LEBANON: DO BY-ELECTIONS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIRUT 000875

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KDEM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: DO BY-ELECTIONS INCREASE THE CHANCES OF
A SECOND GOVERNMENT, ASSASSINATIONS OF MPS?


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a June 16 session, the Lebanese cabinet rushed
through a decree to hold by-elections for the two March 14
parliamentary seats made vacant through assassination;
by-elections will be scheduled for August 5. Former
President Amine Gemayel told us that he hesitates to run for
his son's seat, although his March 14 colleagues believe he
will ultimately say yes. Saad Hariri has not picked a Sunni
candidate to replace Walid Eido, although he favors a Hariri
insider. March 14 politicians claim that Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir supports the by-elections, but Sfeir's comments have
been characteristically ambiguous. The surprising support
given to by-elections by opposition politician Suleiman
Franjieh has unnerved some March 14 leaders, who fear that
Franjieh's motives in favoring by-elections are not benign:
Franjieh's support might suggest that the pro-Syrians will
murder MPs in areas where (unlike in 2005) they might now
win, thus changing the majority through murder combined with
elections. Deputy PM Elias Murr, claiming inside knowledge,
believes that the by-election announcement will also
accelerate President Emile Lahoud's decision to appoint a
second cabinet. Intensified contacts between the March 14
and GOL camps and Michel Aoun's bloc in the aftermath of the
Walid Eido assassination have renewed the hope that it might
be possible to peel Aoun away from the pro-Syrians, at least
sufficiently to make it more difficult for Lahoud to appoint
the second cabinet. End summary.

CABINET DECIDES ON BY-ELECTIONS FOR AUGUST 5
--------------


2. (C) As predicted, the Lebanese cabinet on Saturday (June
16) passed a decree declaring that by-elections for two empty
parliamentary seats (the Metn Maronite seat of Pierre
Gemayel, murdered 11/21/06, and the Beirut Sunni seat of
Walid Eido, murdered 6/13/07) will take place on August 5.
The cabinet passed the decree to Baabda Palace for President
Emile Lahoud's signature. As he has since the Shia
ministers' walk-out on 11/11/06, Lahoud declared the action
illegal, taken by an illegitimate and unconstitutional
cabinet, and refused to accept the decree. Per the
constitution, the cabinet must now wait two weeks before
re-affirming the decision to overcome Lahoud's veto.

CABINET TAKES DECREE ON ELECTIONS
WHERE NONE SHOULD BE REQUIRED
--------------


3. (C) The decision is considered controversial because the
Siniora government opted for a full cabinet decree rather
than a simple administrative decree (normally used to call
for by-elections) to avoid the President's refusal to sign.
Administrative decrees do not require a full cabinet vote;
instead, they are signed, in ascending order, by the
interested minister (in this case the Minister of the
Interior, who is responsible for administering elections),
Prime Minister, then President. Perversely, the constitution
provides no mechanism for overturning the President's refusal
to sign a simple administrative decree. A full cabinet
decree, however, automatically becomes law two weeks after it
is submitted to the President, regardless of whether he signs
it.


4. (C) Such a scenario -- using a full cabinet decree when a
simple administrative decree would suffice -- was never
envisioned, lawyer and long-time MP Boutros Harb (a March 14
moderate) explained to us over lunch on June 16, since it
never occurred to anyone that the president would refuse to
sign administrative decrees. Harb argued that the cabinet's
action to pass a full cabinet decree when none is technically
required is not only legal but necessary in order to protect
the constitution: Article 41 of the constitution ("should a
seat in the Chamber become vacant, the election of a
successor shall begin within two months") does not give the
president the discretion to block elections. So, Harb
argued, the cabinet is taking essential corrective action to
overcome Lahoud's violation of the constitution.

"MORAL IMPERATIVE":
TRYING TO PERSUADE THE PATRIARCH

BEIRUT 00000875 002 OF 005


--------------


5. (C) Like others, Harb also argued about the "moral
imperative" to hold by-elections. If assassins can get away
with changing the parliamentary majority and reducing the
number of seats through murder, then crime does pay. No
legal system or constitution would condone such an outcome.
We talked over the weekend with Harb, Higher Judicial Council
President Antoine Kheir, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk,
Acting Foreign Minister Tariq Mitri, and former MP Nassib
Lahoud, all of whom went separately to see Maronite Patriarch
Sfeir to persuade him of the moral, political, and legal
imperative to support by-elections. Faced with pro-Syrian
figures (including Emile Lahoud's eldest son, former MP Emile
Emile Lahoud and, on Sunday, President Lahoud himself)
telling him that the March 14 majority was attempting to
undercut the powers of the Maronite presidency, Patriarch
Sfeir eventually told Mitri to tell PM Siniora that he would
"not oppose" the by-elections. While Mitri and others
interpreted this as support, the Patriarch's public comments
have been characteristically ambiguous and opaque, meaning
that the pro-Syrians could still try to elicit a statement
from him that would undermine the legitimacy of the
by-elections. (We hope that the Vatican stiffens Sfeir's
backbone on this subject.)

AMINE GEMAYEL HESITATES, BUT MARCH 14
HOPES HE RUNS TO REPLACE MURDERED SON
--------------


6. (C) March 14 leaders are urging former President Amine
Gemayel to run for his son's seat. Tactically, they argue,
Gemayel would have the best chance of beating any candidate
Aoun might field in an area of Lebanon where Aoun still has
strong support. Moreover, Aoun might be embarrassed to field
a candidate against Gemayel or might be worried that his
candidate now might lose against someone of the stature of
Gemayel, publicly confirming that Aoun is losing support. So
the speculation now is that Aoun will permit Gemayel to run
unopposed. (In the 2005 elections, the Aoun list swept the
Metn, but Aoun intentionally did not contest one Maronite
seat -- with Pierre Gemayel thus able to prevail over other
non-Aoun Maronites like Nassib Lahoud. Had Aoun ran a
complete list, Pierre Gemayel most likely would have lost.)


7. (C) Given that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri will most
likely be under Syrian orders to reject the by-elections,
Gemayel is also a good choice to score a symbolic victory:
if Berri refuses to seat the internationally known Gemayel
whenever parliament meets again, then the publicity and
scandal are likely to accrue to the benefit of March 14.
Gemayel told us that he is hesitant to run (perhaps because
he is holding out for running for president later, although
being an MP would not disqualify him),but Marwan Hamadeh,
Walid Jumblatt, and Saad Hariri told us over the weekend that
they are convinced Gemayel will come around to the idea.
Harb, who also predicted Gemayel would run, commented, "Amine
can't ever make a decision quickly."

SUNNI CANDIDATE TO REPLACE EIDO
LIKELY TO BE HARIRI INSIDER
--------------


8. (C) As for the Sunni candidate to replace Walid Eido,
there does not yet seem to be a March 14 consensus. Former
MP Tamaam Salam was under consideration, until he made some
comments to the press that sounded suspiciously pro-March 8.
"We don't want another Pierre Daccache," Jumblatt told us,
referring to the so-called "neutral" MP who ran unopposed as
a compromise candidate to fill the seat of March 14 MP Edmond
Naim, who died of natural causes. Daccache unveiled himself
immediately after elections as unabashedly pro-Aoun. Hariri
said that he favors for Eido's seat Salim Diab, a long-time
advisor to his father who is from the inner core of the
Hariri's Future party machine. But, should Hizballah decide
to participate in the elections, it is not a given that the
March 14 candidate will win: Beirut's second district, which
Eido represented, has a considerable number of Shia voters.
(In the 2005 elections, Hariri was allied with Hizballah for
Beirut.) If Hizballah accepts the legitimacy of the
by-elections and runs its own Sunni candidate, March 14 will
face a tough fight.

BY-ELECTIONS A TOOL FOR MARCH 8

BEIRUT 00000875 003 OF 005


TO REVERSE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY?
--------------


9. (C) In an interview on Hizballah's al-Manar television
on Friday night (6/15),pro-Syrian former Minister Suleiman
Franjieh surprised viewers by coming out in favor of
by-elections. Lahoud, he said, should consider Siniora's
cabinet as a resigned, caretaker cabinet and thus sign the
by-election decree. As they thought about why a March 8
figure would support the by-elections demanded by March 14,
many of our contacts concluded that something sinister was at
work. Perhaps, they said, Franjieh is establishing a
precedent by which March 8 would participate in by-elections,
despite their insistence that Siniora's cabinet is
illegitimate. That way, the assassins could focus on
districts now represented by March 14 MPs but which would
likely end up in March 8 hands in any by-elections. In
Baabda-Alley, for example, there are considerable Shia voters
and Aoun supporters. Walid Jumblatt's March 14 list swept
the race in 2005 by virtue of Hizballah throwing the Shia
votes his way. Now, if one of Jumblatt's MPs was
assassinated, Hizballah would likely back the Aoun candidate,
probably tipping victory in his direction. So perhaps
Franjieh, our contacts fret, was suggesting that a
combination of murder and democratic by-elections could
reverse the parliamentary majority just as effectively, and
with a democratic facade, as simply killing off the March 14
deputies.

MURR SEES BY-ELECTIONS AS LEADING
TO SECOND-GOVERNMENT SCENARIO
--------------


10. (C) Franjieh also might have hinted obliquely that, by
considering Siniora's cabinet a resigned cabinet, President
Lahoud could then replace it by appointing a second PM and
second cabinet. Meeting with us on Saturday evening, Deputy
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr told us that
his sources inside the Lahoud family tell him President
Lahoud intends to do just that, at the end of June, by
declaring that Siniora's resigned cabinet had through the
by-elections usurped the constitutional powers of the
president. (Until a year ago, Murr was married to Lahoud's
daughter Karine, and his father Michel still maintains close
relations with the Lahouds.)


11. (C) Murr did not know how Lahoud would evade the
constitutional requirement that, to name a prime minister,
the president must call MPs to consultations that are, in
essence, votes for a PM candidate. Maybe, Murr speculated,
Lahoud will proceed with a plan to dissolve parliament, in
which case he would argue that there are no MPs to consult.
Or maybe he will call the MPs for consultations, putting
March 14 MPs in a bind: if they go to consultations, they
accept the logic that Siniora has resigned. If they don't go
for consultations, then the March 8-Aounist MPs will,
unopposed, pick a second PM whom Lahoud will appoint, leading
to the two-government scenario everyone has feared.


12. (C) The Ambassador asked Murr about the rumors that he
would accept the Defense Minister slot in the second cabinet,
thus serving in both. "Absolutely not," Murr insisted. But,
he said, he thought the rumors were true that Lahoud would,
even without consulting him or asking for his approval,
assign him that portfolio in the second cabinet. "But I
won't participate and I won't show up for meetings," he said;
"don't worry." The fact that Lahoud, who now detests Murr,
would even move in this direction shows one last concern that
Lahoud has for Lebanon's institutions, Murr argued: Lahoud
doesn't want to take the step of splitting the army. By
claiming that Murr is Defense Minister in the second cabinet,
then LAF Commander Michel Sleiman continues to report to
Murr, and the Shia soldiers will not be forced to choose
between the two cabinets. The Ambassador noted that, if Murr
is named to the second cabinet, his colleagues in the Siniora
cabinet and their political backers, who have never entirely
trusted Murr for his previously strong ties to Syria, would
be immediately suspicious. "I know," Murr said, stabbing out
his fifth cigarette in half an hour; "what can I do?"

A DEAL WITH AOUN: MAYBE MORE LIKELY NOW,
AND MAYBE A WAY TO STOP SECOND GOVERNMENT
--------------


BEIRUT 00000875 004 OF 005



13. (C) Meeting with us on June 16, Mohamad Chatah, senior
advisor to PM Siniora, reported that he had met for four
hours (!) the previous evening with Gebran Bassil, the
bombastic senior advisor (and son-in-law) to Michel Aoun, at
Bassil's request. Bassil told Chatah that General Aoun
wanted to avoid at all costs the two-government scenario,
which he saw as a catastrophe for Lebanon. Thus, Aoun wanted
to know what Siniora was willing to offer him in any kind of
independent deal on cabinet formation that would essentially
corner Nabih Berri and Hizballah and undercut Lahoud's
ability to appoint a second cabinet. PM Siniora, who met
with the Ambassador briefly on June 16, said that he was
intrigued by Aoun's comments. "Why should Aoun have to rely
on Berri to negotiate for the opposition?" Siniora asked.
"We can play to his ego by negotiating separately with him."
Ghattas Khoury, advisor to Saad Hariri, told us that he had
been approached by Aoun MP Ibrahim Kanaan with a similar
proposal as Bassil had pitched to Chatah. Saad Hariri and
Walid Jumblatt remained skeptical of Aoun but nevertheless
agreed to explore possible deals with Aoun.


14. (C) Marwan Hamadeh told us during a June 16 meeting
that he envisioned a deal by which Aoun could offer the
guarantee not to resign in an expanded cabinet, which would
make it impossible for Hizballah and Berri to topple any
cabinet. In return for Aoun's assurances, maybe March 14
could offer assurances on something Aoun wants, like a new
election law. The question in Hamadeh's mind is whether one
can come to an arrangement with Aoun now that does not
include giving him the presidency in the autumn. If
presidential elections were still a year away, it would
probably be easier to conclude a temporary deal to fix the
cabinet, he predicted, for Aoun's interests would be
different than they are now. Now, everything is defined by
the presidency, and that is something March 14 is not
prepared to trade away to Aoun. Murr noted that Aoun had
called him to invite himself to Murr's house for dinner at a
time to be determined; Murr speculated that Aoun is either
trying to match a pitch to Murr to join a second cabinet or
to get Murr to help him rebuild ties with March 14 and GOL
leaders. Murr suspects the latter. Murr mused that, if Aoun
were to make a deal with March 14 leaders, then Emile Lahoud
would find it impossible to appoint a second cabinet, as the
only significant backers would be the Shia bloc.

COMMENT
--------------


15. (C) Whatever the constitutional arguments, the cabinet
had no choice but to proceed with a decision to hold
by-elections. Anything less would have been seen, rightly,
as capitulation to those trying to change the parliamentary
composition by murder. (Timely by-elections for Pierre
Gemayel's seat got lost in the shuffle of the various
protests of December and January. Moreover, Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa, in one of his trips to Lebanon,

SIPDIS
asked PM Siniora not to push for by-elections over Lahoud's
objections, as Moussa tried to broker a comprehensive deal
with the March 8-Aoun forces.) But by-elections alone will
not guarantee that March 14 can retain its majority: in some
parts of the country (notably Baabda-Alley),murder followed
by democratic elections could easily spell victory for the
March 8-Aoun forces, and even the Beirut second district seat
of Walid Eido is not completely safe for March 14, if
Hizballah strongly backs an alternative candidate. With the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon now legally a reality, it is not
clear what more we can do to deter this murder-election
scenario except continue to press the GOL and UN to take
steps to make the tribunal operational as quickly as
possible.


16. (C) As for the second cabinet scenario, Murr's analysis
of Emile Lahoud's twisted thinking has proven reliable in the
past. If it is true that the decision by the cabinet to move
forward with by-elections means that Lahoud will accelerate
the naming of a second cabinet, then we, too, need to
accelerate any power we have to deter such a decision. The
threat of far-reaching financial or legal sanctions for
anyone who would back such a second cabinet may not persuade
Lahoud to back down, but it could reduce the enthusiasm of
others to follow him in this destructive path. If he has
only support among the most die-hard pro-Syrians and
Hizballah, his plan will fail. We underscore the dangers to
Lebanon's stability that a second cabinet will pose: even if

BEIRUT 00000875 005 OF 005


most Lebanese stick to the legitimate Siniora cabinet, in the
most sensitive areas of Lebanon (south of the Litani and
along the Syrian border),the population will be with the
second cabinet. This will cripple our ability, inter alia,
to come up with mechanisms to stop arms smuggling across the
Syrian border. Troop-contributing countries and UNIFIL
officials will, by necessity, probably deal with the second
cabinet, giving it the veneer of legitimacy. We urge
movement now on the steps we have discussed in other channels
that might serve as deterrence.


17. (C) As for Aoun, here is the perfect way for him to
rehabilitate himself: by joining with March 14 forces to fix
the cabinet and trading his guarantee that his ministers
wouldn't topple the cabinet in return for March 14 guarantees
on something of importance to him, like electoral reform. If
Aoun is willing to make such a deal without having the
guarantee of winning the presidency, we think March 14 should
move quickly in that direction: whatever price March 14
leaders must pay to Aoun now (short of guaranteeing the
presidency) is lower than the price Lebanon will pay later if
a second cabinet is declared that has the allegiance of what
could be up to 40 percent of the population, and in sensitive
areas such as UNIFIL's area of operations and the
Syrian-Lebanese border. We will see Aoun today to see if
Aoun himself has any proclivity to move, for once, in a
reasonable, constructive direction. End comment.
FELTMAN