LEBANON: SINIORA INTENDS TO USE NAHR AL-BARID TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000917

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA INTENDS TO USE NAHR AL-BARID TO
PURSUE PALESTINIAN MILITIAS


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a 6/21 meeting, PM Siniora conveyed to the
Ambassador his conviction that the fight at Nahr al-Barid was
a watershed event -- one which will enable his government to
take the offensive against the numerous concentrations of
militants located in the 12 Palestinian refugee camps and in
previously off-limits sanctuaries in the Biqa Valley and
along the Syrian border. Siniora urgently requested
continued military assistance from the U.S., particularly
ammunition to replace depleted stocks, and stated he will
pursue similar donations from both Arab countries and the EU.
Concerning the political situation, Siniora views the French
initiative with circumspection, but recognizes its value as a
"delaying action" to hold off pro-Syrian President Lahoud's
threat to create a parallel government. The Prime Minister
found it most interesting that while opposition forces
crudely threaten to install a second cabinet and thereby
seriously destabilize the country, they are also hotly
pressing their campaign to form a national unity government.
Siniora believes Michel Aoun is finally serious and the time
may be at hand to make an offer to expand the cabinet, but
only if the critical issue of the presidential election is
included in the deal. While admitting it would be extremely
difficult to win consensus for a strictly March 14th
president, Siniora believes it will be possible to elect a
president who holds two essential positions: sovereignty for
Lebanon and the ability to work with Syria as an equal. End
summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and his senior advisor,
former Ambassador Mohamad Chatah, met with the Ambassador and
Special Assistant at the Grand Serail on June 21. PM Siniora
said he would be heading to Paris late on June 25 following a
meeting in Beirut with visiting CODEL Issa. PM Siniora said
he looked forward to his breakfast meeting with the
Secretary, as well as meetings with French officials.

SIPDIS
Mohamad Chatah, who would be accompanying Siniora to Paris,
indicated he would be returning as soon as possible to Beirut
to continue (apparently) accelerating discussions with March
8th opposition figures on the possibilities of an expanded
cabinet and an agreement on the presidential election.

"THE ARMY HELD!!"
--------------


3. (C) PM Siniora was in a clearly confident mood and
expressed to the Ambassador his great satisfaction with the
performance of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in its arduous
fight at Nahr al-Barid. Noting that the last strongpoints of
Fatah al-Islam militants were steadily being eliminated by
the army's elite units, he stated that there is now a real
opportunity to confront the long-standing problem of armed
Palestinian militants in his country. Siniora said the
backing of the army by almost every sector of Lebanon's
society, along with the skill and dedication shown by the
troops in very difficult close urban combat, will allow him
to demand the disarmament of Syrian-backed and armed
Palestinian militants who reside in almost every refugee
camp, as well as the more dangerous sanctuaries in the Biqa
and along the Syrian border.


4. (C) The Prime Minister was clearly fortified by the fact
that despite predictions to the contrary, the
confessionally-diverse army "held" and maintained strong
discipline in the face of a determined enemy who tried to
play the confessional card. Siniora asked who would have
thought that an army with a considerable number of Sunni
troops would unhesitatingly confront and vanquish an outlaw
Sunni extremist group.


5. (C) That being said, the Prime Minister emphasized that
the fight near Tripoli had been costly, in both men and
equipment, and urgently asked the U.S. to continue its
much-appreciated military assistance so that the fight
against radical militancy could be expanded. He said he
realized that as long as Syrian-directed Palestinian
militants were free to operate in his country, Lebanon's
democracy and stability could never be assured. This was the
opportunity he needed to actually implement one of the four

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agreements reached in last summer's national dialogue -- the
disarming of Palestinian militias -- and he did not intend to
let it pass.


6. (C) The Ambassador urged the Prime Minister to take
advantage of the USD 100 million that Saudi Arabia has
donated for immediate military assistance, but it was also
clear that Siniora would be looking for a sustained
assistance program to strengthen the one institution that the
entire people of Lebanon have now rallied around. In
particular, Siniora asked for help to replenish his stocks of
large caliber artillery ammunition, as well as other
equipment that woould help his army fight confront and defeat
a well-armed and geographically dispersed enemy. He assured
the Ambassador that he would use his connections to also ask
for the applicable assistance from his Arab allies, as well
as Turkey and cooperative EU countries.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
--------------


7. (C) Siniora described a political situation that was
close to the cliche of wheels turning within wheels. He was
skeptical of the Cousseran-inspired French initiative,
dismissive of the rapidly-melting Swiss initiative, but
appreciative of Amr Moussa's attempt to draft an Arab League
package deal that sought to balance the opposition's
long-sought increased power in the cabinet with the
pro-reform movement's non-negotiable requirement that the
country's new president protect Lebanon's sovereignty at all
costs.


8. (C) Despite the general haziness of the French proposal,
Siniora still perceived value in the plan to call together
the various political factions, even at the second-tier
level, because it would "freeze" the threat of pro-Syrian
President Emile Lahoud to create political chaos by
(illegally) appointing a new set of government ministers.
Siniora understands that Lahoud is trying to use political
intimation to soften the negotiating stance of March 14th
and, consequently, will use every means available, including
the French and the Swiss, to distract the opposition from
implementing what could be a difficult and destabilizing
situation.


9. (C) The second strategy Siniora said he was pursuing was
a re-engagement with Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel
Aoun. His most trusted advisor, Mohamad Chatah, is currently
involved in (reportedly) substantive discussions with Gibran
Bassil, Aoun's closet advisor. Siniora said he is trying to
determine if Aoun is amenable to a comprehensive solution;
one that would include an expanded cabinet, an agreement on
the president, and perhaps a new electoral law, which seems
to be of critical importance to the former general. Chatah
said he would be returning from next week's trip to Paris as
soon as possible to continue these discussions.


10. (C) In essence, the Prime Minister is using the
positive outcome of Nahr al-Barid and the resulting improved
position of his government to hold off Lahoud's threatened
"second" cabinet scenario by pursuing two paths at the same
time: use the Arab League and French initiatives to tie up
Lahoud and Berri, but at the same time attempt to reach an
acceptable solution with Aoun, who appears to be finally
beginning to consider reasonable proposals.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Late in the evening of June 21, Walid Jumblatt
informed the Ambassador that Hassan Nasrallah has decided to
strictly limit his discussions with PM Siniora and March 14th
leadership to an expansion of the cabinet, i.e. Nasrallah
will not entertain discussing a deal involving the presidency
until he has his blocking minority in the cabinet. If
accurate, this would, in effect, scuttle the Arab League
initiative (and Siniora's negotiating strategy) which sought
to reach a comprehensive solution to end the current crisis.
It appears that Nasrallah may have received new marching
orders from Damascus.


12. (C) But then early this morning (June 22),Walid
Jumblatt informed us that Amr Moussa has apparently (and
unexpectedly) won acceptance from all parties to re-engage in

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a national dialogue that will address both an expanded
cabinet and the presidential election. Full details are not
yet available. End comment.
FELTMAN