BERRI CLAIMS ONLY SINIORA'S RESIGNATION CAN SAVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000769 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM LE SY SUBJECT: BERRI CLAIMS ONLY SINIORA'S RESIGNATION CAN SAVE PARLIAMENT; OTHERS LINK THREAT TO TRIBUNAL VOTE REF: BEIRUT 655 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Conveying a message to the Ambassador on 5/30 via an aide, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri warned that President Emile Lahoud plans to announce the dissolution of parliament in the coming weeks, using a dubious constitutional interpretation (described reftel). Hinting at fears of Syrian retribution, Berri's aide said that, while the Speaker personally opposes the move, he would have no choice but to go along. To avoid this scenario, Berri asked the Ambassador to encourage Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to resign by COB 5/31 (i.e., by the end of the parliament's ordinary session), in order to provoke the automatic convening of parliament called for by the constitution in the case of a cabinet resignation. Briefed on Berri's idea, Siniora, like other March 14 figures (as well as the Ambassador),found the timing of Berri's push suspicious -- on the day the UNSC was scheduled to vote on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Deputy Prime Minister Elias Murr, Lahoud's ex-son-in-law, claimed that sources inside the Lahoud family insist the President will sullenly refrain from dissolving parliament out of fear he could be tried for violating the constitution once he leaves office. According to Murr's analysis, Berri probably used the threat of parliamentary dissolution in order to tell the Syrians he had made one last-ditch effort to derail the tribunal. On the margins of Codel Leahy's meeting with Berri on 5/31, the Speaker insisted to the Ambassador that Siniora's resignation remained the key to a cabinet solution. March 14 leaders, in contrast, are willing to contemplate a Siniora resignation as a technical fix, but only if a new cabinet deal has been worked out to the last detail -- including acceptance of a renomination of Siniora as PM. End summary. BERRI REJECTS LAHOUD'S SIX-PERSON CABINET; BUT DID LAHOUD CONVINCE THE PATRIARCH? -------------- ¶2. (C) On 5/29, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri called the Ambassador to note that Berri's foreign policy advisor Ali Hamdan would deliver an "important message" on Berri's behalf to the Ambassador the following morning. When Hamdan arrived, he told the Ambassador that the 5/29 phone call Berri received from President Lahoud and Maronite Patriarch Sfeir (when Lahoud was having lunch with Sfeir) was "very bad." Berri believes that Lahoud had gone quite a distance in convincing the Patriarch that a six-member national salvation cabinet was the best way forward. A six-person cabinet, in Berri's view, does not work confessionally; the Druse, with their tiny population, cannot be equal to the Shia and the Sunnis in the three seats assigned to the Muslims out of the six. If one seeks a small government, a ten-person cabinet (with two Shia, two Sunnis, and one Druse among the Muslim five) might work, but not six. Lahoud, Hamdan explained (quoting Berri),is clearly thinking along the lines of a military coup d'etat, for the six-person cabinet resembles the military council that (theoretically more than actually) oversees Lebanon's (largely hypothetical) defense policy. Hamdan explained Berri's view that there are also echoes in Lahoud's idea to the six-person cabinet outgoing President Amine Gemayel appointed in 1988, not a scenario that Lebanon should wish to repeat. BERRI SAYS LAHOUD WILL DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT -------------- ¶3. (C) But even more disturbing than the Sfeir-Lahoud phone call, Hamdan said, was a message Berri got from the Baabda Presidential Palace later that evening. Lahoud will move sometime after June 1 to dissolve the parliament, using a dubious interpretation of Article 65 in the constitution. Maybe Lahoud will wait a month or so (in order to avoid having to call new elections before the expiration of his term in November -- the constitution's Article 25 requires new elections within three months of parliament's dissolution),but he will dismiss the chamber. This will free him from the responsibility of the parliamentary consultative process and parliamentary vote of confidence BEIRUT 00000769 002 OF 004 needed for a new prime minister and new cabinet. (Reftel explains how Lahoud might twist the constitution into justifying his dissolution of parliament, despite the clear language in Article 65 that makes the cabinet responsible for dissolving parliament at the request of the president.) Dissolving parliament would be a catastrophe, Berri believes, and will lead to the two-government scenario everyone fears. TO AVOID THIS SCENARIO, SINIORA MUST RESIGN -------------- ¶4. (C) Thus, Hamdan said that Berri's urgent message related to how to avoid this scenario. The best way to do so would be to have parliament convene before the expiration of its ordinary session on May 31. This removes the pretext, since Article 65 allows the dissolution of parliament when it has not met "for no compelling reason" in its ordinary session. But because now it was too late for the requisite 48-hour notice for a parliamentary session, the only way to get the parliament to open in time was the automatic opening that occurs in the case of a cabinet collapse. Thus, Berri, through Hamdan, solicited the Ambassador's help in convincing PM Siniora to resign (causing a constitutional fall of the government) in time that parliament opens automatically before midnight on 5/31. BERRI WILL FEEL FORCED TO GO ALONG WITH DISSOLUTION -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked Hamdan whether Berri thought Lahoud's move to dissolve parliament would be legal. "Absolutely not," Hamdan responded. Then it seems fairly simple to block Lahoud's initiative, the Ambassador responded. The March 14 MPs -- 70 out of the 128-member house (now numbering only 127, given Pierre Gemayel's murder) -- will not accept Lahoud's act. If the Speaker and his bloc stand with the March 14 majority, MP Michel Aoun will surely join them, out of embarrassment if not conviction. Even if Hizballah accepts Lahoud's order as legitimate, if no one else does, Lahoud just makes himself look even more irrelevant. ¶6. (C) Hamdan shook his head. The Speaker, even though he disagrees with Lahoud's action, will be "forced" to stand with Lahoud. Pressed on why that would be, Hamdan would only respond "you know why." The Ambassador asked whether Berri would really obey a Syrian order to go along with a blatantly illegal dissolution of the institution he heads, knowing that he would immediately become as much of an international pariah as Lahoud is. The Speaker "won't have a choice," Hamdan responded. The Ambassador said that he hoped the Speaker was not the coward Hamdan painted him to be. "Not at all," Hamdan responded defensively; that is why the Speaker is asking the Ambassador to help avoid such a scenario altogether. TIMING SUSPICIOUS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador said that he found the timing of Berri's message suspicious: twelve hours later, the UNSC members will gather to vote on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. If Siniora resigns, then UNSC members might very well hesitate, in hopes that a new cabinet might be able to get parliament to ratify the tribunal agreement. Hamdan rejected the linkage, saying that Berri had already internalized the fact that the UNSC would create the tribunal. He is merely trying to save parliament. ¶8. (C) Hamdan and the Ambassador then talked of a variety of scenarios (extended caretaker cabinet, technocratic replacement cabinet, etc.). The Ambassador said that he agreed that, in the aftermath of the passage of the Special Tribunal, it was time once again to focus on the resolving the cabinet crisis. He would recommend to March 14 leaders that they consider new initiatives. But he could not recommend that Siniora resign and remove the legitimacy and power that March 14 gains through the cabinet, especially when Lahoud and Berri would remain in place. If Berri really believes that it is in Lebanon's interest for Siniora to resign, then he should talk directly to Siniora and the March 14 leaders. Hamdan said that Berri, who has snubbed Siniora BEIRUT 00000769 003 OF 004 for months, would now be very pleased to meet with Siniora to discuss any initiatives. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador separately saw PM Siniora, Minister of Communications Marwan Hamadeh, Druse leader and MP Walid Jumblatt, and former MP Ghattas Hariri (close to Saad Hariri). All four had similar reactions: Berri was making a last-ditch effort to derail the tribunal. The dramatic news of Siniora's resignation would surely make some UNSC members decide that it is better to wait. Hamadeh laughed off the threat of Lahoud dissolving parliament -- "no one will recognize (the dismissal)" -- and said that it was not altogether bad for Berri to be in such an uncomfortable position. Will Berri really accept losing his position, Hamadeh mused. MARCH 14 NEEDS TO TABLE NEW INITIATIVES TO SOLVE CRISIS -------------- ¶10. (C) Siniora and the March 14 leaders were receptive to the Ambassador's idea that, in the aftermath of the tribunal's adoption, they could not simply continue to say no to the concept of a national unity cabinet, especially when the idea in principle sounds so appealing to a large number of crises-weary Lebanese. They need an initiative to address the cabinet crisis that is broadly appealing -- and that will toss the political ball in the March 8-Aoun court. Even if March 8-Aoun leaders reject the initiative, that's fine, as long as March 14 leaders present reasonable ideas of resolving the crisis. They need to look serious and sincere in trying something. ¶11. (C) Agreeing, Siniora said that he would call Berri on May 31 to ask for an appointment to go over in detail his "17-13" cabinet that would be based on an agreed cabinet agenda. As for Siniora's resignation, it is something to use as a technical matter once a solution to the cabinet crisis is ended, at which point the resignation would simply trigger implementation of the solution. But the solution, Jumblatt emphasized, would include returning Siniora as PM. (Later in the evening, Hamdan called back for Berri, saying that the Speaker had changed his mind: he would not receive Siniora yet. We passed that word to the PM.) MURR BELIEVES LAHOUD WILL NOT DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) In a separate May 30 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr had a slightly different spin on Berri's urgent message to the Ambassador. Murr, who until last year was married to Lahoud's daughter Karine (and whose father Michel remains on good terms with Emile Lahoud),quoted sources from "inside the family" as saying that, yes, Lahoud definitely wanted to dissolve parliament. But, ultimately, he came to understand that he must not do so. His hesitation does not stem from a sudden, unanticipated injection of decency and sound leadership but rather out of fear that he could be challenged in court with breaking the constitution, once he is out of office and his presidential immunity evaporates. So, for the wrong reasons, Lahoud came to the right conclusion: he can't dissolve parliament. Asked why Berri would be so insistent that is Lahoud's intentions, Murr said that Berri wanted to frighten the Ambassador and March 14 figures into working hard to convince Siniora to resign. And he would also use this tale to report back to the Syrians that he had made a creative, last-ditch effort to derail the tribunal vote in New York. ¶13. (C) While waiting for Codel Leahy to assemble on 5/31, the Ambassador had a brief conversation on the side with Speaker Berri. The Ambassador noted the improbability of Siniora resigning before Berri's suggested deadline of 5/31. "Never mind," Berri said; "tell him to resign tomorrow, next week, whenever." Berri insisted that Siniora's resignation would force people to solve the cabinet crisis, by provoking mandatory consultations on a new cabinet. The March 14 majority has "nothing to fear," Berri said, as the March 14 majority will again be able to pick the PM of its choice. The Ambassador argued that it was implausible to believe that Lahoud would sign a cabinet decree if the cabinet included Siniora, Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, and Murr again, BEIRUT 00000769 004 OF 004 yet March 14 leaders wanted all three. "Trust me," Berri said; "I can help with Lahoud." But Siniora must resign first. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (C) Ever since the Shia ministers walked out of the cabinet on November 11, Hizballah and its allies have demanded that Siniora resign. Defying expectations, Siniora has survived the cabinet walk-out, the large demonstrations, the erection of the "tent city" sit-ins, the violent clashes in January, various security incidents, and so on. Berri's threat of an impending parliamentary dissolution if Siniora does not resign is consistent with this pattern of intimidation against Siniora. We wonder what Lahoud told Patriarch Sfeir about a Siniora resignation. Sfeir is believed to see Siniora as untrustworthy, a Sunni politician who tends to ignore Christian interests. As March 14 leaders tell us repeatedly, it is an uphill battle to convince Sfeir that the March 8-Aoun propaganda against Siniora is based on unfounded rumors. (French Ambassador Emie, on 5/30, showed us with some alarm an interview with Sfeir in the French newspaper Le Croix, in which Sfeir said that, as a first step to resolving Lebanon's woes, the cabinet should be replaced.) ¶15. (C) As for whether Lahoud is really contemplating the dissolution of parliament, we do not know whether this is a serious risk. To even the most casual, non-expert reader of the Lebanese Constitution, it seems a laughable concept that Lahoud would attempt to do this without the cabinet. Unfortunately, if Lahoud, Berri, Hizballah, and the ever-troublesome Michel Aoun all back such action, the actual words of the constitution will not matter: the crisis is suddenly deepened. With the tribunal now behind us, the point of such a patently absurd and destructive move would be related to Lahoud's calculation on what to do to advance Syria's interests in upcoming presidential elections. We like Murr's reasoning that Lahoud fears subsequent legal action and hope that we can somehow use that alleged worry to find ways to discourage Lahoud from moving in the direction of dissolving parliament and appointing a second cabinet. FELTMAN