C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000773

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: CODEL LEAHY MEETS WITH PM SINIORA


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Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On 5/31, PM Siniora conveyed to CODEL Leahy his
sincere gratitude for U.S. leadership in yesterday's UN
Security Council vote for resolution 1757, which will
establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He said the June
10 sunset clause was almost irrelevant because Speaker Berri
will continue to block Lebanon's parliament from meeting.
Although Siniora believes Syria will try to respond with acts
of political violence, the establishment of the tribunal
means their ability to act in Lebanon with impunity is
finally nearing its end. The Prime Minister informed Senator
Leahy and his colleagues that although the GOL desires a
negotiated end to the presence of Fatah al-Islam (FAI) in the
Nahr al-Barid refugee camp near Tripoli, his government will
not hesitate to employ the army to eliminate the terrorist
organization. Siniora believes without a doubt that the
Syrian regime has funded and is now directing FAI. If the
Lebanese army attacks FAI, Siniora does not believe unrest
will spread to Lebanon's 11 other Palestinian refugee camps.
Finally, Siniora urged the U.S. and its international allies
to understand that the recently renewed Middle East peace
proposal put forth by Saudi Arabia is the best means to not
only solve the long-standing Palestinian issue, but is the
key to ensuring Israel's long-term security and peace. End
summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with Senators
Patrick Leahy, Thad Cochran, Chuck Hagel, Ken Salazar,
Benjamin Cardin, Representative Peter Welch, and the
Ambassador at the Grand Serail on May 31. The Prime Minister
was assisted by senior advisor Rola Nouraddine. The
ubiquitous Siniora advisor, Ambassador Mohamed Chatah, was
not present since he was returning from New York following
his lobbying efforts on behalf of UN Security Council
Resolution 1757. PM Siniora was in an e

xpansive mood,
expressing great satisfaction with yesterday's developments
and was hopeful that the worst days for Lebanon's struggling
democracy were now past.

IMPACT OF THE TRIBUNAL
--------------


3. (C) PM Siniora expressed great relief and satisfaction
to his visitors that the Special Tribunal is now a reality,
despite "the best efforts of Syria" to destabilize Lebanon
and destroy the court. He emphasized the "absolutely
essential" leadership role played by the U.S. in the UN
Security Council and said he would be speaking with the
Secretary and the President at the earliest opportunity.

SIPDIS
Concerning Speaker Berri's almost immediate criticism of the
new UN resolution, Siniora maintained that despite his public
statements, Berri is actually "relieved" that he no longer
bears the primary responsibility for blocking progress toward
the tribunal. Concerning the resolution's provision for a
June 10 grace period for possible action by Lebanon's
parliament, Siniora indicated Berri would not be able to take
advantage of the opportunity. Siniora said he supported the
late modification because it was one more gesture of goodwill
to the opposition, but in actuality, Berri was "too fearful"
of his Syrian masters to act independently.


4. (C) Despite the "considerable step forward" that had
been achieved by yesterday's action in New York, Siniora was
fairly certain Syria would react, and probably with violence.
He explained that the "now angry" Syrian regime was very
capable of mobilizing any of their many proxies still active
in Lebanon. Despite the dangers, however, the embattled
Siniora emphasized his belief that the worst days for Lebanon
were now over and with wisdom and continued support from the
international community continued progress could be made
toward sovereignty, prosperity, and stability. He postulated
that Syria and Iran were both angry and anxious that a
democratic, moderate, tolerant Lebanon could survive and
prosper, and had directed considerable resources to drag
Lebanon back under their control. But, he emphasized, the
establishment of the tribunal meant the end of an era of
impunity for assassins and Lebanon would now never turn back.
He noted it was particularly important that witnesses, who
previously were fearful of how their testimony would be used,
would now come forward more readily due to the international

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protection that UN sponsorship promised.

LAF AND NAHR AL-BARID
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the LAF, Siniora said it was slowly, but
steadily emerging from its decades-long domination by Syrian
authorities. Once again recognizing the significance and
speed of recent U.S. security assistance, Siniora said that
with perseverance, the army would soon assume its full
constitutional responsibilities to protect the nation and its
citizens, and preserve its stability. Although it was not
truly ready, and was already stretched thin by its successful
deployment ot the south, it appeared the army was now going
to be severely tested in Tripoli.


6. (C) Siniora described how the Fatah al-Islam terrorist
group had split off from the Syrian-controlled Fatah
al-Intifada extremist group last year -- with Syria's
blessing. He argued convincingly that FAI was merely a
violent extremist group, despite its protestations that it
was defending Islam. Siniora countered, "They are the
antithesis of Islam in that their murder of innocent life is
condemned by the Islamic faith." He contended that FAI's
genesis from Fatah al-Intifada, as well as the timing of
their unprovoked murder of LAF soldiers last Sunday in the
run-up to Chapter VII, were clear indications of direct
Syrian control. As further proof, Siniora spoke of the
confessions of FAI operatives who bombed commuter busses in
Ain Alaq in early February and the subsequent bank robberies
to fund additional destabilizing activities.


7. (C) In his view, it was essential to remove this new
threat as soon as possible. Siniora stated that his
government was not seeking armed confrontation with the group
and would accept their surrender in accordance with norms of
justice, but was adamant that FAI had to be eliminated from
Lebanon. Siniora said his government was working hard with
Palestinian authorities to reach a resolution, but he was not
confident this was possible. And although the negotiations
were probably ill-fated, Siniora wanted to ensure that
Lebanon's Palestinian population did not view the coming
fight as aggression against Palestinians in general. In his
estimation, approximately 10 percent of Nahr al-Barid's
original refugee population of 30,000 refugees still remained
in the camp and every effort would be made to minimize
civilian casualties. But he reminded his visitors that FAI
terrorists had murdered off-duty soldiers without warning or
mercy, and that the fight to remove their presence would most
likely be difficult and costly.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
--------------


8. (C) Whatever the outcome of the impending action in Nahr
al-Barid, Siniora asked the congressmen to recognize the
source of this new wave of extremism in the region, and if
possible to address it. In particular, he urged the U.S. to
seriously consider the re-vitalized Saudi peace initiative,
which was first introduced in 2002, but was given new
validation by this year's Arab Summit. While recognizing the
significant challenge to undo decades of strife, Siniora said
that if the U.S. could persuade Israel to seriously negotiate
on the basis of the Saudi proposal, it could conceivably win
at the table what it could never win through war, namely,
peace with 130 million Arabs and acceptance by 1.3 billion
Muslims.


9. (C) Siniora cautioned that if this "very real"
opportunity was missed, the situation would simply become
more intractable and more threatening to everyone. And it
would give considerable momentum to extremists in the region
and all that entailed. Siniora emphasized that the statement
from the Arab Summit was genuine and, if approached with
vision and commitment, could finally provide a way out of a
60-year old cycle of useless violence.

THE SHEBAA REFRAIN
--------------


10. (C) As he has with nearly every visitor since last
summer's conflict, PM Siniora asked the Senators and
Congressman to consider the status of Shebaa Farms. The
Prime Minster acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue for
Israel and the initial UN decision of 2000 that the area was

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Syrian territory, but countered that it was 45 square
kilometers of nearly worthless -- in both economic and
strategic terms -- land that could completely change the
calculus concerning Hizballah's powerful and destabilizing
arms. Siniora maintained that his government now had
Hizballah in a corner and could completely cut them off if
Shebaa could be placed under UN custodianship, until such
time as Syria and Lebanon could work out the issue in later
negotiations.


11. (C) In Siniora's scenario, it was a win-win situation
in that Israel would not lose any strategically important
territory, Hizballah could not claim it had gained territory,
and the Lebanese government and people could demand that
Hizballah relinquish its arms now that no Lebanese territory
was "occupied." But even more important that Hizballah's
long-sought disarmament, Siniora said that imperialistic Iran
would lose its window on the Mediterranean -- a possession
that Persia has coveted "since the times of Darius." Siniora
also implied that such a move could also lead to normalized
relations between Israel and Lebanon because it would help
complete implementation of the "7 Points" peace plan, which
in turn would allow a renegotiation of Lebanon's 1949
Armistice Agreement with Israel. He concluded by admitting
it would not be easy, but of all the steps that Israel could
make, the relinquishment of Shebaa into UN hands would bring
considerable gain at negligible cost.


12. (U) This cable was not reviewed by CODEL Leahy prior to
release.
FELTMAN