Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07BEIRUT754
2007-05-29 12:02:00
SECRET
Embassy Beirut
Cable title:  

LEBANON: EAC SETS TRIPWIRE OF ARMY ENTRY INTO

Tags:  ASEC CASC PTER LE 
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VZCZCXRO8638
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0754/01 1491202
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291202Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8321
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000754 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING; DPET FOR NEA, DS, H
AND CA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2012
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: EAC SETS TRIPWIRE OF ARMY ENTRY INTO
NAHR EL-BARAD REFUGEE CAMP


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

SUMMARY
--------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000754

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING; DPET FOR NEA, DS, H
AND CA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2012
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: EAC SETS TRIPWIRE OF ARMY ENTRY INTO
NAHR EL-BARAD REFUGEE CAMP


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) On May 29, DCM chaired a full session of the Embassy
Beirut EAC. Principal subjects included the increasing
frequency of credible threat information against western and
Lebanese government interests, tensions arising from the
standoff at the Nahr el-Barad Palestinian refugee camp, and
an impending UNSC vote to adopt under Chapter VII an
international tribunal for Lebanon. Members of the EAC
concurred that if the Lebanese Army were to enter the Nahr
el-Barad Palestinian refugee camp to attack Fatah al-Islam
extremists, Embassy personnel should cancel all off-compound
personal moves, and conduct official moves only for the
highest priority activities. The EAC noted that access in
and out of Beirut's International Airport is especially
vulnerable to being cut off by Shia or other protesters in
the event of civil disorder. The EAC agreed to meet again on
May 30 at 1600 hrs. local to decide whether CODEL Leahy
should come to Lebanon as planned for about five hours on May

31. End Summary.


2. (S) At mid-morning on May 29, the DCM convened a full
meeting of the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) to discuss
rising threats and tensions in Lebanon, and likely risks to
the official and non-official American community. Reporting
from other channels was summarized with regard to an increase
in credible threats against Western interests, including the
UNIFIL peacekeeping mission, as well as against the
Government of Lebanon. For the past week, tensions have
remained high in regard to the standoff between the Lebanese
Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) on
one hand, and Fatah al-Islam extremists inside the Nahr
el-Barad Palestinian refugee camp on the other hand. Related
issues included the May 25 speech of Hizballah Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah, in which Nasrallah declared LAF
entry into the Nahr el-Barad camp to be a "red line" that
should not be crossed; the risk of violence in other
Palestinian refugee camps such Aid el-Hilweh; a shoot-out the
previous day near the Beirut International Airport; the
capacity of the anti-government protesters to shut down at
will the access roads in and out of Beirut International
Airport; and the resolve and the military capacity of the
Lebanese government to take military action at Nahr el-Barad.


3. (S) The EAC agreed that if the LAF were to invade the
Nahr el-Barad camp, such action would most likely occur in
the May 31- June 1 timeframe. If the LAF does enter the
camp, the EAC agreed that given the likely sharp rise in
security threats, all USG personnel should restrict their
off-compound moves to official business only, and such
official moves would only be authorized on the basis of high
priority mission needs. In the event of an LAF entry into
the camp, we would also withdraw from the airport and remove
to the compound a group of eight USG cargo handlers who are
facilitating delivery to the Lebanese of USG-origin
ammunition shipments arriving at Beirut International
Airport. Another group of U.S. military trainers who are at
the LAF's Ranger training facility would remain at that site,
given its strong security.


4. (S) CODEL Leahy: The EAC was concerned that violent
action in or near Beirut International Airport could affect
the arrival or departure of CODEL Leahy on May 31. In the
past, access roads in and out of the airport have been closed
down by protesters. The EAC agreed to meet on May 30 at 1600
hrs. local to make a final recommendation on whether CODEL
Leahy should maintain or cancel its visit to Beirut.


5. (S) The EAC agreed that increasing tensions and threat
reports merit the issuance of another warden message to the
American community in Lebanon. It was noted that none of the
threat reporting was specific or counterable with respect to
particular times or places. The Consular Chief will draft
for Department approval an updated warden message.


6. (C) EAC members noted that Embassy Beirut personnel had
substantially cut back their off-compound personal moves
during the past several days, including the holiday weekend.
They also noted that strikingly few Lebanese were out on the
streets during the weekend evenings, in contrast to the
usually large crowds at shopping malls, cinemas, and

BEIRUT 00000754 002 OF 002


restaurant districts.


FELTMAN