LEBANON: AOUN RECEPTIVE TO RAPPROCHMENT WITH MARCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000896 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC AA SUBJECT: LEBANON: AOUN RECEPTIVE TO RAPPROCHMENT WITH MARCH 14 CAMP, OPPOSES SECOND GOVERNMENT REF: A. BEIRUT 851 ¶B. BEIRUT 875 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader General Michel Aoun agreed that a second government would be catastrophic for Lebanon. The FPM is exploring cooperation with the March 14 majority to form a national unity government, but claims the ball is in March 14's court. While appearing vaguely positive, Aoun refrained from making explicit guarantees that the FPM would not resign from a newly formed government. Aoun said he would not oppose by-elections for the seats of two assassinated March 14 MPs. He agreed that the Lebanese Armed Forces were doing well in Nahr al-Barid and offered his suggestions for improving Lebanon's security forces. End summary. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH MARCH 14? -------------- ¶2. (C) In a June 18 meeting with the Ambassador, DCM, and Pol/Econ Chief at his residence in Rabieh, Aoun, accompanied by his advisor and son-in-law Gebran Bassil, agreed with the Ambassador's assertion that the formation of a second government would be catastrophic for Lebanon. Aoun had heard that President Lahoud was looking to form a second government by July 15 if the current political impasse was not resolved. This would allow time, he reasoned, before the recently-scheduled August 5 by-elections and before Lahoud became preoccupied with the legal procedures leading up to the September 25 presidential election. But, Aoun concluded, we will not arrive at this. ¶3. (C) The FPM leader expressed his willingness to explore a national unity government with the March 14 camp to avoid such a scenario, but wondered aloud whether Amal and Hizballah would agree. The Ambassador noted that March 14 feared PM Siniora's resignation or a constitutional collapse of the cabinet (due to resignation of more than a third of the ministers) more than it hestitated to join with the Aoun bloc, especially if Aoun guaranteed that he would not resign from the newly formed government. Emphasizing that he was speaking in a personal capacity, the Ambassador urged Aoun to talk to PM Siniora, arguing that agreement between the FPM and March 14 on the cabinet would circumvent Parliament Speaker Nabil Berri's obstructionism by robbing his Amal party (and its Hizballah allies) of the ability to force the government to fall. (Note. If Aoun's FPM joins March 14 in an expanded government and gives guarantees not to resign, the remaining opposition groups Amal and Hizbollah would not have enough combined cabinet seats to form the one-third plus one majority needed to topple the government. Should Amal and Hezbollah resign from an expanded cabinet, the issue of a lack of Shia representation in an expanded government, however, cited by Lahoud and his supporters to discredit the current government's legitimacy since the November 2006 resignation of five Shia cabinet members, would continue to pose a problem. End note.) ¶4. (C) The Ambassador stressed that now was the time for Aoun to prove the USG wrong, i.e., that, as he asserts, he is not part of the Hizballah/Berri March 8 bloc. The FPM took a first step in distancing itself from Hizballah when it supported the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Nahr al-Barid rather than accepting Hizballah's red line that the LAF should not enter the Palestinian camp. Now it could take a second important step by supporting the government's efforts to form a national unity government by giving a guarantee of not resigning, rather than side with the March 8 opposition. ¶5. (C) While appearing to be positive, Aoun refrained, however, from providing explicit assurance that he would not resign from a reconstituted government, arguing that it was not in FPM's interests to resign as long as there was no agreement on the Presidency. (Note. Support for Aoun's presidential ambitions are his sine qua non for the FPM's continued alliance with Hizballah and Amal. End note.) Nevertheless, he did tell us to "consider (the question of a national unity government) solved." The Ambassador again BEIRUT 00000896 002 OF 003 urged him to provide a formal guarantee not to resign; otherwise, Aoun's assertion that his party had no reason to resign was no better than Berri's own unconvincing "why would March 8 resign?" (Ref A) in the eyes of a wary March 14. BALL IS IN MARCH 14'S COURT -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador further suggested that Aoun could use March 14's fear of Siniora's resignation to the FPM's advantage, in particular by extracting concessions that March 14 will finally move on a new electoral law, clearly in the interest of all of Lebanon (but not necessarily in the interest of all political leaders). Aoun, visibly warming to the idea, said an agreement must be reached soon. Bassil interjected that the FPM would need guarantees of its own, noting that he had recently held a four-hour discussion with Siniora's chief advisor Mohamad Chatah to discuss cooperation between the two sides. Unfortunately, he said, Chatah did not appear to have any decision-making authority and needed to check with Siniora before responding to the FPM's overtures. Acknowledging Chatah's goodwill, Bassil further said the PM's advisor now realizes that the FPM can be a good partner on security matters but is somehow unable to translate this into concreate measures. The ball is now in March 14's court, he concluded. ¶7. (C) Aoun later stated that, in addition to making progress on the new electoral law, the FPM and March 14 could reach agreement on two points on the security front: the Palestinian issue and Lebanon's relationship with Syria. He did not anticipate any major initiatives on regional security issues, but recalled his 1990 article (published before the Madrid conference) advocating a comprehensive peace plan between Lebanon, Israel and Syria. Aoun said Bassil and Chatah also discussed portfolio allotments in a new cabinet. ¶8. (C) At a separate lunch with the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief the same day, Aoun MP Ibrahim Kenaan, apparently unaware of the Bassil-Chatah discussion, said he had held a (separate) discussion with Chatah regarding a "Declaration of Principles," to which the two sides would publicly subscribe in an effort to form a new cabinet. Like Bassil, Kenaan was sketchy on the details. Kenaan also indicated that the FPM had its sights set on the Ministry of Justice. FPM WON'T OPPOSE BY-ELECTIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) Noting that is was President Lahoud's "prerogative" to sign the June 16 cabinet decree calling for by-elections to replace the two assassinated March 14 MPs Pierre Gemayel (November 21, 2006) and Walid Eido (June 3, 2007),Aoun said he would not oppose the elections. The Ambassador stressed that Lahoud's refusal to sign the cabinet decree (Ref B) sends a message that "murder pays." Aoun sidestepped the allegation, countering that the two seats should be deducted from the 128-member quorum, creating a new quorum of 126, in which March 14 would still have the majority. The Ambassador further argued that Lahoud is essentially using an administrative process to violate the constitution, which requires that elections be held within 60 days after a vacancy occurs. Aoun replied that the solution was an accelerated formulation of a new government; once a new cabinet was in place, he argued, Lahoud would sign the decree. Following the parliamentary by-elections (scheduled for August 5),Lahoud could then consult with the new parliament to form a new government. ¶10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question as to whether the FPM would field a candidate in Pierre Gemayel's Metn district (where Gemayel's father Amine, brother of assassinated President Bashir Gemayel and potential presidential candidate is widely expected to run despite his current disavowals),Aoun said that depended on Amine's behavior; the FPM was still reeling from the insult of Amine's refusal to accept Aoun's condolence call after Pierre's assassination, and there had been no efforts at reconciliation since. Aoun, noting that the FM had not fielded a candidate in the elections to replace MP Gebran Tueni (assassinated December 12, 2005),argued that, in any case, the ruling of a country does not depend on one seat. IMPLICATIONS OF NAHR AL-BARID -------------- BEIRUT 00000896 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was doing a good job in Nahr al-Barid, Aoun seized the moment to expound on his ideas for improving Lebanon's security. First, the LAF needed more equipment. Aoun also advocated the creation of two units, an anti-terrorist unit and what he termed and "anti-subversive warfare" unit in addition to traditional military units and was working on a plan in this regard. Lebanon also needed an operations center comprising all of its various intelligence services, including Surete Generale, army intelligence (G-2), and the intelligence branch of the Internal Security Forces (ISF). A quick response team also was needed to react to but also prevent security incidents. Lamenting the lack of a parliamentary security committee (which he had proposed in 2005),Aoun said what was needed was a body able to consult with the heads of al the security forces to delineate responsibilities. The confusion that currently reigned made Lebanon more vulnerable than necessary to security threats, Aoun argued, noting that Al-Qaeda now has operations in Lebanon. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) With Aoun, the primary question is always whether the General is a willing ally of the Syrians or not. If he is simply an unwitting participant in their schemes, then it should be theoretically possible to appeal to his ego and ambitions to peel him away from his unholy alliance with Hizballah and the assorted pro-Syrians in Lebanon. For some time now, some of his MPs and many of his supporters have been expressing discomfort with his positions, leading to wistful thinking on the part of March 14 activists. If Aoun would give credible guarantees that his ministers would not resign from an expanded cabinet, for example, then March 14 leaders should find the concept of a national unity government less frightening: the potential resignation of Shia ministers would not (as it didn't in November) spell the constitutional collapse of the cabinet. But if -- as we expect -- the only guarantee Aoun seeks in return is the presidency, of course, then there can be no deal. While we think the odds remain stacked against any kind of Aoun-March 14 deal, we will continue to nudge March 14/GOL leaders and the Aounists into exploring possible cabinet options and guarantees. FELTMAN