LEBANON: DO BY-ELECTIONS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000875 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: DO BY-ELECTIONS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF A SECOND GOVERNMENT, ASSASSINATIONS OF MPS? Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 16 session, the Lebanese cabinet rushed through a decree to hold by-elections for the two March 14 parliamentary seats made vacant through assassination; by-elections will be scheduled for August 5. Former President Amine Gemayel told us that he hesitates to run for his son's seat, although his March 14 colleagues believe he will ultimately say yes. Saad Hariri has not picked a Sunni candidate to replace Walid Eido, although he favors a Hariri insider. March 14 politicians claim that Maronite Patriarch Sfeir supports the by-elections, but Sfeir's comments have been characteristically ambiguous. The surprising support given to by-elections by opposition politician Suleiman Franjieh has unnerved some March 14 leaders, who fear that Franjieh's motives in favoring by-elections are not benign: Franjieh's support might suggest that the pro-Syrians will murder MPs in areas where (unlike in 2005) they might now win, thus changing the majority through murder combined with elections. Deputy PM Elias Murr, claiming inside knowledge, believes that the by-election announcement will also accelerate President Emile Lahoud's decision to appoint a second cabinet. Intensified contacts between the March 14 and GOL camps and Michel Aoun's bloc in the aftermath of the Walid Eido assassination have renewed the hope that it might be possible to peel Aoun away from the pro-Syrians, at least sufficiently to make it more difficult for Lahoud to appoint the second cabinet. End summary. CABINET DECIDES ON BY-ELECTIONS FOR AUGUST 5 -------------- ¶2. (C) As predicted, the Lebanese cabinet on Saturday (June 16) passed a decree declaring that by-elections for two empty parliamentary seats (the Metn Maronite seat of Pierre Gemayel, murdered 11/21/06, and the Beirut Sunni seat of Walid Eido, murdered 6/13/07) will take place on August 5. The cabinet passed the decree to Baabda Palace for President Emile Lahoud's signature. As he has since the Shia ministers' walk-out on 11/11/06, Lahoud declared the action illegal, taken by an illegitimate and unconstitutional cabinet, and refused to accept the decree. Per the constitution, the cabinet must now wait two weeks before re-affirming the decision to overcome Lahoud's veto. CABINET TAKES DECREE ON ELECTIONS WHERE NONE SHOULD BE REQUIRED -------------- ¶3. (C) The decision is considered controversial because the Siniora government opted for a full cabinet decree rather than a simple administrative decree (normally used to call for by-elections) to avoid the President's refusal to sign. Administrative decrees do not require a full cabinet vote; instead, they are signed, in ascending order, by the interested minister (in this case the Minister of the Interior, who is responsible for administering elections), Prime Minister, then President. Perversely, the constitution provides no mechanism for overturning the President's refusal to sign a simple administrative decree. A full cabinet decree, however, automatically becomes law two weeks after it is submitted to the President, regardless of whether he signs it. ¶4. (C) Such a scenario -- using a full cabinet decree when a simple administrative decree would suffice -- was never envisioned, lawyer and long-time MP Boutros Harb (a March 14 moderate) explained to us over lunch on June 16, since it never occurred to anyone that the president would refuse to sign administrative decrees. Harb argued that the cabinet's action to pass a full cabinet decree when none is technically required is not only legal but necessary in order to protect the constitution: Article 41 of the constitution ("should a seat in the Chamber become vacant, the election of a successor shall begin within two months") does not give the president the discretion to block elections. So, Harb argued, the cabinet is taking essential corrective action to overcome Lahoud's violation of the constitution. "MORAL IMPERATIVE": TRYING TO PERSUADE THE PATRIARCH BEIRUT 00000875 002 OF 005 -------------- ¶5. (C) Like others, Harb also argued about the "moral imperative" to hold by-elections. If assassins can get away with changing the parliamentary majority and reducing the number of seats through murder, then crime does pay. No legal system or constitution would condone such an outcome. We talked over the weekend with Harb, Higher Judicial Council President Antoine Kheir, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri, and former MP Nassib Lahoud, all of whom went separately to see Maronite Patriarch Sfeir to persuade him of the moral, political, and legal imperative to support by-elections. Faced with pro-Syrian figures (including Emile Lahoud's eldest son, former MP Emile Emile Lahoud and, on Sunday, President Lahoud himself) telling him that the March 14 majority was attempting to undercut the powers of the Maronite presidency, Patriarch Sfeir eventually told Mitri to tell PM Siniora that he would "not oppose" the by-elections. While Mitri and others interpreted this as support, the Patriarch's public comments have been characteristically ambiguous and opaque, meaning that the pro-Syrians could still try to elicit a statement from him that would undermine the legitimacy of the by-elections. (We hope that the Vatican stiffens Sfeir's backbone on this subject.) AMINE GEMAYEL HESITATES, BUT MARCH 14 HOPES HE RUNS TO REPLACE MURDERED SON -------------- ¶6. (C) March 14 leaders are urging former President Amine Gemayel to run for his son's seat. Tactically, they argue, Gemayel would have the best chance of beating any candidate Aoun might field in an area of Lebanon where Aoun still has strong support. Moreover, Aoun might be embarrassed to field a candidate against Gemayel or might be worried that his candidate now might lose against someone of the stature of Gemayel, publicly confirming that Aoun is losing support. So the speculation now is that Aoun will permit Gemayel to run unopposed. (In the 2005 elections, the Aoun list swept the Metn, but Aoun intentionally did not contest one Maronite seat -- with Pierre Gemayel thus able to prevail over other non-Aoun Maronites like Nassib Lahoud. Had Aoun ran a complete list, Pierre Gemayel most likely would have lost.) ¶7. (C) Given that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri will most likely be under Syrian orders to reject the by-elections, Gemayel is also a good choice to score a symbolic victory: if Berri refuses to seat the internationally known Gemayel whenever parliament meets again, then the publicity and scandal are likely to accrue to the benefit of March 14. Gemayel told us that he is hesitant to run (perhaps because he is holding out for running for president later, although being an MP would not disqualify him),but Marwan Hamadeh, Walid Jumblatt, and Saad Hariri told us over the weekend that they are convinced Gemayel will come around to the idea. Harb, who also predicted Gemayel would run, commented, "Amine can't ever make a decision quickly." SUNNI CANDIDATE TO REPLACE EIDO LIKELY TO BE HARIRI INSIDER -------------- ¶8. (C) As for the Sunni candidate to replace Walid Eido, there does not yet seem to be a March 14 consensus. Former MP Tamaam Salam was under consideration, until he made some comments to the press that sounded suspiciously pro-March 8. "We don't want another Pierre Daccache," Jumblatt told us, referring to the so-called "neutral" MP who ran unopposed as a compromise candidate to fill the seat of March 14 MP Edmond Naim, who died of natural causes. Daccache unveiled himself immediately after elections as unabashedly pro-Aoun. Hariri said that he favors for Eido's seat Salim Diab, a long-time advisor to his father who is from the inner core of the Hariri's Future party machine. But, should Hizballah decide to participate in the elections, it is not a given that the March 14 candidate will win: Beirut's second district, which Eido represented, has a considerable number of Shia voters. (In the 2005 elections, Hariri was allied with Hizballah for Beirut.) If Hizballah accepts the legitimacy of the by-elections and runs its own Sunni candidate, March 14 will face a tough fight. BY-ELECTIONS A TOOL FOR MARCH 8 BEIRUT 00000875 003 OF 005 TO REVERSE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY? -------------- ¶9. (C) In an interview on Hizballah's al-Manar television on Friday night (6/15),pro-Syrian former Minister Suleiman Franjieh surprised viewers by coming out in favor of by-elections. Lahoud, he said, should consider Siniora's cabinet as a resigned, caretaker cabinet and thus sign the by-election decree. As they thought about why a March 8 figure would support the by-elections demanded by March 14, many of our contacts concluded that something sinister was at work. Perhaps, they said, Franjieh is establishing a precedent by which March 8 would participate in by-elections, despite their insistence that Siniora's cabinet is illegitimate. That way, the assassins could focus on districts now represented by March 14 MPs but which would likely end up in March 8 hands in any by-elections. In Baabda-Alley, for example, there are considerable Shia voters and Aoun supporters. Walid Jumblatt's March 14 list swept the race in 2005 by virtue of Hizballah throwing the Shia votes his way. Now, if one of Jumblatt's MPs was assassinated, Hizballah would likely back the Aoun candidate, probably tipping victory in his direction. So perhaps Franjieh, our contacts fret, was suggesting that a combination of murder and democratic by-elections could reverse the parliamentary majority just as effectively, and with a democratic facade, as simply killing off the March 14 deputies. MURR SEES BY-ELECTIONS AS LEADING TO SECOND-GOVERNMENT SCENARIO -------------- ¶10. (C) Franjieh also might have hinted obliquely that, by considering Siniora's cabinet a resigned cabinet, President Lahoud could then replace it by appointing a second PM and second cabinet. Meeting with us on Saturday evening, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr told us that his sources inside the Lahoud family tell him President Lahoud intends to do just that, at the end of June, by declaring that Siniora's resigned cabinet had through the by-elections usurped the constitutional powers of the president. (Until a year ago, Murr was married to Lahoud's daughter Karine, and his father Michel still maintains close relations with the Lahouds.) ¶11. (C) Murr did not know how Lahoud would evade the constitutional requirement that, to name a prime minister, the president must call MPs to consultations that are, in essence, votes for a PM candidate. Maybe, Murr speculated, Lahoud will proceed with a plan to dissolve parliament, in which case he would argue that there are no MPs to consult. Or maybe he will call the MPs for consultations, putting March 14 MPs in a bind: if they go to consultations, they accept the logic that Siniora has resigned. If they don't go for consultations, then the March 8-Aounist MPs will, unopposed, pick a second PM whom Lahoud will appoint, leading to the two-government scenario everyone has feared. ¶12. (C) The Ambassador asked Murr about the rumors that he would accept the Defense Minister slot in the second cabinet, thus serving in both. "Absolutely not," Murr insisted. But, he said, he thought the rumors were true that Lahoud would, even without consulting him or asking for his approval, assign him that portfolio in the second cabinet. "But I won't participate and I won't show up for meetings," he said; "don't worry." The fact that Lahoud, who now detests Murr, would even move in this direction shows one last concern that Lahoud has for Lebanon's institutions, Murr argued: Lahoud doesn't want to take the step of splitting the army. By claiming that Murr is Defense Minister in the second cabinet, then LAF Commander Michel Sleiman continues to report to Murr, and the Shia soldiers will not be forced to choose between the two cabinets. The Ambassador noted that, if Murr is named to the second cabinet, his colleagues in the Siniora cabinet and their political backers, who have never entirely trusted Murr for his previously strong ties to Syria, would be immediately suspicious. "I know," Murr said, stabbing out his fifth CIGARETTE in half an hour; "what can I do?" A DEAL WITH AOUN: MAYBE MORE LIKELY NOW, AND MAYBE A WAY TO STOP SECOND GOVERNMENT -------------- BEIRUT 00000875 004 OF 005 ¶13. (C) Meeting with us on June 16, Mohamad Chatah, senior advisor to PM Siniora, reported that he had met for four hours (!) the previous evening with Gebran Bassil, the bombastic senior advisor (and son-in-law) to Michel Aoun, at Bassil's request. Bassil told Chatah that General Aoun wanted to avoid at all costs the two-government scenario, which he saw as a catastrophe for Lebanon. Thus, Aoun wanted to know what Siniora was willing to offer him in any kind of independent deal on cabinet formation that would essentially corner Nabih Berri and Hizballah and undercut Lahoud's ability to appoint a second cabinet. PM Siniora, who met with the Ambassador briefly on June 16, said that he was intrigued by Aoun's comments. "Why should Aoun have to rely on Berri to negotiate for the opposition?" Siniora asked. "We can play to his ego by negotiating separately with him." Ghattas Khoury, advisor to Saad Hariri, told us that he had been approached by Aoun MP Ibrahim Kanaan with a similar proposal as Bassil had pitched to Chatah. Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt remained skeptical of Aoun but nevertheless agreed to explore possible deals with Aoun. ¶14. (C) Marwan Hamadeh told us during a June 16 meeting that he envisioned a deal by which Aoun could offer the guarantee not to resign in an expanded cabinet, which would make it impossible for Hizballah and Berri to topple any cabinet. In return for Aoun's assurances, maybe March 14 could offer assurances on something Aoun wants, like a new election law. The question in Hamadeh's mind is whether one can come to an arrangement with Aoun now that does not include giving him the presidency in the autumn. If presidential elections were still a year away, it would probably be easier to conclude a temporary deal to fix the cabinet, he predicted, for Aoun's interests would be different than they are now. Now, everything is defined by the presidency, and that is something March 14 is not prepared to trade away to Aoun. Murr noted that Aoun had called him to invite himself to Murr's house for dinner at a time to be determined; Murr speculated that Aoun is either trying to match a pitch to Murr to join a second cabinet or to get Murr to help him rebuild ties with March 14 and GOL leaders. Murr suspects the latter. Murr mused that, if Aoun were to make a deal with March 14 leaders, then Emile Lahoud would find it impossible to appoint a second cabinet, as the only significant backers would be the Shia bloc. COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) Whatever the constitutional arguments, the cabinet had no choice but to proceed with a decision to hold by-elections. Anything less would have been seen, rightly, as capitulation to those trying to change the parliamentary composition by murder. (Timely by-elections for Pierre Gemayel's seat got lost in the shuffle of the various protests of December and January. Moreover, Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, in one of his trips to Lebanon, SIPDIS asked PM Siniora not to push for by-elections over Lahoud's objections, as Moussa tried to broker a comprehensive deal with the March 8-Aoun forces.) But by-elections alone will not guarantee that March 14 can retain its majority: in some parts of the country (notably Baabda-Alley),murder followed by democratic elections could easily spell victory for the March 8-Aoun forces, and even the Beirut second district seat of Walid Eido is not completely safe for March 14, if Hizballah strongly backs an alternative candidate. With the Special Tribunal for Lebanon now legally a reality, it is not clear what more we can do to deter this murder-election scenario except continue to press the GOL and UN to take steps to make the tribunal operational as quickly as possible. ¶16. (C) As for the second cabinet scenario, Murr's analysis of Emile Lahoud's twisted thinking has proven reliable in the past. If it is true that the decision by the cabinet to move forward with by-elections means that Lahoud will accelerate the naming of a second cabinet, then we, too, need to accelerate any power we have to deter such a decision. The threat of far-reaching financial or legal sanctions for anyone who would back such a second cabinet may not persuade Lahoud to back down, but it could reduce the enthusiasm of others to follow him in this destructive path. If he has only support among the most die-hard pro-Syrians and Hizballah, his plan will fail. We underscore the dangers to Lebanon's stability that a second cabinet will pose: even if BEIRUT 00000875 005 OF 005 most Lebanese stick to the legitimate Siniora cabinet, in the most sensitive areas of Lebanon (south of the Litani and along the Syrian border),the population will be with the second cabinet. This will cripple our ability, inter alia, to come up with mechanisms to stop arms smuggling across the Syrian border. Troop-contributing countries and UNIFIL officials will, by necessity, probably deal with the second cabinet, giving it the veneer of legitimacy. We urge movement now on the steps we have discussed in other channels that might serve as deterrence. ¶17. (C) As for Aoun, here is the perfect way for him to rehabilitate himself: by joining with March 14 forces to fix the cabinet and trading his guarantee that his ministers wouldn't topple the cabinet in return for March 14 guarantees on something of importance to him, like electoral reform. If Aoun is willing to make such a deal without having the guarantee of winning the presidency, we think March 14 should move quickly in that direction: whatever price March 14 leaders must pay to Aoun now (short of guaranteeing the presidency) is lower than the price Lebanon will pay later if a second cabinet is declared that has the allegiance of what could be up to 40 percent of the population, and in sensitive areas such as UNIFIL's area of operations and the Syrian-Lebanese border. We will see Aoun today to see if Aoun himself has any proclivity to move, for once, in a reasonable, constructive direction. End comment. FELTMAN