C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000993

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DEFENSE MINISTER SUGGESTS NEW TWIST ON
PRESIDENCY


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4
(b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Defense Minister Elias Murr believes Syria ultimately
will scuttle the most recent compromise idea (promoted by his
father Michel) for solving Lebanon's political impasse --
appointing Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General
Michel Sleiman for a two-year term to replace President Emile
Lahoud. Syria's only goal is continued political chaos in
Lebanon, and it will use its Lebanese allies to pull the plug
on any initiative that appears likely to bring an end to the
ongoing impasse, Murr contends. Perversely, the opposition
is now downplaying threats of a second government precisely
because that risk appeared to be pushing March 14 towards a
compromise. In Murr's mind, the two-year Sleiman presidency
scenario presents a win-win solution for March 14: by
feigning to support Sleiman, it would gain his loyalties (and
more importantly, those of the LAF) when the Syrian-backed
opposition eventually dashes his presidential aspirations.
End summary.

FADING OF TWO-GOVERNMENT THREAT:
ACTUALLY A SYRIAN PLOY TO PREVENT SOLUTION
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met
with Murr at his home on July 3. Much of the discussion
focused on an idea Murr's father, Metn political boss and MP
Michel Murr, has been promoting: a two-year transitional
presidency, filled by LAF Commander Michel Sleiman. (Michel
Murr argues that, while a two-year presidency is no one's
first choice, it is in fact the only viable solution.
Maronite presidential candidates, none of whom are assured of
victory this year, will embrace it, in the hopes of bettering
their chances for elections two years hence. Maronite
Patriarch Sfeir will accept it as preferable to a potential
vacuum in the office. March 8 leaders will hope that, in two
years, their parliamentary weight will be greater, given
summer 2009 elections. And so on.)

3. (C) In what seemed to us one of the more twisted
explanations for Syria's behavior in Lebanon, Elias Murr
argued that the recent waning of talk of a second government
was the result of Damascus' efforts to keep the political
situation on edge (though he also agreed the US visa ban was
"a good message"). The threat of a second government, which
Murr termed "a very dangerous game," had pushed Future
Movement leader Saad Hariri toward accepting a compromise in
the form of a two-year presidency, Murr claimed. Since
Syria's true intent is to avoid a compromise at any cost,
Murr explained, it now is withdrawing the threat to remove
any incentive for March 14 to reach a deal with the
opposition. Murr, essentially advocating that March 14 call
the opposition's bluff and agree to his father's proposal for
a two-year Sleiman presidency, said, "Let them (the
pro-Syrians) be the ones to say no." March 14 would then
reap the dual victory of being seen as the side that was
ready to compromise to put an end to the ongoing political
standoff, and of securing the support of Sleiman and the LAF
in the process. "It's a win-win solution," Murr said.

SUPPORT SLEIMAN TO GAIN HIS LOYALTY,
IN KNOWLEDGE HE'LL NOT WIN THE PRESIDENCY
--------------


4. (C) Echoing some of his father's earlier comments to the
Ambassador, Murr urged the US to express enthusiasm for a
Sleiman presidency, noting that Saad Hariri had already given
his support. Amal leader Nabih Berri would also agree
because, according to Murr, he was looking for a solution at
any price so as to appear blameless for the country's
political problems. The Patriarch would support any
consensus candidate. But, in fact, Sleiman would not become
president: the Syrians, in the end, would tell Hizballah not
to support Sleiman in its efforts to prevent a solution to
the political stalemate. There will be a vacuum, most likely
filled in a two-government scenario. So, Murr concluded, if
Sleiman believes he has March 14 and US support, while Syria
and Hizballah leave him in the lurch, we will gain his
loyalties and keep the army on our side. That would be a
significant accomplishment and reduce the support for the

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potential second cabinet.


5. (C) The Ambassador pointed out several problems with the
strategy: 1) UN Special Envoy for Lebanon Geir Pedersen
doesn't believe Hizballah will veto Sleiman; 2) Lebanese
Forces leader Samir Geagea, who harbors his own presidential
hopes, strongly dislikes Sleiman and would probably not risk
supporting him; 3) the Patriarch isn't fond of military
presidents and is even more allergic to tampering with the
constitution, which a two-year presidency and a Sleiman
presidency (because of prohibition on military candidates)
would require; 4) Sleiman is acting constructively now
because he is following Minister Murr's orders, but as head
of state would no longer have that constraint; 5) Sleiman has
not proven himself to be a very strong leader, often becoming
paralyzed for fear of offending one side or the other; and 6)
Murr's approach could actually be a trap to install another
Syrian-backed president, namely Sleiman, this time one with
the army behind him.

SLEIMAN NO LONGER A SYRIAN SATELLITE
--------------


6. (C) Murr's answer to the last concern was an emphatic no.
Sleiman already is indicating his growing disillusionment
with Damascus and Hizballah. He claimed to have cut his ties
with Syria following the March 14, 2005, demonstrations, when
he ordered the LAF to protect the protesters. Hizballah
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's presumption in giving

SIPDIS
the LAF "red lines" in its Nahr al-Barid fight offended him.
Though initially reluctant to send his forces into the Nahr
al-Barid camp (Murr admitted Sleiman's wariness about
upsetting the Shia was to blame for his initial inaction),
Sleiman now will do anything to defend his country and wants
to "destroy" anything related to Syria, Murr claimed. Nahr
al-Barid changed him, gave him a taste of what it means to be
a real Lebanese.


7. (C) Though agreeing that Sleiman is "not a leader," Murr
said Sleiman wants to prove he's a better politician than
commander-in-chief. Furthermore, as the last officer from
the pre-1975-1990 civil war generation, he enjoys the respect
of his troops, who "trust" him not to destroy the army.
However, Murr admitted, the general will have to fight to
maintain the unit of the army and avoid a Sunni-Shia split in
the upcoming months. But if March 14 supports his candidacy
for president, "at least we won't have an enemy in Sleiman,"
Murr contended, at a time when, more then ever, March 14
needs the LAF on its side.


8. (C) Murr dismissed Pedersen's opinion as a reflection of
his narrowly-focused concerns for UN forces in Lebanon. As
for the Patriarch, Murr said he had sent LAF G-2
(Intelligence) Director George Khoury to speak with him. The
Patriarch reportedly said he would not block a Sleiman
presidency if it resolves Lebanon's political problems and if
there's consensus. March 14 would work on Geagea and
Progressive Socialist Leader Walid Jumblatt. Murr emphasized
again that either Hizballah or Aoun would ultimately veto the
idea, so March 14's strategy should be to support it in order
to gain Sleiman's gratitude and loyalty, thus securing the
LAF on the side of March 14 in a two-government crisis.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Elias Murr would have us believe that -- as we busily
scribble our notes -- he is confiding to us insights he keeps
hidden from his powerful father Michel. Michel purports to
be pushing the idea of a two-year interim presidency, filled
by LAF Commander Sleiman, as a last-ditch, desperate move to
save Lebanon from the chaos Syria plans to impose. Elias, by
contrast, whispers conspiratorially that his father is naive
(an infrequent accusation against anyone in the wily Murr
clan), as it is impossible to avoid the chaos; Syria will not
allow a solution to Lebanon's political crisis that doesn't
restore Syrian hegemony. So March 14 leaders should be
applauding his father's initiative not because it has any
chance of success: it doesn't, as Syria will use Hizballah
or Aoun to veto it. But March 14 can use Michel's proposal
to win Sleiman and the LAF to the side of the legitimate
cabinet, in case of a two-government scenario. While it
would be a great coup to have Sleiman and the LAF firmly on
March 14's side, we wonder whether Syria would really veto a

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Sleiman presidency.


10. (C) Michel Murr is famous (or infamous) for back room
political deal-making. His political opportunism -- which
made him a firm ally of Damascus during the Syrian occupation
-- now puts him on the side of presidential elections, as
power will accrue to him if he succeeds in creating Lebanon's
next president. As for Elias, he must have an interest in
seeing Sleiman as president, since Sleiman would be grateful
to Elias: Sleiman has renewed popularity and credibility
today because of political backing (at times even pushing)
from Elias Murr for military action at key points in the Nahr
al-Barid fighting. So we suspect that the
related-but-contrasting pitches from Murr pere et fils have
more to do with positioning the Murr dynasty cleverly than
with saving Lebanon.


11. (C) As for the two-year presidency idea, this is not
its first incarnation. Until now, the idea has been
considered and then shelved, for fear that a two-year
presidency would further undermine Lebanon's constitutional
institutions and create a two-year political stalemate, as
everyone jockeys for position for 2009 legislative and
presidential elections. We told Michel Murr that it would be
far better for him to devote his political shuttling efforts
to promoting a six-year presidency in accordance with
Lebanon's constitution. But, in the end, if the Lebanese
themselves collectively focus on a two-year presidency as the
best way to avoid vacuum and chaos, we should not be the ones
to block it. We propose neither facilitating nor blocking an
idea that we calculate is, like so many other Lebanese
proposals, more likely than not going to be shelved by the
Lebanese themselves.
FELTMAN