LEBANON: SINIORA CONFIDENT DESPITE CONCERTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000984 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY LE FR SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA CONFIDENT DESPITE CONCERTED SYRIAN CAMPAIGN TO DESTABILIZE LEBANON Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Coming off a pivotal trip to Paris, Rome, Madrid, Cairo and Jeddah, PM Siniora spoke confidently of the pro-democracy movement's successful facing down of Syria's focused campaign to destabilize the country. Siniora believes the pro-Syrian opposition just might be becoming frustrated. Despite Nahr al-Barid, attempted unrest in Ein el-Helweh, the June 24 attack on UNIFIL, June 17 rocket launches, border closings, MP Eido's assassination, Lahoud's threat of a second government, random explosions, Damascus' torpedoing of the Arab League initiative, and Berri's continued closure of parliament, Siniora maintained that thanks to unwavering international support, Lebanon's fledgling democracy has taken every blow and not buckled. He acknowledged, however, that the coming months, leading up to the September-November presidential electoral period, may yet prove to be the most dangerous, particularly regarding assassinations of democratic reformists. He urgently asked for continued U.S. security assistance emphasizing that it was enabling him to finish the fight against Sunni militants in Tripoli and continue his drive to neutralize other extremist groups. Concerning the border, he said his discussions in Cairo and Riyadh, as well as in Germany, Italy and France, had laid the groundwork for a possible Arab/Muslim/European border monitoring force, but he wanted to be proceed carefully so that it doesn't become yet another promising, but unrealized initiative. Siniora also noted that he was trying to steer French thinking about a possible dialogue with Syria in a constructive direction. End summary. ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with the Ambassador and Special Assistant in the Grand Serail on July 2, 36 hours after his return from nearly a week outside the country. It was clear that the respite from his confined existence in the Serail had been a genuine tonic for his spirits. His closest advisor, former Ambassador Mohamad Chatah, and his senior advisor, Rola Nouraddine, also attended the meeting. Prior to seeing Siniora, the Ambassador also discussed the meetings in Paris with March 14th stalwart Marwan Hamadeh, who provided additional details on Siniora's discussions with the new French foreign policy team. A SUPPORTIVE ELYSEE PALACE -------------- ¶3. (C) Following his "extremely valuable" meeting with the Secretary, PM Siniora met with President Sarkozy, his SIPDIS National Security Advisor Jean-David Levitte, as well as Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and his advisors. Siniora said he found Sarkozy fully committed in his support of Lebanon's democracy, but also eager to try out new approaches to break out of the continuous series of crisis. (Marwan Hamadeh said based upon his observations, it would be much more effective for Siniora "to deal with Elysee Palace than the Quai D'Orsay" if the GOL desired decisive action from the French.) Sarkozy pointedly asked Siniora to answer three questions: what should be done about Lebanon's borders; how will Siniora meet the opposition's threat of a "second government"; and finally, should theymove forward with the French initiative? ¶4. C) In response to Sarkozy's inquiry regarding Lebnon's problematic borders, Siniora said that he nd the French president discussed in general term the concept of a "tripartite" Arab/Muslim/Europan monitoring force that would provide credible order security, while at the same time blunt Syran charges that UNIFIL was exceeding its mandate. Siniora said that while Sarkozy and his advisors dd not commit to the plan, they found it interestng and worthy of pursuit. Siniora noted that suh a plan should help undercut the Syrian argumens that the Syrian-Lebanese border cannot be handed the same way as the Israeli-Lebanese border (wit the PR implication being that Israel is an enem but Syria a fraternal Arab partner). ¶5. (C) As a result of these promising conversations, Sniora said he also discussed the idea with ItalianPrime Minister Romano Prodi, Egyptian President Hsni Mubarak, German Chancellor Angela Merkel (byphone),Arab League BEIRUT 00000984 002 OF 003 Secretary General Amr Moussa and Saudi King Abdullah. When SIPDIS asked about the level of interest of the various parties and a possible timeline, Siniora urged patience in order not to "burn" the plan before it could be fleshed out. Siniora indicated, however, that he realized that time was important and the border issue had to be addressed sooner rather than later. SECURITY ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶6. (C) PM Siniora urgently requested Washington to continue to meet his country's pressing need for equipment, particularly large caliber munitions, so that Lebanon could continue to successful battle the well-armed extremists in the north, as well as deter other militant groups, particularly the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Islam clones, from answering Syria's persistent call for havoc. ¶7. (C) While in Cairo, Siniora said he had spoken to Mubarak about Egypt's readiness to supply artillery munitions. Although he appreciated Mubarak's offer to supply some of his needs, Siniora was clearly not impressed by the Egypt's insistence that its Arab brother pay top dollar for the ammunition, as well as find a way to transport it to Beirut. Siniora asked directly if Egypt was selling him U.S.-supplied munitions and wondered if the U.S. could exert some pressure on its opportunistic client to lower its exorbitant price mark-ups. ¶8. (C) The Prime Minister explained that he viewed the current struggle in Nahr al-Barid as having as much impact on Lebanon's sovereignty as its struggle for independence in ¶1948. Siniora argued that for the first time in decades, Lebanon's army was proving it could carry out its constitutional responsibility of protecting Lebanese and confronting foreign threats. According to Siniora, the army's success in Tripoli was as important to a free Lebanon as last summer's historic LAF deployment to the south -- and just as worrying to the unrelenting Syrian regime. AN UNSURE OPPOSITION -------------- ¶9. (C) Siniora reflected on the numerous recent attempts by Syria to create instability with the intent to bring down the democratic government that steadfastly opposes Syria's return to Lebanon. Although proud of the resilience and unexpected durability of the reform movement, Siniora said he was also well aware that the coming months would perhaps be even more difficult as Syria pulls out all the stops. Siniora said he was still considering the ramifications, but believed the time may soon be right to call the bluff of both the opposition and the Syrians. ¶10. (C) Both PM Siniora and Mohamad Chatah, who is the primary GOL interlocutor with the Aounists, believe that FPM leader Michel Aoun has become "uncomfortable" with his political allies and his slipping support in the Christian community. Although his public statements still careen unpredictably between reason and demagoguery, Aoun appears to have pulled back from his support for a second government and may be looking for an "invitation" to participate in the government. Siniora said he has instructed Chatah to continue his fairly regular contact with Aoun's top advisors in the hope that an acceptable resolution might be reached, but he clearly indicated he did not consider it likely. The Prime Minister believed that with only three months to go before parliament was scheduled to begin deliberations for Lebanon's next president, it was far more useful to concentrate March 14th resources and energies on building support for a quorum to elect a pro-democratic president. A POSSIBLE APPROACH TO SYRIA -------------- ¶11. (C) More intriguing was Siniora's admission that he had discussed with the Sarkozy, Prodi and Merkel the pros and cons of approaching Syria with a "comprehensive package," similar to the 2002 Lockerbie agreement with Libya. Siniora said that he sensed that Sarkozy was still musing about the possibility of a dialogue with Damascus, and Siniora, unable to stop the French, hoped to steer Sarkozy's thinking in a constructive direction. Siniora said he warned Sarkozy and BEIRUT 00000984 003 OF 003 Merkel that in any approach to Syria, one had to be exceedingly careful of the regime's proven ability to "create light" (i.e., differences wide enough for light to pass) between its foes. He also explained an additional danger in any approach to the insular Syrian regime was its proclivity to misinterpret any approach as a weakness in its opponents. ¶12. (C) Bearing in mind those pitfalls, Siniora advised his European allies that if they were to approach Syria, they must go in knowing exactly what they wanted and when they wanted it. Toward this end, he believed the preparatory work would have to be done by a "non-political" envoy who would set the ground rules before any proposal would be offered. At a minimum, Siniora said, Syria should stop its support of the Palestinian military bases in the Biqa' Valley. Siniora acknowledged that the idea was still in its earliest stages, but since his discussions with Sarkozy, Prodi and Merkel had occurred after his June 26 meeting with the Secretary, he wanted the U.S. to hear about it first from him. FELTMAN