PM SINIORA RESOLUTE ON NAHR AL-BARID, MAKES FINAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000747

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2027
TAGS: PTER PREL PARM MASS MOPS LE SY
SUBJECT: PM SINIORA RESOLUTE ON NAHR AL-BARID, MAKES FINAL
PUSH ON TRIBUNAL


Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In a one-on-one 5/28 meeting with the Ambassador,
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora speculated that the
political will to "finish" Fatah al-Islam (FAI) had
increased, not decreased, in the aftermath of Hizballah
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's 5/25 televised address.

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He cited the March 14 sweep of the Doctors' Syndicate
election as evidence that the public was disgusted with the
Hizballah position that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had
to observe Nasrallah-defined "red lines" in fighting FAI.
While he hoped the FAI fighters would surrender, Siniora said
that, if not, he insisted that the LAF should "do what it
takes" to end the FAI threat. Siniora expressed deep
appreciation for USG delivery of ammunition, but he cautioned
against the involvement of any USG military personnel in the
operations against Nahr al-Barid. Such involvement would not
stay secret, and, regardless of whatever military planning
benefits must accrue, the political backlash might destroy
him government. The Ambassador assured the PM that no such
involvement was contemplated. On the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon, Siniora expressed confidence that, in a phone call
the previous evening, he had persuaded South African
President Mbeki to support the draft UNSC resolution.
Immediately after his meeting with the Ambassador, the PM
hosted the ambassadors of the nine UNSC members represented
in Lebanon to make a final push for the tribunal's approval
and to ask for their countries' support if military action in
Nahr al-Barid becomes the only option for the Lebanese.
Russian Ambassador Sergui Boukin was negative on both points.
He expressed his conviction that both the tribunal
resolution and action in Nahr al-Barid will destabilize
Lebanon, arguments that Siniora forcefully rejected.

SINIORA BELIEVES NASRALLAH'S SPEECH
CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC OPINION -- FOR MARCH 14
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2. (S) The Ambassador met with PM Siniora in back-to-back
meetings on 5/28 -- first, in a one-on-one session, and,
second, when the PM hosted the Ambassadors of the nine
Security Council members represented in Lebanon (e.g., P-5,
Indonesia, Qatar, Italy, and Belgium). In the one-on-one
meeting, Siniora said that he is convinced that Hizballah
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's Friday night (5/25)

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speech had backfired. Nasrallah surely hoped that, by
setting red lines for the LAF and "putting the LAF and Fatah
al-Islam at the same level," he would destroy the political
will to go after FAI in Nahr al-Barid.


3. (S) Instead, the PM said, both the Lebanese public and
politicians are "disgusted." "They want rule of law. They
want the army to win." Asked by the Ambassador how he gauged
such public opinion, Siniora cited statements by Aoun bloc
MPs supporting the army and distancing themselves from
Nasrallah's red lines as well as the 5/27 elections in the
Doctors' Syndicate. While a week ago March 14 leaders had as
much as conceded losing the majority of the eight seats up
for grabs in the Syndicate, in fact March 14 swept all the
slate and also won the presidency of the Syndicate. (Note:
In Lebanon, the heavily contested elections to syndicates are
frequently cited as bellwethers of
public opinion. End note.)

IF NO OTHER OPTION, SINIORA
WILL BACK MILITARY ASSAULT
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4. (S) Siniora said that he still wished for a solution to
the Nahr al-Barid problem short of a military solution. "We
are not in a hurry," he said (echoing something MP Saad
Hariri had told the Ambassador earlier in the day). But,
ultimately, if FAI fighters do not surrender, the LAF will
have to "do what it takes" to root out FAI from the camp. He
claimed that he will "insist" upon a military solution if
that proves the only option. Siniora claimed to have been in
"continuous contact" with PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen),who is "1,000 percent supportive of whatever
decisions we take." He reviewed at some length efforts to

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get civilians out of harm's way, estimating that about 5,000
civilians remained in the camp (up from UNRWA's estimate of
3,000).

APPRECIATION FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE;
REQUEST THAT US MILITARY PERSONNEL STAY DISTANT
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5. (S) Siniora expressed deep appreciation for the work that
the USG has accomplished in rapid delivery of military
assistance to Lebanon and the facilitation of assistance from
others. He displayed a surprising (and surely newly minted)
awareness of ammunition sizes and uses, noting that he would
have to reach out to Turkey for some needed ammunition. In
talking of the Egyptian contribution, the PM (channeling his
long-time role as Finance Minister) griped that the Egyptians
were inflating the nominal prices. While "beggars can't be
choosers," he said that he had a responsibility to use the
Saudi USD 100 million contribution for LAF supplies wisely.
The Ambassador emphasized the need for the PM to draw down
the Saudi money for the USG contributions as well, lest the
new USD 220 million for the LAF in the supplemental
assistance bill be exhausted quickly. Siniora was
noncommittal, noting the need to discuss the accounting again
later.


6. (S) Lowering his voice, Siniora also said that he wanted
to put down his own red line for us. As grateful as he is
for the assistance, the intelligence cooperation, and our
facilitation with other donors, he wanted to make sure that
the USG did not "get crazy ideas" about sending in special
forces to help the LAF. In terms of military personnel,
Siniora asked that the USG stay as far away from this fight
as possible. While US military personnel might be able to
offer advice and training that improves the LAF's
performance, there is no way that, in Lebanon, such
assistance would remain secret. What the USG has been doing
in terms of training for the LAF so far "is perfect." But
"don't do anything special now." The political cost to
Siniora's cabinet would be enormous, the PM calculated; "this
could destroy us. Please understand how serious this is."
The Ambassador responded that we are not contemplating such a
move.

SPECIAL TRIBUNAL: SINIORA
BELIEVES SOUTH AFRICA NOW ON BOARD
--------------


7. (S) The Ambassador asked Siniora for an update on his
lobbying efforts for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Siniora reported that he was making a final round of phone
calls. He believed that, the previous evening, he had won
over South African President Mbeki. Mbeki talked of how
close South Africa is to Syria, and how, while South Africa
supported the tribunal, South Africa believed that the
Lebanese should adopt it themselves. Siniora recounted how
he had built up a persuasive case to convince Mbeki that the
UNSCR actually reflected the majority will of the Lebanese.
Siniora expressed confidence that, now, Mbeki will instruct
his delegation in New York to support the resolution.
(Comment: We hope so. End comment.)

SINIORA SUMMONS UNSC AMBASSADORS
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8. (C) In the subsequent meeting with the nine UNSC
ambassadors, Siniora made a final push for adoption of the
tribunal resolution. While he covered familiar territory at
some length, he did so with passion. He then linked the
Special Tribunal to the LAF's fight with FAI in Nahr
al-Barid, describing FAI as another Syrian tool (in a series
that included the closure of parliament and the recent bombs)
that attempts to "sow doubt" in the minds of UNSC members.
He complained that those who claim Lebanon will be
destabilized by the tribunal resolution or a fight against
FAI "seem to favor punishing the victim, not the
perpetrators." Siniora was unequivocal, blaming Syria
directly for FAI. He repeated some of his arguments that he
had made to the Ambassador earlier, that Nasrallah's 5/25
speech had led to a "consolidation of public opinion" against
FAI. While emphasizing that he hoped military action could
be avoided, Siniora asked the UNSC members to ask their

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countries to support whatever decision Lebanon must take,
"even if we ultimately cannot avoid invading the camp." In
this regard, Siniora passed out an official statement
regarding FAI (faxed to NEA/ELA),asking that it be
distributed to capitals.

RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR WARNS OF INSTABILITY
--------------


9. (C) While most UNSC ambassadors expressed strong support
for the tribunal and for whatever the Siniora cabinet decides
regarding FAI, the Russian disagreed, and the Qatari remained
silent. Russian Ambassador Sergui Boukin quizzed Siniora at
length about what "legal rights" Lebanon had to enter Nahr
al-Barid. The Palestinians have "extraterritorial rights,"
Boukin argued. Siniora disagreed. Whatever extraterritorial
rights the Palestinians gained under the questionable 1969
Cairo agreement had been abrogated in 1984 and never restored
subsequently, even if the GOL did not push its authority in
the camps in practice. Moreover, Mahmoud Abbas provided
"carte blanche to do whatever we think is needed." It was
"already past time" that the GOL needed to take a stand
against the lawlessness in the camps, and the FAT attacks on
the LAF "are too egregious to ignore."


10. (C) Boukin responded that the GOL, if it orders an LAF
invasion of the camp, puts itself in a "lose-lose" situation.
If the LAF enters the camp, it might very well lose the
battle with FAI. And even if it wins, FAI "is everywhere in
Lebanon" and will "burn the country." It is an "iron rule of
military doctrine" that conventional militaries cannot defeat
terrorists like FAI, and Lebanon would be foolish to try.
Responding that "doing nothing guarantees the state loses,"
Siniora asked icily whether Russia had applied that military
doctrine to its own fight against domestic terrorism. Boukin
then switched to the Special Tribunal, saying that he
remained convinced that "we will all regret" a Security
Council resolution creating the tribunal. Siniora said that,
while he regretted having to resort to asking the UNSC for
"what Lebanon should have been able to do on its own," he
would regret more the idea that impunity for murder continues
to haunt Lebanon.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (S) Siniora was in top form in his meeting with the
UNSC members: passionate, organized, even clever at times
(such as in responding to Boukin). Remembering how he used
his PM perch to good effect during last summer's war, we have
often noted that Siniora seems to do better in crises than
when the situation is quiet. Of course, he has had much
practice in dealing with crises over the past two years. In
any case, while the PM is not a military strategist and would
have little understanding of whether the LAF is truly capable
of winning an outright war against Fatah al-Islam, his
political will in standing up to FAI seemed stronger today
than we have seen it before. That is good news.
FELTMAN