LEBANON: GEAGEA URGES DEAL ON PRESIDENCY, PRESSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000837 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA URGES DEAL ON PRESIDENCY, PRESSURE ON LAHOUD TO AVOID DUAL GOVERNMENT Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 8 meeting with the Ambassador, Lebanese Forces leader Dr. Samir Geagea said the key to resolving Lebanon's political crisis is the presidency, suggesting that a deal over President Lahoud's replacement is possible if the Saudis exert their influence with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Geagea advocated both carrots and sticks in pressuring Lahoud not to create a second government. While eager to form a national unity government, Geagea said cabinet expansion is not a top priority at this time. He was not enthusiastic about the French initiative to host a National Dialogue. Despite what Geagea viewed as Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) reluctance to fight to the end in Nahr al-Barid, he expected operations to be completed within two to three days. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with Christian Forces leader Dr. Samir Geagea in his heavily fortified residence in Bzummar on June 8. Geagea was accompanied by his Foreign Affairs Advisors Elie Khoury and Joseph Nehmeh. FOCUSING ON PRESIDENCY -------------- ¶3. (C) Geagea stressed the need instead to concentrate on the presidency now in order to avoid a second government and resolve the issue of cabinet expansion. The worse case scenario would be confrontation with Lahoud. He suggested that a deal was possible if the Saudis used their influence with Berri. Berri favors (and March 14 would also accept) MP Boutros Harb as a presidential candidate, he claimed, but would need help overcoming Hizballah's objections. The Saudis, who have a good relationship with Berri, could provide the necessary "umbrella" to protect him against Hizballah, he argued, but it would have to be done quickly. The Ambassador agreed to encourage Saudi Ambassador Abdulaziz Khoja to meet with Geagea to discuss the idea. The Ambassador also stressed the need to secure Christian support for any presidential candidate to avoid giving Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun an excuse to reject the deal and rebuild his popularity based on a shared sense of victimhood. Geagea replied that Lebanese Forces would help manage Harb's campaign and that Patriarch Sfeir has ideas on the subject as well. If we can solve the Berri problem via a Harb presidency, he repeated, it would be a "great achievement." ¶4. (C) Geagea said that former MP Nassib Lahoud would also be an acceptable candidate to Lebanese Forces, though detested by both Hizballah and Berri because they believe (falsely) that he is associated with Hariri. Neither Nassib nor Harb would "go astray strategically." Geagea noted that Berri is also looking at Jean Obeid. The Ambassador responded that an Obeid presidency would be a gift to Lahoud. Because it would be based on agreement among the Muslim parties, Aoun would claim he had been isolated and the Christians would feel betrayed. Furthermore, the Ambassador stressed, Obeid would have to prove to the US that he is able to work independently of Hizballah. Geagea said that he considered Minister of Justice Charles Rizk a distance third possibility, after Harb and Nassib Lahoud. LAHOUD NEEDS INCENTIVES NOT TO FORM A DUAL GOVERNMENT -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador expressed US concern that, under a two-government scenario, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and others would argue that they need to talk to the second government, thereby suggesting than an inherently illegal government has some legitimacy. Suggesting that Defense Minister Elias Murr probably would assume the same role in a second government, Geagea stressed the importance of stopping Lahoud from taking steps to form a second government before he starts. Though not necessarily pro-carrot, Geagea said he had been thinking about positive incentives to deter him. Noting that the President's mandate is over in four to five months, Geagea argued that any moves that would allow Lahoud to finish his mandate and be assured of political asylum (rumors are that Lahoud is preparing to go to Qatar) would alleviate many of the fears that would otherwise induce him to form a separate government. Geagea agreed with the BEIRUT 00000837 002 OF 002 Ambassador's suggestion that negative incentives would also be useful. Both carrots and sticks are needed, Geagea said, but the emphasis first should be on carrots -- with vague hints of later sticks -- to avoid a confrontation with Lahoud. ¶6. (C) Geagea dismissed the Ambassador's suggestion that fear of Syria was motivating Lahoud, arguing that after his presidential mandate expires he can easily go to the US or other places where the Syrians can't get him. "Fear of a Syrian bullet is not what his driving him," he said. Geagea agreed, however, with the Ambassador's observation that Lahoud was nervous about legal actions against him once he leaves office, adding that the GOL is preparing a criminal lawsuit for the death of a tortured detainee under Lahoud's command of the LAF, in addition to corruption charges. RESERVATIONS ON FRENCH INITIATIVE TO HOST NATIONAL DIALOGUE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Noting that France had not yet approached him on its proposal to host a National Dialogue, Geagea said it was his understanding that the idea was to invite the 14 personalities previously involved in the Dialogue plus unspecified others. In response to the Ambassador's concern that France's hosting the meeting would send a signal that Paris viewed all of Lebanon's political parties equally, Geagea observed that President Sarkozy had already made a statement to that effect earlier that day. In any case, Geagea did not expect Future Movement leader Saad Hariri to accept France's invitation and said he would tell the French later that day that Lebanese Forces can not accept the invitation unless it mirrors the National Dialogue formula. Geagea further stated he could not accept Berri to head the Dialogue, as currently his only role is leader of Amal and not Parliament Speaker because of his refusal to convene parliament. Patriarch Sfeir would be more appropriate, he said. ¶8. (C) Geagea advocated a "solution riche" to forming a national unity government, dismissing talks of 19 11 and other formula for cabinet expansion as "tactics." His main concern was to get Hizballah and Amal on board, with appropriate guarantees for March 14. Stating that the US has better relations with Berri, Geagea pressed the Ambassador to help with Amal. He agreed with the Ambassador's assertion that Siniora's resignation is a red line. ¶9. (C) Geagea stated that because Lebanese Forces has no influence with the two Shia parties, it was left with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun, whose eye is fixed on the presidency. Unfortunately Aoun sought to gain from any developments, such as a second government or Hizballah coup, that would create chaos to further his presidential ambitions. Khoury added that Aoun was counting on a deal with Hariri that he had discussed with the French to achieve his goal. LAF NEARING THE END IN NAHR AL-BARID -------------- ¶10. (C) Geagea said the LAF hoped to finish its operations in the Nahr al-Barid camp in two to three days. He opined that the Commander in Chief Michel Sleiman's reluctance to fight to the end had diluted the LAF's potential. The LAF should have used the momentum gained after the first two days of fighting to finish the job. Instead, he explained, the LAF had been pushed into the confrontation first by Fatah al-Islam (FAI),then by the GOL and, most importantly, public opinion that demanded an end to the extremists. Nevertheless, the LAF was experiencing maximum cohesiveness: all of the Shia have ignored Hizballah leader Nasrallah's hints that they should not enter the camp, and the Sunnis are the most eager to fight FAI. Geagea disagreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that a victory at Nahr al-Barid would boost LAF Commander Michel Sleiman's presidential aspirations, arguing that Sleiman was not immediately interested in politics and was not actively pursuing the presidency, though he conceded this might change once Sleiman finishes his military career. FELTMAN