LAHOUD'S LEGAL ADVISOR: SECOND CABINET (OR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000974 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2027 TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY SUBJECT: LAHOUD'S LEGAL ADVISOR: SECOND CABINET (OR LAHOUD'S NEXT EXTENSION) TO COME IN AUTUMN, NOT NOW REF: BEIRUT 708 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's amiable legal advisor, Selim Jeressaiti, told the Ambassador on 6/29 that -- based on Jeressaiti's advice -- Lahoud has begrudgingly delayed the appointment of a second cabinet from July until September. If no consensus presidential candidate emerges by then, and if Siniora's cabinet has not yet been replaced, then Lahoud will take one of two actions: he will either appoint a second cabinet, or he will announce that he will remain in Baabda Palace beyond his November 24 term expiration. He will not turn over presidential powers to the "illegitimate" Siniora cabinet. Jeressaiti's preferred solution (consistent with his earlier comments, reftel) was for PM Fouad Siniora to resign -- to be replaced by a technocratic cabinet headed by Najib Mikati. Told by the Ambassador that such an option was unlikely, Jeressaiti switched to promoting a national unity cabinet. Asked why the Syrians had instructed their allies to reject Arab League proposals including a national unity cabinet only a week earlier, Jeressaiti said that, then, Lahoud and Damascus intended to move quickly on the second cabinet. Now, with the second cabinet decision postponed, it is time to try again on a national unity cabinet or work for a consensus president. Jeressaiti also quizzed the Ambassador extensively about the just-announced visa ban, suggesting that the President's proclamation is having its intended effect. End summary. LAHOUD WANTED SECOND CABINET NOW; LEGAL ARGUMENTS PERSUADED HIM TO WAIT -------------- ¶2. (C) Judge Selim Jeressaiti met with the Ambassador on 6/29. Asked whether all the talk about President Emile Lahoud's plan to appoint a second cabinet was bluff or indicated a real danger, Jeressaiti (who serves as Lahoud's legal advisor) said that, until a few days earlier, Lahoud and Damascus indeed planned to appoint a second cabinet by mid or late July. Lahoud is "frustrated" by the continued illegitimacy of the Siniora cabinet, and Lahoud's "Syrian friends" were prodding him to move swiftly in naming a new cabinet that would enjoy sufficient popular and international support so as to weaken PM Fouad Siniora. ¶3. (C) But Jeressaiti (who previously served on Lebanon's constitutional court) claimed to have used constitutional arguments to dissuade Lahoud, who reluctantly agreed and explained to Damascus that he could not move now. Jeressaiti noted that, constitutionally, Lahoud would have to call for binding parliamentary consultations to replace the PM, and March 14 MPs (still clinging to a razor-thin majority despite assassinations) could easily renominate Siniora. But if Lahoud waits until September 25, the date when Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has called for presidential elections, then the parliament is an electoral body only. At that point, MPs (in Jeressaiti's constitutional interpretation -- one we suspect other constitutional lawyers would dispute) cannot do anything except work to elect a president. So Lahoud, if he wants to avoid having his choice of PM tied by the mandatory parliamentary consultations and having his second cabinet linked to a parliamentary vote of confidence, must wait until September to appoint a second cabinet. BUT IF NO PRESIDENT AND SINIORA REMAINS, THEN LAHOUD MIGHT JUST STAY IN BAABDA -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked by the Ambassador whether a second cabinet in September is the impending "Lahoud surprise" that has been rumored in Beirut political circles, Jeressaiti said that Lahoud, if he senses that he has insufficient support for a second cabinet from Hizballah, Berri, and Michel Aoun (who used a 7/1 New TV interview to express opposition to a second cabinet),may announce instead that he is staying in Baabda Palace indefinitely beyond the expiration of his term on November 24. Lahoud will not turn over the powers of the presidency to an "illegal" president who was elected without a two-thirds parliamentary quorum. And, if presidential BEIRUT 00000974 002 OF 003 elections do not take place for lack of a quorum, he will not allow the presidential executive powers to be transferred to the "illegitimate" Siniora cabinet until the presidential vacuum can be filled. The Ambassador asked how Jeressaiti would legally and constitutionally justify Lahoud remaining in Baabda beyond November 24. Yes, Jeressaiti conceded: it would be unconstitutional. But a lesser sin, in Lahoud's view, then transferring power to a cabinet that lost its constitutionality when the Shia ministers submitted their resignations on November 11. TWO SOLUTIONS: EITHER A CONSENSUS PRESIDENT, OR A CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE CABINET -------------- ¶5. (C) By convincing Lahoud to wait until September to act, Jeressaiti argued that he had provided an opportunity to the Lebanese and their international friends to fix the problem ahead of time. There are two approaches, Jeressaiti said. If a consensus presidential candidate emerges who will elected in a parliament with a two-thirds quorum, then Lahoud will feel that the security and unity of Lebanon has been sufficiently safeguarded. He will transfer power to that president and leave Baabda Palace peacefully and on time. Or, if there are no presidential elections but a constitutionally legitimate cabinet is in place, then Lahoud will transfer his powers to that cabinet until such time as presidential elections can be held. There is no constitutional problem with either approach, Jeressaiti argued; "take your pick." DISCUSSING A "CONSENSUS" PRESIDENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked how realistic it was to come up with a true consensus president. Won't Syria's allies push for a candidate who appeared to be a consensus figure but who was in fact entirely reliant on, and subservient to, Damascus? Jeressaiti countered with another question: if there was a true consensus figure, would the United States accept him? Wouldn't the United States push for a "militant" March 14 figure? The Ambassador explained that the USG was watching the process as much as the names. If a credible presidential candidate emerges from a truly Lebanese process, that is fine with us. But if it becomes clear that Syria's allies are manipulating the constitution and using intimidation to force acceptance of a so-called consensus candidate, then the international community will have a problem. How a president is selected is as important as who the president is. For the Lebanese, rather than talk first about names, perhaps it is best to talk about what the job will be over the next six years, to see who are those most qualified, the Ambassador suggested. ¶7. (C) Is there any way for you to talk to Syria about the presidency, Jeressaiti asked. No, the Ambassador responded, noting that none of the leading candidates opposed a positive relationship with Syria based on mutual respect. Jeressaiti mused about finding the candidate subject to the least "vetoes." He noted, as an example, that Nassib Lahoud would receive vetoes from Michel Aoun, Amine Gemayel, and Michel Murr, all for local Metn political reasons. Emile Lahoud would veto his cousin. The Syrians would veto Nassib, not wanting "a Saudi" to occupy both the premiership and the presidency. (Nassib's wife, a Sunni, has a sister who was once married to King Abdullah.) Berri and Hizballah, wary of Nassib's ties to Washington, would as well. The Ambassador noted that Emile Lahoud and Syria do not cast votes in the presidential elections. Asked who he thought might be a true consensus candidate, Jeressaiti shook his head: "If I say anyone, you will think he's Syria's candidate." He did list people he thought would be poor choices, including former Foreign Ministers Jean Obeid and Fares Bouez, both of whom, he said, are favored by Berri. SHIFTING FROM SINIORA'S RESIGNATION TO A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to the cabinet, Jeressaiti said (as he had earlier, reftel) that he believed Siniora's resignation would unlock the door to a solution. Najib Mikati did an excellent job as PM for ten weeks during the 2005 transition period; why not replace Siniora's discredited cabinet with a BEIRUT 00000974 003 OF 003 technocratic cabinet headed by Mikati? The period of time before the presidential elections is about the same. The Ambassador agreed Mikati did a good job as PM, but the times are not analogous. Then, March 14 leaders knew that they had a chance to compete in parliamentary elections. Now, they have no assurances that presidential elections will indeed take place. If there are no presidential elections, then they will have given up their cabinet power with no easy way to regain it. As long as two of the three most powerful constitutional offices remain in the hands of Syria's allies, March 14 will not volunteer to give up the premiership, the Ambassador argued. ¶9. (C) So, Jeressaiti asked, what about a national unity cabinet, split 19-11, 18-12, or 17-13? That is another way to avoid "Lahoud's surprise" in September. The Ambassador said that the USG was not opposed, but it was up to the Lebanese themselves to come up with arrangements that provided appropriate assurances. Just as we did not veto Siniora's inclusion of Hizballah representatives in his original cabinet despite our serious misgivings, we would not now impose a particular cabinet composition on Lebanon. But, the Ambassador noted, only a week earlier, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa proposed a dialogue initiative SIPDIS that included on the agenda the idea of a national unity cabinet. March 14 leaders accepted the idea, but Syria's allies, after initially saying yes, rejected it. If the March 8-Aoun leaders want a national unity cabinet, why did they reject Moussa's proposal? Jeressaiti said that, at the time, Syria and Lahoud hoped for the second cabinet to be announced soon. Now, thanks to Jeressaiti's arguments, they know it can't be done until September, if they want to avoid parliamentary consultations. So it is time to try again for a national unity cabinet. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) We do not know whether Jeressaiti's thinking mirrors that of Lahoud or not. If Lahoud chooses between orders from Damascus and opposing constitutional arguments from Jeressaiti, he'll follow the Syrian orders. (Usually, we suspect, Jeressaiti is tasked post-fact to justify legally whatever Lahoud is doing.) But, while a week ago all signs indicated that a second cabinet was imminent, those fears now seem to be receding. If it's true that Lahoud is postponing his decision until September, we suspect it has less to do with Jeressaiti's constitutional arguments and more to do with the fact that Michel Aoun and even Nabih Berri seem somewhat queasy about a second cabinet. We note that, as the meeting came to a close, Jeressaiti quizzed the Ambassador extensively about the new Presidential Proclamation banning visas for Lebanese and Syrian officials. We suspect that the visa ban is, as planned, dampening enthusiasm for the second cabinet. And Jeressaiti's shocking suggestion that Lahoud is contemplating remaining in Baabda beyond his November 24 term expiration is probably rooted in realization that the second cabinet is more difficult than Lahoud initially thought. ¶11. (C) One part of Jeressaiti's arguments was consistent with everything else we've heard: that Lahoud will never turn over presidential power to the current Siniora cabinet. Therefore, given that we cannot yet say with certainty that presidential elections will take place as scheduled, we cannot therefore rule out altogether the second cabinet or the possibility of Lahoud trying to stay in place. We will continue to seek ways to deter such destructive developments. FELTMAN