coordinating Body for Southern Serbia (CB) present at the event. Aliu said that if Kosovo became independent, Belgrade should do more, not less, to stabilize the south through investment rather than more militarization. CB economic head Nenad Popovic assured Arsic and Aliu that Belgrade "would take care of Southern Serbia," and Economic Ministry State Secretary Verica Kalanovic promised cooperative efforts between SIPDIS Belgrade and local governments. The DCM and Silberstein said the United States was working hard to achieve the "softest landing" for Serbia after Kosovo, which included pressure to keep Belgrade and the local leaders -- both represented at the table -- committed to each other. Serbia, however, had to seize the opportunities for progress inherent in resolving Kosovo's final status. In this context, it was in everyone's interest that Belgrade invests in the south and locals should engage with Belgrade. ¶7. (U) During Silberstein's trip through Southern Serbia, November 29, pragmatic Vranje mayor Miroljub Stojcic echoed Arsic and Aliu's concern that Belgrade was more worried about responding to Kosovo than about the impact of those responses on the ground. Stojcic said that he hadnot been consulted on Belgrade's Kosovo contingenc plans for Kosovo CDI and admitted that his regio would suffer from closure of the Kosovo border r other efforts to punish Kosovo. Albanian leades in Bujanovac and Presevo said that the local Abanians contributed to stability in the south and hat Belgrade had yet to deliver on promises -- spcifically regarding minority rights (to use the lbanian language, symbols, etc),key developmentprojects, and demilitarization in the region. Cmment -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The DS was more suppliant, the DSS more arrogant and tough. Their underlying message was the same, however. Both sought to link U.S. support for Kosovo independence to rgional destabilization, disruption of pro-Western movement in Serbia, and Serbia's move toward Russia. Our message to both was clear: We want Serbia to seize the opportunities for rapid integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions that would emerge after Kosovo status is resolved. At the same time, our red lines are well known and Serbia will have to shoulder the responsibility for its actions should it take provocative steps in the aftermath of a CDI. ¶9. (U) The United States plays a critical role in Southern Serbia. We will continue to emphasize to both Belgrade and Southern Serbia leaders that Presevo Valley Albanians must commit to peaceful integration in Serbia, and Belgrade must deliver on investment and political integration promises. This will be more important than ever during the next months, where political decisions from Belgrade could affect everyday life in Southern Serbia. End Comment. ¶10. (U) EUR/SCE Deputy Director Robert Silberstein has cleared this message. MUNTER