Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT773
2007-05-31 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: CODEL LEAHY MEETS WITH PM SINIORA

Tags:  IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000773 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: CODEL LEAHY MEETS WITH PM SINIORA


BEIRUT 00000773 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b)
.

SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000773 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: LEBANON: CODEL LEAHY MEETS WITH PM SINIORA BEIRUT 00000773 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) . SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On 5/31, PM Siniora conveyed to CODEL Leahy his sincere gratitude for U.S. leadership in yesterday's UN Security Council vote for resolution 1757, which will establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He said the June 10 sunset clause was almost irrelevant because Speaker Berri will continue to block Lebanon's parliament from meeting. Although Siniora believes Syria will try to respond with acts of political violence, the establishment of the tribunal means their ability to act in Lebanon with impunity is finally nearing its end. The Prime Minister informed Senator Leahy and his colleagues that although the GOL desires a negotiated end to the presence of Fatah al-Islam (FAI) in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp near Tripoli, his government will not hesitate to employ the army to eliminate the terrorist organization. Siniora believes without a doubt that the Syrian regime has funded and is now directing FAI. If the Lebanese army attacks FAI, Siniora does not believe unrest will spread to Lebanon's 11 other Palestinian refugee camps. Finally, Siniora urged the U.S. and its international allies to understand that the recently renewed Middle East peace proposal put forth by Saudi Arabia is the best means to not only solve the long-standing Palestinian issue, but is the key to ensuring Israel's long-term security and peace. End summary. ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Fouad Siniora met with Senators Patrick Leahy, Thad Cochran, Chuck Hagel, Ken Salazar, Benjamin Cardin, Representative Peter Welch, and the Ambassador at the Grand Serail on May 31. The Prime Minister was assisted by senior advisor Rola Nouraddine. The ubiquitous Siniora advisor, Ambassador Mohamed Chatah, was not present since he was returning from New York following his lobbying efforts on behalf of UN Security Council Resolution 1757. PM Siniora was in an expansive mood, expressing great satisfaction with yesterday's developments and was hopeful that the worst days for Lebanon's struggling democracy were now past. IMPACT OF THE TRIBUNAL -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Siniora expressed great relief and satisfaction �
A;to his visitors that the Special Tribunal is now a reality, despite "the best efforts of Syria" to destabilize Lebanon and destroy the court. He emphasized the "absolutely essential" leadership role played by the U.S. in the UN Security Council and said he would be speaking with the Secretary and the President at the earliest opportunity. SIPDIS Concerning Speaker Berri's almost immediate criticism of the new UN resolution, Siniora maintained that despite his public statements, Berri is actually "relieved" that he no longer bears the primary responsibility for blocking progress toward the tribunal. Concerning the resolution's provision for a June 10 grace period for possible action by Lebanon's parliament, Siniora indicated Berri would not be able to take advantage of the opportunity. Siniora said he supported the late modification because it was one more gesture of goodwill to the opposition, but in actuality, Berri was "too fearful" of his Syrian masters to act independently. ¶4. (C) Despite the "considerable step forward" that had been achieved by yesterday's action in New York, Siniora was fairly certain Syria would react, and probably with violence. He explained that the "now angry" Syrian regime was very capable of mobilizing any of their many proxies still active in Lebanon. Despite the dangers, however, the embattled Siniora emphasized his belief that the worst days for Lebanon were now over and with wisdom and continued support from the international community continued progress could be made toward sovereignty, prosperity, and stability. He postulated that Syria and Iran were both angry and anxious that a democratic, moderate, tolerant Lebanon could survive and prosper, and had directed considerable resources to drag Lebanon back under their control. But, he emphasized, the establishment of the tribunal meant the end of an era of impunity for assassins and Lebanon would now never turn back. He noted it was particularly important that witnesses, who previously were fearful of how their testimony would be used, would now come forward more readily due to the international BEIRUT 00000773 002.2 OF 003 protection that UN sponsorship promised. LAF AND NAHR AL-BARID -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to the LAF, Siniora said it was slowly, but steadily emerging from its decades-long domination by Syrian authorities. Once again recognizing the significance and speed of recent U.S. security assistance, Siniora said that with perseverance, the army would soon assume its full constitutional responsibilities to protect the nation and its citizens, and preserve its stability. Although it was not truly ready, and was already stretched thin by its successful deployment ot the south, it appeared the army was now going to be severely tested in Tripoli. ¶6. (C) Siniora described how the Fatah al-Islam terrorist group had split off from the Syrian-controlled Fatah al-Intifada extremist group last year -- with Syria's blessing. He argued convincingly that FAI was merely a violent extremist group, despite its protestations that it was defending Islam. Siniora countered, "They are the antithesis of Islam in that their murder of innocent life is condemned by the Islamic faith." He contended that FAI's genesis from Fatah al-Intifada, as well as the timing of their unprovoked murder of LAF soldiers last Sunday in the run-up to Chapter VII, were clear indications of direct Syrian control. As further proof, Siniora spoke of the confessions of FAI operatives who bombed commuter busses in Ain Alaq in early February and the subsequent bank robberies to fund additional destabilizing activities. ¶7. (C) In his view, it was essential to remove this new threat as soon as possible. Siniora stated that his government was not seeking armed confrontation with the group and would accept their surrender in accordance with norms of justice, but was adamant that FAI had to be eliminated from Lebanon. Siniora said his government was working hard with Palestinian authorities to reach a resolution, but he was not confident this was possible. And although the negotiations were probably ill-fated, Siniora wanted to ensure that Lebanon's Palestinian population did not view the coming fight as aggression against Palestinians in general. In his estimation, approximately 10 percent of Nahr al-Barid's original refugee population of 30,000 refugees still remained in the camp and every effort would be made to minimize civilian casualties. But he reminded his visitors that FAI terrorists had murdered off-duty soldiers without warning or mercy, and that the fight to remove their presence would most likely be difficult and costly. MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶8. (C) Whatever the outcome of the impending action in Nahr al-Barid, Siniora asked the congressmen to recognize the source of this new wave of extremism in the region, and if possible to address it. In particular, he urged the U.S. to seriously consider the re-vitalized Saudi peace initiative, which was first introduced in 2002, but was given new validation by this year's Arab Summit. While recognizing the significant challenge to undo decades of strife, Siniora said that if the U.S. could persuade Israel to seriously negotiate on the basis of the Saudi proposal, it could conceivably win at the table what it could never win through war, namely, peace with 130 million Arabs and acceptance by 1.3 billion Muslims. ¶9. (C) Siniora cautioned that if this "very real" opportunity was missed, the situation would simply become more intractable and more threatening to everyone. And it would give considerable momentum to extremists in the region and all that entailed. Siniora emphasized that the statement from the Arab Summit was genuine and, if approached with vision and commitment, could finally provide a way out of a 60-year old cycle of useless violence. THE SHEBAA REFRAIN -------------- ¶10. (C) As he has with nearly every visitor since last summer's conflict, PM Siniora asked the Senators and Congressman to consider the status of Shebaa Farms. The Prime Minster acknowledged the sensitivity of the issue for Israel and the initial UN decision of 2000 that the area was BEIRUT 00000773 003.2 OF 003 Syrian territory, but countered that it was 45 square kilometers of nearly worthless -- in both economic and strategic terms -- land that could completely change the calculus concerning Hizballah's powerful and destabilizing arms. Siniora maintained that his government now had Hizballah in a corner and could completely cut them off if Shebaa could be placed under UN custodianship, until such time as Syria and Lebanon could work out the issue in later negotiations. ¶11. (C) In Siniora's scenario, it was a win-win situation in that Israel would not lose any strategically important territory, Hizballah could not claim it had gained territory, and the Lebanese government and people could demand that Hizballah relinquish its arms now that no Lebanese territory was "occupied." But even more important that Hizballah's long-sought disarmament, Siniora said that imperialistic Iran would lose its window on the Mediterranean -- a possession that Persia has coveted "since the times of Darius." Siniora also implied that such a move could also lead to normalized relations between Israel and Lebanon because it would help complete implementation of the "7 Points" peace plan, which in turn would allow a renegotiation of Lebanon's 1949 Armistice Agreement with Israel. He concluded by admitting it would not be easy, but of all the steps that Israel could make, the relinquishment of Shebaa into UN hands would bring considerable gain at negligible cost. ¶12. (U) This cable was not reviewed by CODEL Leahy prior to release. FELTMAN

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