WAITING FOR HIZBALLAH: SAUDI AMBASSADOR CLAIMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000094 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER LE SY SUBJECT: WAITING FOR HIZBALLAH: SAUDI AMBASSADOR CLAIMS BERRI, HARIRI ON BOARD FOR ELEMENTS OF A POLITICAL DEAL Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: In a 1/18 meeting with the Ambassador, Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja said that he has received approvals from Parliament Speaker Berri and MP Saad Hariri for the broad outlines of a political deal to resolve Lebanon's political crisis. Hizballah has not yet responded to his ideas, which he will pitch to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora when he returns from his Arab tour sometime this evening. Khoja's proposal links approval of the tribunal to expansion of the cabinet (along the 19-10-1 split floated by Amr Moussa in December),and he keeps presidential and legislative elections on their current schedules. Khoja acknowledged that even the agreement in principle from Hariri and Berri could break down over the details, especially regarding how the "neutral" minister would be chosen and function. (Khoja himself mused about former Foreign Minister Jean Obeid playing the "neutral" role, given that Obeid's presidential ambitions would prevent him from siding with either side.) Khoja agreed that his proposal would have little appeal to Michel Aoun. End summary. ¶2. (S) Pulling a page from his suit pocket, Khoja shared with the Ambassador the elements he has over the past few days been peddling in an attempt to solve Lebanon's political crisis. He acknowledged that he started with the ideas in circulation from Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa's December trips and revised them in hopes of finding the breakthrough that eluded Moussa. If his ideas have traction, Moussa could return to clinch the deal. Khoja's ideas follow: -- Special Tribunal for Lebanon: A team composed of March 14 and March 8-Aoun judges would study the tribunal documents together and discuss possible amendments. The team would operate under strict time limits, having only "three or four days to make their recommendations." -- Simultaneously with the work of the tribunal study team, a second team of March 8-Aoun and March 14 leaders would discuss how to expand the cabinet to 30 members (from its original 24),along the split proposed by Amr Moussa: 19 ministers from the March 14 majority and allies, 10 ministers from the March 8-Aoun opposition, and one "neutral" minister. �A; The team would make recommendations regarding the exact composition of the cabinet. As with the tribunal team, this team would have only three or four days to develop a cabinet slate. As the cabinet will only be expanded, not changed, Siniora does not have to resign, nor does the cabinet statement need to be revisited. -- Having concluded the steps above, both parties would sign a binding agreement regarding acceptance of the tribunal and the expanded cabinet in line with the recommendations made by the two teams. -- At that point, Speaker Berri would convene the parliament in an extraordinary session, to announce the expanded cabinet and the intention to pass the tribunal documents. -- The new cabinet would then meet and automatically approval the tribunal documents, passing them onto President Emile Lahoud. If Lahoud still rejects the tribunal, the cabinet would again pass the tribunal documents and transfer them to the parliament, which in its special session would ratify them. (Khoja explained that this would restore Lebanon's constitutional process. When the Ambassador noted that March 14 leaders have previously rejected as too risky the idea of submitting the tribunal documents to a new cabinet without a two-thirds majority on their side, Khoja explained that the binding nature of the March 8-March 14 agreement eliminates the danger.) -- The new cabinet would focus on Paris III reforms and the drafting and passage of a new legislative election law. -- Presidential elections will take place in autumn, as scheduled; Lahoud will serve out the remainder of his extended term (expiring November 24). (Upon the election of a new president, the cabinet is considered constitutionally as resigned, meaning that a new cabinet -- and new cabinet decree -- will need a parliamentary vote of confidence at that time.) -- Legislative elections will take place as scheduled in 2009 and will not be moved forward. BEIRUT 00000094 002 OF 002 ¶3. (S) Khoja said that Berri has already signed on to these outlines of a deal. When MP Saad Hariri was in Saudi Arabia, he passed on his approval to Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Despite having met three times since Saturday with Hizballah representative Hajj Hussein Khalil, "I am still waiting for Hizballah's answer," Khoja said. Khoja said that he had also met with March 14 Christian representatives Nayla Mouawad and Nassib Lahoud, both of whom found the proposal attractive. As for Walid Jumblatt, his advisors Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Aridi also liked the idea, Khoja said. He will brief PM Siniora upon the latter's return (anticipated sometime this evening) from his Arab tour. ¶4. (S) Michel Aoun, Khoja said, will be a problem: he will see that, under this scenario, while he will have four cabinet seats, he is unlikely to become president. In fact, Khoja mused, Aoun's anticipated objections might explain Hizballah's delay in responding: Hizballah may not yet be prepared to show its willingness to abandon Aoun. Asked by the Ambassador whether he had the impression that Hizballah wanted a way out of the political stalemate, Khoja paused to think before answering yes. ¶5. (S) Khoja acknowledged that the approvals of Berri and Hariri could evaporate, depending on the details. The limited duration of the first two steps (on the tribunal and cabinet formation) will help focus people and thus reveal how seriously they desire a solution. Khoja said that he still has no clear idea from Berri or Hizballah what are the concerns regarding the tribunal documents. ¶6. (S) As for the one neutral minister, Khoja said that Berri was still opposed to having a non-voting minister. Thus, if the "neutral" minister was going to vote, then it was critically important that he/she be truly neutral. March 14 leaders will be on alert, watching carefully for characteristic Berri tricks to turn the neutral minister into someone permanently on the March 8-Aoun side. Khoja said he proposed that Berri give five names to Siniora, with Siniora able to choose one. Khoja himself would help Berri pick the names to be forwarded to the PM, to ensure credibility of at least part of the slate. "What do you think about (former Foreign Minister) Jean Obeid?" Khoja asked, arguing that Obeid's presidential ambitions would make him -- despite his known links to Syria -- unwilling to offend either side. Obeid would not side with the pro-Syrians and risk alienating the March 14 MPs who will have the decisive voice in electing the next president. ¶7. (S) Comment: With Amr Moussa keeping away and little direct dialogue taking place across Lebanon's political divide, Khoja is on a lonely quest: he seems to be the only person actively shuttling between the two sides, and he seems to have an almost naive faith that, somehow, the right formula can overcome objections to the tribunal. We suspect that his diplomacy explains Hizballah's decision not mobilize its supporters for labor demonstrations over the past week, as Hizballah does not seem eager to annoy the Saudis at the moment. Khoja's ideas are a definite improvement over earlier versions and show the influence of March 14 leaders on his thinking. (Less than a week ago, Khoja still advocated giving the March 8-Aoun minority a blocking and "toppling" minority.) But, with each side here deeply suspicious of the other, Khoja will have to hammer out the details if he hopes for broad acceptance of his proposal. While we think he is playing a constructive role -- especially in terms of lowering tensions in advance of next week's Paris III conference -- Khoja specifically asked us not to push his proposals, lest we taint them by association. We will, however, quietly explore his ideas with our close contacts on the March 14 side. We agree with Khoja that how the neutral minister is chosen is key to securing solid March 14 approval -- and March 14, in our view, should be careful to avoid saying no and letting the March 8-Aoun forces out of the corner. FELTMAN