C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000820

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA ON NARH AL-BARID, CABINET
EXPANSION


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) In a June 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime
Minister Siniora said the destination of the weapons
intercepted by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on June 6 had
not yet been determined, but the GOL would not return them to
Hizballah under any circumstances. He said the LAF will keep
them. The Ambassador asked about the pace of LAF's operation
in Narh Al-Barid. Siniora said the operation would come to
an end in the next few days, quite possibly with the
surrender of the extremists. Siniora said the GOL was
weighing a proposal to expand the number of ministers using a
19 11 formula, as well as a French initiative to host a
National Dialogue between Lebanese parties. Siniora also
expressed his thanks to the President and Secretary Rice
regarding the Presidential Directive for the Partial
Resumption of Travel to Lebanon. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by newly arrived DCM and
Pol/Econ Chief, met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora at his
offices in the Grand Serail for the DCM's introductory call.
Siniora, accompanied by Senior Advisor and former Ambassador
Mohamed Chatah and Advisor Rola Noureddine, seemed tired,
acknowledging that although overworked, his "morale was high."

DESTINATION OF INTERCEPTED WEAPONS UNCLEAR
--------------


3. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry regarding the
LAF's June 6 interception of weapons in Mar Elias in the Biqa
Valley, Siniora said he planned to get more details from LAF
Commander General Michel Sleiman later in the day. Although
he was not sure the weapons were destined for Hizballah (who
claimed them, according to Siniora), he could not confirm the
contrary either. Rumor had it the weapons had crossed into
Lebanon from Syria and were in the process of going to their
intended destination (although Hizballah claimed that it was
merely moving around existing stocks). In any case, Siniora
stressed, the LAF would maintain possession of the weapons
and there was now no danger of them getting in

to Hizballah
hands. (Separately, Defense Minister Elias Murr said the the
same thing.) Conceding that the shipment had caused the
government embarrassment, Siniora was nevertheless confident
that even an expanded cabinet would not have voted to return
the confiscated weapons, since Aoun would side with the
government and such a vote would not require a two-thirds
majority. Siniora was receptive to the Ambassador's offer to
try to track the production location and date of the weapons
if the GOL could provide details.

NAHR AL-BARID OPERATIONS NEARING AN END?
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador asked about LAF,s efforts to contain
extremists at the Nahr al-Barid, noting that, while fighting
continued, there had been no reports of significant actions
in several days. Siniora said the operation was reaching the
end and could be over in "a day or two" with a "realistic
possibility" of surrender. He stressed that the GOL must
play the issue "firmly but prudently" to avoid laying the
foundation for new groups of extremists and creating
incentives for revenge by Palestinians and a rise in
extremism. Asked by the Ambassador whether he was engaged in
wishful thinking that would allow Fatah al-Islam time to
regroup, Siniora insisted that, now, there was already
contact regarding possible surrender. (Murr expressed doubt
that surrender was a real option and gave the negotiations 24
hours to succeed, before he would order major military
operations to commence again.)


5. (C) If the extremists do surrender, Siniora said they
would face trial as criminals. The only negotiations Siniora
supported regarded the departure of their families from
Lebanon. The Ambassador noted that other convicted
terrorists, since as the Dinniya gang, ended up being
released from prison for political reasons. Siniora insisted
that the FAI extremists would not be granted amnesty, as
leniency would only encourage other extremists. All the
same, Siniora repeated, the GOL needed to treat them fairly
to avoid converting them into martyrs or induce feelings of
revenge. Describing the LAF's operations as a "great
victory" for the GOL, Siniora said the Palestinians have
learned a lesson from the events that would help the GOL

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develop a more constructive relationship with the camps.

MOVING FORWARD ON THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


6. (C) On the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Siniora said he
wanted to move quickly on the steps Lebanon must take,
preferably completing them before any change in or expansion
of the cabinet. But while the GOL was ready to do its part
in appointing a deputy prosecutor, this could not be done
until the UN Secretary General appointed the lead prosecutor,
which, given the UN's usual way of doing business, was
unlikely to happen for six months. Siniora commented that
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri was noticeably relaxed after
being relieved of the burden of the Tribunal's approval.

GOL CONSIDERING CABINET EXPANSION
--------------


7. (C) Turning to cabinet expansion, Siniora referred to the
Tribunal and Nahr al-Barid as "two major slaps in the face"
for Hizballah, and said Hizballah now recognizes the limits
in pushing its luck. The March 14 majority has already given
it seven proposals regarding the composition of the cabinet.
Ultimately, Siniora opined, Hizballah wants a solution that
maintains the current government statement (from July 2005,
with odious language on the arms of the resistance).
According to remarks make by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
to Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, who then
reiterated them to the Prime Minister, the opposition
remained very interested in expanding the number of cabinet
ministers. Siniora said he was considering the possibility,
but did not want to make a decision before the UN's June 10
deadline for the Tribunal's establishment. Noting that
presentation of a decision to expand would be as important as
the substance, Siniora acknowledged that it would allow
Hizballah to save face after "selling their souls to the
devil on the Tribunal."


8. (C) Calling the 19-11 formula "risky," Siniora said the
majority needed to think very carefully about the
implications of expansion. In particular, it would need to
convince supporters such as March 14 leader Saad Hariri,
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces leader Samir
Geagea (the most difficult) and keep them united. Siniora
agreed with the Ambassador on the need for Christian input,
saying he was in touch with Free Patriotic Movement leader
General Michel Aoun's people. However, Siniora did not
anticipate any problems here, since Aoun's party shared the
same principles as March 14 on many issues that would come up
in an expanded cabinet. As for the view of Aoun himself,
Siniora said he is single-mindedly focused on his own
presidential aspirations.


9. (C) Under the 19-11 formula, Siniora said that none of
the existing ministers would depart, except Economy and Trade
Minister Sami Haddad, who, as a Protestant, would not be
eligible for a cabinet seat under the new confessional
allotments. (In a peculiar tradition, Lebanon's protestants
and other minorities have a minister in a 24-member cabinet.
In a 30-member cabinet, however, the Armenians pick up a
second ministry and the protestants and minorities lose their
seat.) However, Haddad would stay on as a close advisor to
the Prime Minister. The Ambassador suggested that the 19-11
formula would be less risky than the status quo, which seemed
to guarantee President Emile Lahoud would appoint a second
cabinet. The Ambassador added that Siniora's red line should
be his own resignation.

WEIGHING FRENCH INITIATIVE TO HOST NATIONAL DIALOGUE
--------------


10. (C) Siniora dubbed France's offer to host a National
Dialogue between the various Lebanese parties as "helpful"
because it would build up hope in the run-up to the September
25 presidential election. Noting that he was speaking
personally and not under instructions, the Ambassador gave
his strong reservations. He said that the French initiative
would put representatives of people like Suleiman Franjieh at
the same table as representations of March 14 and PM Siniora.
The impression would be that France sees the views of
Hizballah and March 14 as having equal validity. The March
8-Aounist opposition will declare a victory, saying that
France has "corrected" its policy and become more
even-handed. It is fine, the Ambassador noted, for the
Lebanese themselves to sit around a National Dialogue table.

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But for France to sponsor such a dialogue, March 14 will
appear to have lost one of its major backers. (Separately,
Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh told us that
Jumblatt refuses to send any representatives to the French
dialogue. At a lunch hosted by March 14 stalwart Michel
Khoury, Minister Tariq Mitri and former MP Nassib Lahoud also
expressed unhappiness with the French initiative. Aoun's
deputies, on the other hand, have embraced the idea.)

APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE
--------------


11. (U) At the end of the meeting, PM Siniora also expressed
his thanks to the President and Secretary Rice regarding the
June 5 Presidential Directive for the Partial Resumption of
Travel to Lebanon to Promote Peace and Security.

FELTMAN