LEBANON: PM SINIORA ON NARH AL-BARID, CABINET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000820 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL LE SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM SINIORA ON NARH AL-BARID, CABINET EXPANSION Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a June 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Prime Minister Siniora said the destination of the weapons intercepted by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on June 6 had not yet been determined, but the GOL would not return them to Hizballah under any circumstances. He said the LAF will keep them. The Ambassador asked about the pace of LAF's operation in Narh Al-Barid. Siniora said the operation would come to an end in the next few days, quite possibly with the surrender of the extremists. Siniora said the GOL was weighing a proposal to expand the number of ministers using a 19 11 formula, as well as a French initiative to host a National Dialogue between Lebanese parties. Siniora also expressed his thanks to the President and Secretary Rice regarding the Presidential Directive for the Partial Resumption of Travel to Lebanon. End summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by newly arrived DCM and Pol/Econ Chief, met with Prime Minister Fouad Siniora at his offices in the Grand Serail for the DCM's introductory call. Siniora, accompanied by Senior Advisor and former Ambassador Mohamed Chatah and Advisor Rola Noureddine, seemed tired, acknowledging that although overworked, his "morale was high." DESTINATION OF INTERCEPTED WEAPONS UNCLEAR -------------- ¶3. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry regarding the LAF's June 6 interception of weapons in Mar Elias in the Biqa Valley, Siniora said he planned to get more details from LAF Commander General Michel Sleiman later in the day. Although he was not sure the weapons were destined for Hizballah (who claimed them, according to Siniora),he could not confirm the contrary either. Rumor had it the weapons had crossed into Lebanon from Syria and were in the process of going to their intended destination (although Hizballah claimed that it was merely moving around existing stocks). In any case, Siniora stressed, the LAF would maintain possession of the weapons and there was now no danger of them getting into Hizballah hands. (Separately, Defense Minister Elias Murr said the the same thing.) Conceding that the shipment had caused the government embarrassment, Siniora was nevertheless confident that even an expanded cabinet would not have voted to return the confiscated weapons, since Aoun would side with the government and such a vote would not require a two-thirds majority. Siniora was receptive to the Ambassador's offer to try to track the production location and date of the weapons if the GOL could provide details. NAHR AL-BARID OPERATIONS NEARING AN END? -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked about LAF,s efforts to contain extremists at the Nahr al-Barid, noting that, while fighting continued, there had been no reports of significant actions in several days. Siniora said the operation was reaching the end and could be over in "a day or two" with a "realistic possibility" of surrender. He stressed that the GOL must play the issue "firmly but prudently" to avoid laying the foundation for new groups of extremists and creating incentives for revenge by Palestinians and a rise in extremism. Asked by the Ambassador whether he was engaged in wishful thinking that would allow Fatah al-Islam time to regroup, Siniora insisted that, now, there was already contact regarding possible surrender. (Murr expressed doubt that surrender was a real option and gave the negotiations 24 hours to succeed, before he would order major military operations to commence again.) ¶5. (C) If the extremists do surrender, Siniora said they would face trial as criminals. The only negotiations Siniora supported regarded the departure of their families from Lebanon. The Ambassador noted that other convicted terrorists, since as the Dinniya gang, ended up being released from prison for political reasons. Siniora insisted that the FAI extremists would not be granted amnesty, as leniency would only encourage other extremists. All the same, Siniora repeated, the GOL needed to treat them fairly to avoid converting them into martyrs or induce feelings of revenge. Describing the LAF's operations as a "great victory" for the GOL, Siniora said the Palestinians have learned a lesson from the events that would help the GOL BEIRUT 00000820 002 OF 003 develop a more constructive relationship with the camps. MOVING FORWARD ON THE TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶6. (C) On the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Siniora said he wanted to move quickly on the steps Lebanon must take, preferably completing them before any change in or expansion of the cabinet. But while the GOL was ready to do its part in appointing a deputy prosecutor, this could not be done until the UN Secretary General appointed the lead prosecutor, which, given the UN's usual way of doing business, was unlikely to happen for six months. Siniora commented that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri was noticeably relaxed after being relieved of the burden of the Tribunal's approval. GOL CONSIDERING CABINET EXPANSION -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to cabinet expansion, Siniora referred to the Tribunal and Nahr al-Barid as "two major slaps in the face" for Hizballah, and said Hizballah now recognizes the limits in pushing its luck. The March 14 majority has already given it seven proposals regarding the composition of the cabinet. Ultimately, Siniora opined, Hizballah wants a solution that maintains the current government statement (from July 2005, with odious language on the arms of the resistance). According to remarks make by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema, who then reiterated them to the Prime Minister, the opposition remained very interested in expanding the number of cabinet ministers. Siniora said he was considering the possibility, but did not want to make a decision before the UN's June 10 deadline for the Tribunal's establishment. Noting that presentation of a decision to expand would be as important as the substance, Siniora acknowledged that it would allow Hizballah to save face after "selling their souls to the devil on the Tribunal." ¶8. (C) Calling the 19-11 formula "risky," Siniora said the majority needed to think very carefully about the implications of expansion. In particular, it would need to convince supporters such as March 14 leader Saad Hariri, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea (the most difficult) and keep them united. Siniora agreed with the Ambassador on the need for Christian input, saying he was in touch with Free Patriotic Movement leader General Michel Aoun's people. However, Siniora did not anticipate any problems here, since Aoun's party shared the same principles as March 14 on many issues that would come up in an expanded cabinet. As for the view of Aoun himself, Siniora said he is single-mindedly focused on his own presidential aspirations. ¶9. (C) Under the 19-11 formula, Siniora said that none of the existing ministers would depart, except Economy and Trade Minister Sami Haddad, who, as a Protestant, would not be eligible for a cabinet seat under the new confessional allotments. (In a peculiar tradition, Lebanon's protestants and other minorities have a minister in a 24-member cabinet. In a 30-member cabinet, however, the Armenians pick up a second ministry and the protestants and minorities lose their seat.) However, Haddad would stay on as a close advisor to the Prime Minister. The Ambassador suggested that the 19-11 formula would be less risky than the status quo, which seemed to guarantee President Emile Lahoud would appoint a second cabinet. The Ambassador added that Siniora's red line should be his own resignation. WEIGHING FRENCH INITIATIVE TO HOST NATIONAL DIALOGUE -------------- ¶10. (C) Siniora dubbed France's offer to host a National Dialogue between the various Lebanese parties as "helpful" because it would build up hope in the run-up to the September 25 presidential election. Noting that he was speaking personally and not under instructions, the Ambassador gave his strong reservations. He said that the French initiative would put representatives of people like Suleiman Franjieh at the same table as representations of March 14 and PM Siniora. The impression would be that France sees the views of Hizballah and March 14 as having equal validity. The March 8-Aounist opposition will declare a victory, saying that France has "corrected" its policy and become more even-handed. It is fine, the Ambassador noted, for the Lebanese themselves to sit around a National Dialogue table. BEIRUT 00000820 003 OF 003 But for France to sponsor such a dialogue, March 14 will appear to have lost one of its major backers. (Separately, Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh told us that Jumblatt refuses to send any representatives to the French dialogue. At a lunch hosted by March 14 stalwart Michel Khoury, Minister Tariq Mitri and former MP Nassib Lahoud also expressed unhappiness with the French initiative. Aoun's deputies, on the other hand, have embraced the idea.) APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE -------------- ¶11. (U) At the end of the meeting, PM Siniora also expressed his thanks to the President and Secretary Rice regarding the June 5 Presidential Directive for the Partial Resumption of Travel to Lebanon to Promote Peace and Security. FELTMAN