LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000898 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER OVERVIEW -------------- ¶1. (SBU) As you visit Lebanon, the much-buffeted democratic government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is fully engaged on a number of critical issues. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are now locked in close combat with Sunni extremists who profess affiliation with Al Qaida, but who many believe are directed by the Syrian regime, in the northern Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Barid. The 57,000 personnel of the LAF are stretched thin: guarding the country's 450 kilometer border; patrolling south Lebanon for the first time in 30 years; engaged with Sunni extremists in the north and patrolling the perimeters of 11 other refugee camps elsewhere in the country; and perhaps most importantly, protecting democratic institutions from Hizballah-led opposition elements that have already tried to overrun the government in both December 2006 and January 2007. Politically, the Siniora government continues to search for an acceptable resolution to a now-seven-month-old crisis brought on by the November 2006 walk-out of six opposition ministers. While negotiations to resolve the dilemma are accelerating, the price the opposition is trying to extract from Sinora's pro-reform democratic majority, known as the March 14th coalition, remains too high. ¶2. (SBU) Add to this intimidating list of challenges the need to move quickly to maintain the momentum of UNSCR 1757, which authorized the establishment as of June 10 of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon under Chapter VII, a parliament blocked from meeting by its pro-Syrian Speaker, and a very real threat by the pro-Syrian president of Lebanon to create a competing, destabilizing parallel government. Amazingly, these issues actually make the other tasks faced by the Siniora government -- reducing a USD 44 billion national debt, reconstructing an infrastructure damaged by last summer's conflict between ISRAEL and Hizballah, and revitalization of a struggling economy -- pale by comparison. ¶3. (SBU) On the plus side of the ledger, it is difficult to imagine a more resilient people or economy. Despite repeated blows from an imposing list of unsavory characters -- Syria, Iran, Palestinian rejectionists, Hizballah, pro-Syrian sympathizers -- the government of Siniora keeps plodding steadily forward. We may view with dismay the pace of reform, but it is undeniable that Siniora and his beleaguered ministers and allied members of parliament have by and large doggedly pursued policies that they hope will lead to a democratic, secure, and prosperous country. Particularly with regard to matters that concern the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we believe you will discern trends both good and bad, but on the whole you will see a country that has an almost unlimited potential to become a model in a very tough neighborhood. SECURITY SERVICES UNDER GREAT STRAIN -------------- ¶4. (SBU) As of June 19, elite units of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are nearing the end of a month-long, hard fought battle against Sunni extremists in the dense urban environment of the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in northern Lebanon. The camp is usually home to 35,000 Palestinian refugees, but it is presently the stronghold of several hundred, well-trained extremists. The current battle erupted without notice on May 20, when Fatah al-Islam (FAI) militants struck LAF units stationed near the camp in the aftermath of a raid by Internal Security Forces (ISF) on a FAI hideout in the nearby city of Tripoli. Part of the determination and sacrifice of the LAF currently engaged can be traced to the murder of unsuspecting LAF guards during the first few hours of the conflict. ¶5. (SBU) As the fight enters its fifth week (the first three weeks were essentially a holding action designed to allow innocent refugees a chance to escape the camp -- approximately 2,000 refugees remain somewhere in the complex),LAF units have suffered high losses: more than 65 soldiers killed in action, mostly from its hard-to-replace elite units. FAI losses have also been high and the influx of U.S.-supplied weaponry has been of considerable help. Many observers have been surprised by the tenacity of the LAF in attacking and eventually taking FAI strong points. While BEIRUT 00000898 002 OF 004 armed forces victory over the FAI now seems certain, the aftermath of the struggle remains in doubt, in part because FAI is a murky group. A year ago, FAI didn't even exist as an entity and it is still not known exactly who controls and supplies it. An educated guess would be Syria. ¶6. (SBU) The outcome of this fight, and any others against Palestinian or Al Qaida groups in the immediate future, will do much to determine the long-term credibility and operational effectiveness of the LAF. Pro-democratic forces both in and outside the government believe the outcome will be pivotal for Lebanon and they are pulling out all the stops to obtain assistance for their troops. Some of these well-intentioned calls for assistance are misplaced, because they unduly emphasize "precision" weapons without fully understanding engagement constraints, to say nothing about the lack of pertinent training. But regardless of the inapplicability of some calls for assistance, it can be stated with assurance that the LAF desperately needs resupply of dwindling munitions and upgrades to their intelligence and urban war-fighting capacities. ¶7. (SBU) Outside the LAF, the ISF (national police force), Customs police, and Surete Generale (internal police activities, such as anti-TIP, anti-piracy, anti-organized crime) also badly need assistance in the form of training and equipment to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. The Department of State in cooperation with other U.S. agencies, including the FBI, is fully engaged in a substantial USD 60 million plus effort to provide this assistance, but the program is expected to take several years and requires sustained commitment, as well as additional funding. A POROUS BORDER....AND SHEBAA -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Only one year after Hizballah fired more than 4,000 rockets into northern Israel, prompting an Isaeli attack on Lebanon and a month-long war, Lebanon is awash once more in weapons. Despite efforts to improve border security by positioning approximately 8,000 additional LAF troops on the border, all evidence indicates that weapons smuggling has continued unabated to both Hizballah and several Palestinian rejectionist groups resident in the country. ¶9. (SBU) The most serious attempt to address this critical issue, whose enforcement is emphasized in UNSCR 1701, the resolution which ended last summer's conflict, is the German-led Northern Border Pilot Project. The chief problem with this well-conceived and well-financed project is that it will take until the end of 2007 to fully test the integrated, intelligence-based concept. The second drawback is that it will only apply to the less problematic northern border with Syria, while it appears the primary flow of weaponry and militants cross into Lebanon along its long eastern border with Syria. That said, there are already plans to "turn the corner" and extend the project's integrated approach to the more difficult eastern border in December 2007. The German-led effort is presently the best option, and although we would like to see a more rapid timeline, it holds the greatest promise to finally seal Lebanon's border to the destabilizing trafficking of illegal arms and militants. ¶10. (SBU) One final border issue you may encounter is the largely-manufactured problem of Shebaa Farms -- a 45 square kilometer piece of contested land controlled by Israel, that the UN has formally recognized as Syrian, but which Siniora's government steadfastly maintains is Lebanese. Although it is an insignificant slice of border territory with no inhabitants, PM Siniora seems to believe that if it could be transferred from Israeli control to UN oversight, it would give his government the instrument it needs to force the disarming of Hizballah's powerful militia. This somewhat naive position has unfortunately become embedded in almost every policy discussion the Prime Minister now has with U.S. officials, and even though your interests lie elsewhere, do not be surprised if Siniora also raises it with you. JUDICIAL SYSTEM -- TRYING TO STAND UP -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Thirty years of Syrian control and systemic corruption has eviscerated Lebanon's traditionally strong BEIRUT 00000898 003 OF 004 judicial culture. The fact that a Lebanese court is not able to indict or try the perpetrators of the numerous acts of political violence committed since October 2004 is sad testament to the present weaknesses of the country's judicial system. Judges have been murdered, witnesses intimidated, forensic evidence has disappeared, but perhaps most dangerous is the widespread public belief that a fair, speedy trial is nearly impossible to attain. ¶12. (SBU) There are numerous courageous and progressive jurists, lawyers and court administrators, but they must cope with a system that was deliberately distorted and manipulated to favor and protect Lebanon's Syrian overlords. Making matters more difficult is the fact that Lebanon's legal code has not been updated for decades and any attempt to do so in parliament is obstructed by an anti-reform minority that seeks to maintain the status quo. ¶13. (SBU) U.S. programs, under the auspices of USAID and the Middle East Partnership Initiative, are beginning to make a dent in the many areas that require reform. And this effort has been augmented by similar assistance programs sponsored by our European allies and some agencies of the United Nations. But overall, the work still to be tackled is significant and will require several years of sustained effort. POLITICAL SITUATION -- NEVER BE SURPRISED -------------- ¶14. (SBU) As implied above, PM Siniora is the glue that holds it all together. Through an unanticipated war, difficult cease-fire negotiations, coup attempts by a well-financed and unscrupulous opposition led by Hizballah, multiple assassinations and assassination attempts of pro-reform leaders, and political in-fighting among his own coalition, PM Siniora has demonstrated remarkable endurance and commitment to democratic rule. He frequently states that his most cherished dream is to peacefully leave office to another democratically elected government. ¶15. (SBU) That said, it is also clear that Siniora and his close circle of loyal advisors need help to continue and persevere in their difficult fight. A key challenge will be the upcoming presidential election, scheduled to take place in a special electoral session of parliament in the September 23 - November 26 timeframe. The current president, Emile Lahoud, makes no secret of his allegiance to Syria and he has effectively stalled many of the pro-reform programs Siniora has tried to implement. In the face of its defeat to block the UN Special Tribunal, Syria appears to be pulling out all the stops to re-elect another pro-Syrian president, both to blunt the effectiveness of the tribunal and to keep alive Syria's deeply held desire to re-establish its hegemony over Lebanon. ¶16. (SBU) Because of the very high stakes involved, all the political maneuvering is now centered on this upcoming election. The terrorist organization Hizballah wants a president amenable to its self-perceived role as the "resistance" so that it can keep its powerful armed militia. Opposition member and Christian leader Michel Aoun is the tormented Hamlet of Lebanon, deeply desiring the throne, but forever changing his positions and then attempting to explain them using tortured logic. The influential Maronite Patriarch Sfeir continually tries to preserve the "Christian" institution of the presidency, but remains anxious of open commitment due to events in the past. At the same time, Saad Hariri, leader of the parliamentary majority as well as the Sunni community, wants to protect the fledgling tribunal and his majority, but at the same time is cognizant of the charges that the Sunnis already control too much of the government. And then there are the six, or seven, or even eight political leaders of the Maronite community who all want to be president, but in fighting each other, make the opposition's job that much easier. And finally, there is the Druse warlord Walid Jumblatt, who has been both ally and enemy to almost every other participant in Lebanon. At present, he is the strongest and most impassioned voice for sovereignty, but everyone is mindful that his ultimate allegiance is toward his small community. POSSIBLE OUTCOMES -------------- BEIRUT 00000898 004 OF 004 ¶17. (SBU) In just the past week, discussions between the myriad political players have increased in both frequency and seriousness. But we have witnessed increased dialogue before, only to see it unceremoniously dissolve into recriminations and renewed impasse. The difference now is that the coming 150 days are indeed critical: if Lebanon emerges with a president committed to the country's sovereignty and stability, democracy stands a good chance of success. If on the other hand, another pro-Syrian president is installed in Baabda palace, continued stalemate may actually be a preferred outcome. CONCLUSION -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Director Mueller, you arrive with Lebanon at yet another crossroads. You will undoubtedly be asked to re-confirm America's commitment to Lebanon and her struggling democracy. You will also undoubtedly hear many rumors and well-meaning but half-baked ideas. Lebanon has become a critical case for democracy and reform in the Arab world. It is essentially the only Arab country with a pluralistic tradition and some (though distant) experience with democracy. We are convinced our assistance can make a real difference. We urge you to listen to your Lebanese interlocutors, give them your valued counsel, and let us know how we can better help your Bureau advance U.S. interests in this most important country. Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman sends. FELTMAN