POST-TRIBUNAL POLITICAL INITIATIVES: WHICH IS THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000784 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 1 CLASSIFICATION CHANGED SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: POST-TRIBUNAL POLITICAL INITIATIVES: WHICH IS THE LEAST-BAD OPTION? REF: BEIRUT 769 BEIRUT 00000784 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) With the passage of UNSCR 1757 on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the international community handed a significant victory to the March 14 and GOL leaders. While figures such as Saad Hariri have strained to project a spirit of magnanimity toward Hizballah and its allies in the aftermath of UNSCR 1757, we do not believe that they have a plan for what's next in the months leading to the autumn presidential elections. Unfortunately, the March 8-Aoun alliance does have ideas, including destructive proposals such as the possible dissolution of parliament and the appointment of a second cabinet that, while illegitimate, would enjoy popular support among the Shia, Aounists, and other pro-Syrians. March 8-Aoun forces seem determined to create chaos in hopes of derailing presidential elections that do not go their way. ¶2. (C) We, along with the French, Egyptian, and Saudi ambassadors, are urging March 14 and GOL leaders to seize the initiative. Instead of continuing to say no to a National Unity Government -- a concept that repeated opinion polls demonstrate has broad popular appeal -- March 14 and GOL leaders should promote a solution to the cabinet crisis that would strike most Lebanese as reasonable and within the broad definition of National Unity (unity that in reality, of course, does not really exist in Lebanon). March 14 leaders should project sincerity and seriousness in wanting to fix the cabinet. With the UNSCR having created the tribunal, the March 14 bloc -- with one of its key demands met -- now might offer some flexibility in order to make it as difficult as possible for President Emile Lahoud to move to dissolve parliament and appoint a second cabinet in the run-up to the autumn presidential elections. ¶3. (C) Broadly speaking, there are five primary options that March 14 and GOL leaders could consider: -- Maintain the status quo until presidential elections (which, constitutionally, will trigger the resignation of the current cabinet). The 17-member rump cabinet, without Shia, has proven more durable than anyone could have predicted when the Shia ministers walked out on November 11, 2006. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in particular has been resolute in the face of numerous challenges. But, no matter how much support the cabinet receives domestically and internationally, a whiff of illegitimacy hangs over it and all of its decrees, given the lack of Shia representation. It cannot effectively implement its agenda. Given that Lahoud, Berri, and Aoun all insist that the current cabinet is illegitimate, the longer the status quo remains, the more likely Lahoud's appointment of a second government becomes. -- Promote the 19-10-1 cabinet solution. This expansion of the existing cabinet was the previous March 14/GOL position, by which Hizballah and its allies, by virtue of the non-voting neutral member, would have an effective "blocking minority" over significant cabinet decisions (that require two-thirds affirmative vote) but would be denied the "toppling minority" (by which if more than a third of the ministers resign, the cabinet is considered constitutionally collapsed). Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, and MP Michel Aoun have SIPDIS already rejected this idea repeatedly, and we doubt they will be more flexible after the March 14 "victory" in the tribunal. So, if March 14 leaders pursue this option, it means, in effect, that they have stuck with the status quo. See above, in other words. -- Have PM Siniora resign, to convert the cabinet to a caretaker status. As noted reftel, Nabih Berri says that a Siniora resignation would be the key to an overall solution to the cabinet crisis and, eventually, the presidency. As the parliament automatically convenes in the case of a cabinet resignation, Berri also argues that Siniora's resignation would check Lahoud's desire to dissolve parliament. Siniora's resignation would trigger the consultative process to pick a new Prime Minister and thus make it difficult, if not impossible, for Lahoud to appoint a second cabinet. The resigned Shia ministers would return to the caretaker cabinet, which would have constitutional legitimacy to address day-to-day routine matters. The BEIRUT 00000784 002.2 OF 003 cabinet would not be able to take major decisions, which would probably include asking the UNSC to renew UNIFIL's mandate after its August 31 expiration. Economic reform is another issue in which we have a major interest and also requires cabinet and parlimentary action. -- Replace the existing cabinet with a new cabinet, split along different lines. (This is a variation of the option above, with the difference being that the new cabinet would be worked out before Siniora actually resigns.) After his two meetings with Lahoud, Patriarch Sfeir has indicated his support for a six-person "national salvation" cabinet. PM Siniora, in contrast, has touted a 17-13 cabinet idea, by which the March 8-Aoun opposition would have a blocking and toppling minority. But this cabinet would operate under an entirely new cabinet program that would be agreed upon in advance. Siniora proposes that this cabinet program (which receives parliamentary approval at the time of the vote of confidence) be based upon policies already accepted by March 14 and March 8 leaders alike: Siniora's seven-point plan from last summer, UNSCR 1701, the four decisions of the 2006 National Dialogue, and Paris III reforms. Siniora has also mused that a new cabinet, perhaps composed of technocrats rather than politicians (a la the 2005 Mikati cabinet) could be formed with a very narrow, non-controversial cabinet program that would simply oversee Lebanon between now and presidential elections. The advantage to this option is that the current, July 2005 cabinet program, with its outdated and odious language about "protection of the Resistance," would at last be jettisoned in favor of something else. -- Accept the long-standing March 8-Aoun demand of a 19-11 expanded cabinet. In the aftermath of the November 11 ministerial resignations, the pro-Syrians insisted on expanding Siniora's existing cabinet to 30 members, giving the March 8-Aoun opposition a blocking minority while retaining the existing July 2005 cabinet decree. Knowing of the March 14 fear of the "toppling minority," Nabih Berri promised to provide guarantees that the blocking minority would not resign or withhold cabinet quorum in advance of presidential elections. At the time he was promoting this idea, Berri offered it as a trade: March 8-Aoun politicians would agree to the Special Tribunal, and March 14 politicians would agree to an expanded cabinet split along 19-11 lines. ¶4. (C) Our initial thinking was that Siniora's approach for a new 17-13 cabinet based on a new cabinet program was best: if March 14 and March 8-Aoun leaders could agree upon a program for the months between now and the autumn presidential elections (which lead to a new cabinet),then the danger of giving the toppling and blocking minority to the pro-Syrians seemed less significant, particularly after UNSCR 1757 solved the issue of the tribunal. But having pondered Nabih Berri's insistence that Siniora resign, and knowing from a variety of sources of the pro-Syrians' hatred of Siniora, we now suspect that, once Siniora resigns, it won't matter what deal has been worked out before: Lahoud, in one of his few absolute powers, will refuse to sign the decree forming the cabinet unless certain demands are met. He is unlikely, for example, to agree to the inclusion of Minister of Justice Charles Rizk. After Rizk's work on the tribunal, March 14 is not willing to abandon him. Lahoud will probably extract a considerable price for his signature, perhaps including the elimination of Siniora. We think that any solution that requires Siniora to resign first is probably a pro-Syrian trap. ¶5. (C) Thus, we concur with Walid Jumblatt and Samir Geagea, who have told us that they see Siniora's resignation as a red line that should be avoided at all costs. If one hopes to move away from the status quo -- given the danger that Lahoud is likely to seize the stalemate to appoint a second cabinet -- that means that we are speaking of expanding the existing cabinet rather than replacing it. Lahoud would have less room for mischief, as he would only have to sign the decrees appointing new ministers, not the entire cabinet, in the case of expansion. An expanded cabinet leaves the odious cabinet program (with its "protection of the Resistance" language) in place, but we note that this program is in place now -- with no practical impact on the ground. Moreover, we would argue that whatever relevance the July 2005 cabinet program still enjoys has been altered significantly by the acceptance of the seven-point plan (which calls for the state to have a monopoly of arms) BEIRUT 00000784 003.2 OF 003 and UNSCR 1701. Reality has weakened the written program. ¶6. (C) As for the blocking minority that a 19-11 cabinet split implies, this, too, is now of less concern than it was in November 2006, given UNSCR 1757 and the short time this cabinet will be in office. While the March 8-Aoun ministers could prevent the cabinet from requesting the extension of UNIFIL's mandate, we doubt that will be the case, given Aoun and Berri's support for UNIFIL. (The "blocking minority" could complicate, however, the ability to expand UNIFIL's mandate. But even if the current cabinet would agree to asking UNIFIL to deploy along the Syrian border -- and it's unlikely that Siniora's current cabinet would make that request -- troop-contributing countries would probably pay close attention to Shia views outside of the current cabinet, since the Shia populate the Biqa' area where the troops would be located.) Even if Berri's offer not to use the "toppling minority" in advance of presidential elections proves insincere, the toppled cabinet will still enjoy constitutional caretaker status up until presidential elections lead to the creation of a new cabinet. A 19-11 cabinet, too, might not always split along those lines: in terms of Paris III reforms, Aoun's 4-5 ministers are likely to vote with the majority. Aoun would have the opportunity to demonstrate what he always says, that he is not a card-carrying member of March 8. ¶7. (C) In actual fact, with the tribunal now imposed by the Security Council, we doubt that Berri, Hizballah and Aoun are still interested in their 19-11 proposal. They seem to want Siniora's head, and Lahoud's proposition to Patriarch Sfeir about the six-person salvation cabinet is an example of how the pro-Syrians are now insisting on even more than 19-11. (The six-person cabinet would be divided in half between March 8 and March 14.) But if March 14 and GOL leaders use the 19-11 plan cleverly, they end up showing the March 8-Aoun leaders as being unreasonable, if they awkwardly say no to an offer that was their demand only a few weeks ago. In our view, in the aftermath of UNSCR 1757, March 14 and GOL leaders should appear to be the ones displaying flexibility and coming up with reasonable-looking solutions. We judge that the 19-11 option, with Berri's guarantee of not resigning, is the least-bad option for the months ahead. The status quo is too risky, given public discontent over the current stalemate and the danger that Lahoud will intentionally confuse matters by moving in the direction of appointing a second cabinet and perhaps dissolving parliament. ¶8. (C) For now, Lebanon is paralyzed politically. There is no growing outcry among the general population against either Nabih Berri's refusal to convene parliament nor Emile Lahoud's refusal to sign papers of state. Unless there is some kind of new initiative, this paralysis will not change in the near future, while issues like UNIFIL renewal and economic reform hang over both the Lebanese and their friends in the international community, All eyes in Lebanon are now watching the fight between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. If the LAF prevails, March 14 and GOL leaders will be politically strengthened. But they still, in our view, need to go on the offensive in proposing cabinet solutions. We are meeting with the various March 14 and GOL leaders in the coming days to see how they propose to put into action their current words about reaching out to the March 8-Aoun opposition. FELTMAN