LEBANON: SAFADI SEES SYRIAN HAND BEHIND EIDO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000870 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER LE SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAFADI SEES SYRIAN HAND BEHIND EIDO ASSASINATION REF: BEIRUT 860 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). LEBANON: SAFADI SEES SYRIAN HAND BEHIND EIDO ASSASSINATION SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Minister of Public Works and Transportation Mohammad Safadi blamed Syria for the June 13 assassination of March 14 MP Walid Eido. Eido and March 14 Youth and Sports Minister Ahmed Fatfat have both been targets for some time, he claimed, due to their verbal assaults against the Syrians. The killing won't stop, with or without the Special Tribunal, he said, and the Lebanese political impasse won't end until the conflict between Sunnis and Alawis is resolved. At an upcoming meeting the cabinet will discuss whether to hold by-elections to replace two assassinated March 14 MPs or whether to avoid provoking the opposition. Safadi calculated that while Hizballah is loathe to lose the protection afforded it by the current cabinet statement, its Syrian backers are eager to foment chaos and increase their control. Eido's assassination will make it harder, but Safadi is still determined to work simultaneously toward electing a new president and an acceptable national unity government; he also sees a need for the GOL to offer better protection to its MPs and the staff it will select for the international tribunal. Finally, Safadi believes that Sunni support for the GOL remains strong up north, despite extensive Sunni casualties in the army's fighting in Nahr al-Barid camp. End Summary SYRIA THE LOGICAL CULPRIT; ANTI-SYRIANS NATURAL TARGETS -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador, DCM, and Econoff on June 14 (the day after the assassination of March 14 MP Walid Eido),Minister of Public Works and Transportation Mohammad Safadi argued only Syria would conduct an assassination now. Safadi, a Sunni March 14 stalwart, reasoned that only Syria would work to interrupt Saudi and French attempts to find a solution to Lebanon's political impasse. Eido and March 14 Minister of Youth and Sports Ahmed Fatfat have been targets for a long time due to their frequent verbal attacks against Syria, Safadi told us. He recounted a story we'd heard earlier from other sources: upon hearing of the assassination, a broadcaster with Parliamentary Speak and Amal leader Nabih Berri's Shia-affiliated NBN television, thinking she was off the air, commented to a colleague, "at least they've gotten rid of one, I hope they will get rid of Fatfat, too." (Note: The videoclip of this is now circulating widely. End note.) Safadi told us that Fatfat, upon hearing this, took a copy of the video to UNIIIC as evidence that he is a potential target for assassination. Fatfat also confronted Berri, who first angrily accused Fatfat of threatening him before finally calling Fatfat back to say he had fired the two responsible employees. THE KILLING WON'T STOP UNTIL A SUNNI ALAWITE DEAL IS REACHED -------------- ¶3. (C) Safadi argued that the series of political assassinations won't stop -- with or without the Special Tribunal -- and the Lebanese political impasse won't end until Sunnis and Alawites resolve their differences. Although Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is unwilling to compromise, it is far better to find a solution sooner rather than later, Safadi said. He expressed frustration that Syrian Sunnis are quite nationalistic now, and no longer feel any connection to Lebanese Sunnis, who are now more closely affiliated with the Lebanese state than any other group. The Lebanese Sunni "street" is very anti-Syrian, and Lebanese Sunnis are ready to blame Syria for any problem, Safadi went on. It is hard to even find a Sunni interlocutor to speak with the Syrians; the Alawites refuse to talk to Lebanese Sunni leaders like Siniora, Safadi, or others in the GOL, who the Syrians view as a threat to the undemocratic regimes in the region. MARCH 14 CLINGING TO CONSTITUTIONALITY BEIRUT 00000870 002 OF 003 -------------- . (C) Safadi told the Ambassador that the next offiial cabinet meeting, scheduled for June 16, willdiscuss whether to call for immediate by-electios for the two assassinated March 14 MPs, Pierre emayel and Walid Eido. March 14 is down to just68 members in the 128-member parliament. The cabnet is currently undecided; they are consulting layers to determine whether it is constitutional t hold by-elections without the consent of the prsident, although it is clear the president's refsal to sign the government's decree to hold electons within 60 days of the assassinations is uncostitutional. March 14 members are concerned that,if they take what would be seen as an unconstituional step, the opposition will respond with addtional unconstitutional actions, including the fomation of a second government. The GOL is clingng to constitutional integrity as a symbol of it legitimacy, Safadi explained. PM Advisor Mohamme Chatah told DCM in a subsequent meeting that th cabinet almost certainly will pass a decree callng for by-elections, but has one concern. If caling elections led to President Lahoud initiatin early his long-rumored plan to establish a secod government, that second government might receive support in south Lebanon where UNIFIL operates, rquiring UNIFIL to work with it in some way for oerational effectiveness. OPPOSITION MOTIVATIOS -------------- ¶5. (C) The last thin Hizballah wants is a second government, Safadi easoned, because it would lose the protection affrded it as "the resistance" by the 2005 cabinet eclaration. While the current government if it stcks to the cabinet program cannot allow the armyto stop "resistance" arms shipments with impunit, chances are slim that a new cabinet would agreeto a declaration that includes similar language rotecting Hizballah. Similarly, Safadi argued, ran wants to maintain influence in Lebanon through Hizballah, and would prefer that the majority an opposition reach an agreement to end the politicl impasse. ¶6. (C) In contrast to Hizballah's Leanese political interests and those of its Iranin backers, Safadi went on, the Syrians are unwiling to compromise. They want to create chaos inLebanon so Syria can reassert control over what it views as its territory or sphere of influence. Te struggle is now between individuals rather tha states, Safadi argued; it is a struggle to the eath between Bashar al-Assad and Walid Jumblatt nd others. POLITICAL NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶7. (C) Echoing sentiments expressed by Rik the day before (reftel),Safadi said Eido's asassination will make it harder to form a nationa unity government, as Sunni-Shia tensions escalae. He noted that residents of the southern suburs celebrated the assassination by passing out candes, as they did after the assassination of MP Giran Tueni in December 2005. Safadi told us thathe is planning to approach Saad Hariri to offer imself as an intermediary, since his lack of invovement in the 1975-1990 civil war means he is unainted by a militia past and thus better able totalk to all sides. Lebanon can't withstand large ivilian casualties like in Iraq and Gaza, he arged, so some action is necessary, and the GOL stil needs to work on solving the twin problems of a new national unity cabinet in conjunction with electing a new strong, pro-March 14 president. The easiest way out, Safadi told us, is entirely new parliamentary elections; March 14 would do well, at least up north. ¶8. (C) In addition, the GOL will have to provide better security to its MPs and to the four Lebanese judges and the deputy prosecutor who will be selected to work on the Special Tribunal, Safadi stressed. MPs are already expressing outrage that the GOL offers Parliamentarians only minimal protection, and more MPs could defect from the March 14 alliance. Safadi reflected that he is lucky to be able to afford his own security guards to supplement the three assigned to him by the Ministry of Interior, and to have a strong sense of security awareness that most MPs lack. Safadi expressed concern that as long as the assassinations continue, the opposition has the upper hand in keeping pressure on March 14 MPs and ministers. BEIRUT 00000870 003 OF 003 NEWS FROM TRIPOLI -------------- ¶9. (C) Safadi, a Tripoli native, estimated that 95 percent of Sunnis there support the GOL; the remaining five percent are extremists, however, able to cause significant damage. Rival Sunni politicians Omar Karami and Najib Mikati are not popular, Safadi reported; Mikati has spent a lot of money to regain popularity, but at this stage has gained little. Noting that most of the casualties were local Sunnis killed in surprise attacks on checkpoints, Safadi claimed northerners do not resent the army for killing Sunnis in their battle in Nahr al-Barid camp, and are not resentful that primarily Sunnis have been killed, according to Safadi. In addition, he argued that northern Sunnis are disproportionately represented in the LAF, and that the GOL has intentionally downplayed any Shia involvement in the Nahr al-Barid battle to avoid raising sectarian tensions. ¶10. (C) There are more Fatah al-Islam (FAI) fighters in Nahr al-Barid than expected, Safadi noted. In addition, more than 30 Saudi nationals are involved, and quite a few camp residents or outlaws hiding in the camp have joined forces with FAI because they see a common cause in fighting the LAF, Safadi assessed. FELTMAN