LEBANON: BERRI RAISING THE BAR ON NATIONAL UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000851 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: BERRI RAISING THE BAR ON NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT? REF: BEIRUT 831 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 11 meeting with the Ambassador, Parliament Speaker and Amal leader Nabih Berri hardened his positions on three issues. First, he rejected the 19-11 cabinet formula he had previous advocated, demanding instead a 17-13 division (with two seats more for the opposition). Second, Berri withdrew his earlier promise that the March 8-Aoun ministers would not resign from the cabinet, thus raising the possibility that "blocking minority" might indeed become the "toppling minority" March 14 politicians feared. Third, Berri said that he would no longer simply accept Maronite Patriarch Sfeir's choice for president (should Sfeir ever utter a name),saying that his offer to stand by the Patriarch had expired. While he seemed slightly more open to an improved cabinet program to replace the July 2005 agenda, Berri -- as he has before -- continued to insist on the resignation of PM Siniora as the key to fixing the cabinet. Dismissing France's initiative (Ref A) to host a national dialogue as a poorly planned "political picnic," he nevertheless welcomed the assistance of the Saudis and others in serving as mediators. Berri purported to have no bone in the fight (other than concerns for constitutional propriety) as to whether a national unity government is formed; the important thing was for March 14 and March 8 to agree on a way forward so that parliament can elect a new president on September 25, as scheduled. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, met with Berri at his residence. Berri was accompanied by Senior Advisor Ali Hamdan and Amal MP Ali Bazzi (a US citizen) from the Bint Jubayl district in South Lebanon. FRENCH INITIATIVE A "POLITICAL PICNIC" -------------- ¶3. (C) Berri, who had met with French Special Envoy for Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseron on June 10, commented that France's initiative to host a National Dialogue seemed to lack any real planning and as such could be harmful. He reportedly told Cousseran he understood the new French government's need to demonstrate its activism in Lebanon and its willingness to work with all the players. In the end, Berri told the Ambassador, the meetings in Paris would be nothing more than a nice photo op and a "political picnic." The Speaker did express appreciation, however, for Saudi and other efforts to play a mediating role between Lebanon's various political groupings. PRESIDENCY IS KEY TO RESOLVING POLITICAL CRISIS -------------- -- ¶4. (C) Berri said the presidency was the key to unlocking Lebanon's political crisis. Claiming that he would support whichever candidate March 14 and March 8 agree on, Berri said the important thing was consensus. Neither group alone had enough votes in parliament to elect a new president. Voting would then take place on September 25 as scheduled, and on November 24 the winner would assume the presidency and form a new government of his own. If still in office by the time of the presidential elections, PM Siniora would then have to resign constitutionally. But, Berri opined, Siniora would be asked to lead the new government because of his popular support. (Comment: This would certainly surprise Saad Hariri, who expects to be PM after presidential elections. End comment.) Siniora would then seek parliamentary approval on the formation of a new government. The current debate over cabinet expansion would become a moot point, Berri concluded, since the new government would be of the new presidency's choosing. Berri said he had discussed this scenario with Patriarch Sfeir. SINIORA MUST RESIGN FIRST -------------- ¶5. (C) Berri argued that, constitutionally, Siniora could neither change nor enlarge the current government without first resigning. Siniora's resignation is essential to fixing the cabinet. The real question was, did March 14 want a new government, with a new cabinet program, or an expanded version of the current government, with the same cabinet BEIRUT 00000851 002 OF 004 program? (Note: Berri's interesting constitutional interpretations aside, the distinction between a new cabinet and an expanded cabinet is significant. While a new cabinet would permit the jettisoning at last of some odious pro-Hizballah language approved by parliament in the July 2005 cabinet program, it would also necessitate the resignation of the current cabinet. President Emile Lahoud, in one of his few absolute powers, has to co-sign the cabinet formation decree with the Prime Minister. A presidential veto in this case cannot be overruled. For a simple cabinet expansion, on the other hand, the old cabinet statement would remain. But Lahoud would only be required to co-sign the appointments of the additional ministers, reducing the chances for presidential mischief. End note.) ¶6. (C) Berri, who previously insisted upon maintaining the current cabinet program, indicated some flexibility this time regarding a new cabinet program. Siniora, he said, asked to base a new cabinet program on four agenda items already approved by the Lebanese: the four decisions of the spring 2006 National Dialogue sessions, Siniora's 7-point plan approved during Hizballah's war with Israel, UNSCR 1701, and the Paris III reform plan. The 7-point plan is already incorporated in UNSCR 1701, Berri said (suggesting that he would not support separate reference to it),and, for the other three agenda points, Berri himself had been among the authors. So naturally Berri would support such a cabinet program. But, he added, he would not enter into specific negotiations on the program until Siniora resigned without any "preset conditions." Constitutionally, he argued, there should be no discussions on the formation of a new cabinet until this occurred. He claimed that Lahoud also preferred a new cabinet and new cabinet program. MARCH 14'S VIEWS NOT CLEAR -- EXCEPT REJECTION OF UNITY CABINET -------------- ¶7. (C) Berri claimed he would not object if the parties ultimately decided not to form a national unity government. He just wanted the March 14 leaders (who need their own national dialogue table to unite their positions, Berri quipped) to let him know what they wanted. In fact, Berri claimed, March 14 leaders never had a real interest in a national unity government. By focusing on issues like the Special Tribunal and the presidency, March 14 leaders diverted attention away from the cabinet. As evidence, Berri cited the last line of March 14's communique that called for a national unity government after -- and not before -- the election of a new president. This, in Berri's mind, proved that March 14 leaders are not serious in speaking of a 19-11 cabinet now. According to Berri, there would be no need for a national unity government after the presidential elections, since the newly elected president would use his constitutional powers to sign the cabinet formation decree to shape the cabinet in his own choosing. So March's 14 calls for a national unity cabinet after presidential elections were a smokescreen. RAISING THE BAR ON NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT? -------------- ¶8. (C) As the conversation continued, it became clear that Berri no longer accepted the 19-11 formula for cabinet expansion that he once advocated (and that March 14 leaders have at last started to consider). Now, he said, he wants the 17-13 cabinet (with two seats more for the opposition) that PM Siniora once proposed. The Ambassador noted that the 17-13 proposal is not really workable, as former President Amine Gemayel would object: he expects to nominate the replacement for his murdered son Pierre's cabinet seat (bringing the cabinet share of the March 14 bloc and allies to 18). With a flick of the hand, Berri waved that concern away as unimportant. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted that the 19-11 cabinet proposal was originally presented as a trade: the March 8-Aoun bloc would approve the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and, in return, the March 14 bloc would concede to the March 8-Aoun demand for a 19-11 cabinet. With the international community assumed the March 8-Aoun concessions by creating the tribunal itself, why would the March 8-Aoun bloc now insist on a larger cabinet share? Berri skirted the Ambassador's question by stating the current government is illegitimate, Lahoud is losing patience, and a new government must be formed. BEIRUT 00000851 003 OF 004 ¶10. (C) Berri also withdrew his previous guarantees that he would ensure that the March 8-Aoun bloc would not use its cabinet decision to topple the cabinet at will. (If more than a third of the ministers resign, a cabinet is considered constitutionally fallen.) He claimed that his earlier promise not to have the "blocking minority" become a "toppling minority" was linked to the tribunal. Now the tribunal was passed, there was no more need for such guarantees. Why, he asked (suggesting implausibly that logic might occasionally prevail in Lebanese politics),would the March 8-Aoun politicians withdraw from the cabinet, when they know that the cabinet will inherit the presidential powers if no presidential elections occur? The Ambassador noted the danger that President Emile Lahoud might appoint a second cabinet, a destructive act that would be facilitated by the collapse of the Siniora cabinet that March 8-Aoun ministerial resignations would provoke. Berri claimed that he would not support a second cabinet, but he refused to renew his previous promise to keep the March 8-Aoun ministers in the cabinet. NO LONGER WILLING TO BACK PATRIARCH'S CHOICE -------------- ¶11. (C) Asked by the Ambassador whether he would guarantee the majority that presidential elections will take place -- another demand by the March 14 bloc in the case of a national unity cabinet -- Berri bristled, I will give the guarantee "for my country, not March 14." The Ambassador asked Berri whether he still stuck to his position that he would support any presidential candidate named by Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Berri shook his head. While he was willing to coordinate and consult with the Patriarch, the Speaker's earlier vow to go along with the Patriarch's choice was linked entirely to the drive to oust Lahoud from office early. Had there been early presidential elections to replace Lahoud, then Berri would have gone along with the Patriarch's choice. Now, no. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Berri, as usual, postured as the great facilitator and defender of Lebanon's constitution. Yet as any indefatigable readers of our previous reporting would recognize, Berri was busily rewriting the history of his own positions, in favor of hardening them considerably. After all, whatever the origins of the idea, he was the first public advocate of the 19-11 cabinet split, and the downtown "tent city" sit-in was erected in support of a 19-11 government. Yet just as March 14 leaders started to consider the idea seriously (with Saudi Ambassador Khoja pushing it), Berri has moved on. The withdrawal of his previous guarantee against ministerial resignations and his refusal to consider assurances regarding presidential elections will dampen any interest by March 14 leaders to consider a national unity proposal. Indeed, Walid Jumblatt and Saad Hariri, speaking to us after a March 14 leadership coordination session on June 12, told us that, in the face of the growing appetite by the March 8-Aoun bloc, they will put any potential political initiatives regarding the cabinet on hold until after the Nahr al-Barid fight concludes. ¶13. (C) Hariri's confidante Ghattas Khoury tells us that Hizballah has passed on a similar message to Hariri, adding that Hassan Nasrallah will not even deign to accept Hariri's offer to meet until Hariri has publicly accepted the 17-13 split and the need for Siniora's resignation. Hariri (as well as his March 14 partners) considers both demands red lines. The question is whether Berri and Hizballah are simply offering an opening negotiating stance. Our March 14 contacts believe that, in fact, Berri and Hizballah have been ordered by Damascus to harden their positions, now that there are signs that 19-11 might actually be accepted by the March 14 politicians. Berri's abandonment of his long-standing position about accepting the Patriarch's choice for president might also be linked to realization that, against all expectations, the Patriarch might actually give a name. ¶14. (C) Meeting with the Ambassador and DCM on June 13, Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi -- traditionally the most "pro-Syrian" and "pro-Hizballah" of Walid Jumblatt's advisors, with close contacts and friends in the March 8 camp -- told us that he finds the Berri-Hizballah hardened position as evidence that Damascus does not want a solution BEIRUT 00000851 004 OF 004 to Lebanon's cabinet crisis. Damascus, Aridi claims, will permit only two options for Lebanon: either chaos or a president of Damascus' choosing. Damascus hopes to use the upcoming presidential elections and the fear of chaos in order to force the United States to renew engagement with Syria. As for his old friend the Speaker, Aridi said that Berri no longer exists: he has become simply a mouthpiece for Syrian orders. FELTMAN