MURR ON NASRALLAH SPEECH: HARMFUL, BUT GOL/LAF

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000746 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2027 TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PREF MASS LE SY SUBJECT: MURR ON NASRALLAH SPEECH: HARMFUL, BUT GOL/LAF STILL DETERMINED TO ATTACK FATAH AL-ISLAM REF: BEIRUT 743 Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In a 5/26 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr attacked as "unacceptable" Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's televised speech the previous evening. While according to Murr Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman also rejected Nasrallah's "red line" prohibition on the LAF entering Nahr al-Barid camp, Murr said that Nasrallah had underscored his point by sending Hizballah security chief Wafiq Safa' to threaten Sleiman. Murr said that, in the aftermath of Nasrallah's speech, the LAF needs to worry about a potential split (should the Shia soldiers cite Nasrallah's red lines in refusing orders to invade the camp),about Sunni political cover (with Nasrallah suddenly appearing to be defending Sunnis),and about terrorist attacks elsewhere in Lebanon (initiated by either Fatah al-Islam or al-Qaida) that could distract the LAF. Nevertheless, Murr said that the GOL and LAF remained determined to eliminate Fatah al-Islam from Nahr al-Barid, with a full-scale attack perhaps to begin in two or three days. PM Siniora, MP Saad Hariri, and MP Walid Jumblatt also vowed that their political support for LAF action remained strong. Separately, the Ambassador met with UNRWA Commissioner General Karen Abu-Zaid and UNRWA Lebanon Field Director Richard Cook on 5/26. They estimated that about 3,000 civilians remain in the camp, trapped by Fatah al-Islam snipers who refuse to allow the last of their human shield to depart. End summary. MURR DESCRIBED NASRALLAH'S SPEECH AS "HARMFUL BUT NOT FATAL" TO LAF PLANS -------------- ¶2. (S) Deputy PM and Defense Minister Murr told the Ambassador on 5/26 that Nasrallah's speech the previous evening was "harmful but not fatal" to GOL and LAF plans to fight Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp. Murr said that he, PM Siniora, and LAF Commander Michel Sleiman all agreed that it was "unacceptable" for Nasrallah to be putting down red lines for what the LAF can and cannot do. Even MP Michel Aoun is uncomfortable with Nasrallah's stated prohibition on the LAF entering Nahr al-Barid, Murr said, �0A;noting that Aoun's senior advisor (and son-in-law) Gebran Bassil had given radio and television comments that no one can set red lines for the LAF in fighting terror. ¶3. (S) Murr said that he assumed Nasrallah, "who must hate Fatah al-Islam as much as I do," had several motivations in breaking his previous silence on the LAF campaign in the north. First, Nasrallah is signaling to Fatah al-Islam to avoid Hizballah and Shia targets if, as Murr expects, Fatah al-Islam cells elsewhere in Lebanon initiate attacks either to distract the LAF from Nahr al-Barid or in reaction to LAF attacks in Nahr al-Barid. Second, Nasrallah must fear that the LAF might actually win this battle, which would then put Hizballah in an awkward situation: Hizballah has justified its arms in part on the argument that Lebanon has a weak army. If the army wins, then Hizballah's arms become easier domestically to oppose. Third, "Syria doesn't want Fatah al-Islam destroyed." Syria, Murr said, probably ordered Nasrallah to give such a speech. HIZBALLAH THREATENS SLEIMAN -------------- ¶4. (S) Murr claimed that Nasrallah, to drive home his point, had sent Hizballah security chief Wafiq Safa' to see Sleiman before the speech, warning Sleiman that the speech would contain important information for him. Safa' returned to Sleiman again after the speech, to threaten the Commander that he will never be president and may not survive at all if he were to order the LAF into Nahr al-Barid. While deeply offended by Nasrallah's speech and Safa's threats, Sleiman nevertheless felt it prudent to pass a message back to Nasrallah that the question of invading Nahr al-Barid is largely out of his control. He noted that he is under extreme pressure from Murr and Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Murr said, claiming to have a reliable source within BEIRUT 00000746 002 OF 003 Sleiman's inner circle. MURR WORRIED ABOUT ATTACKS ELSEWHERE -------------- ¶5. (S) Despite of all of this, Murr said that he, Siniora, Sleiman, and the other political and security leaders felt as compelled as ever to do what it takes to eliminate the Fatah al-Islam threat from Nahr al-Barid. Still, in light of Nasrallah's speech, they had three worrisome questions. First, did Nasrallah use his speech to signal to the Shia soldiers that they should defy any order to enter the camp, thus splitting the army? Murr said that he was fairly sure that the Shia would stay with their units but added that "we need to watch this." Second, will the pro-Syrian Sunnis start to split the heretofore Sunni solidarity against Fatah al-Islam? Nasrallah "cleverly" positioned himself as a defender of the Sunnis. Murr said that he had told Saad Hariri that he needed to be "even more aggressive" in distancing Lebanon's Sunnis from Fatah al-Islam and maintaining Sunni solidarity as cover for the LAF. Third, will Fatah al-Islam or its allies set off bombs and launch attacks elsewhere in Lebanon, that would distract or deter the LAF from its Nahr al-Barid fight? Murr's tone suggested that he thought such attacks were inevitable, and he noted that "we should move quickly before they burn the country." MURR PREPARED TO ISSUE INVASION ORDER HIMSELF -------------- ¶6. (S) Murr said that, at this point, he thought the LAF would be physically prepared to enter Nahr al-Barid in two or three days. He said that, ultimately, he would be the one to give the order, since Sleiman wants deniability. Once the invasion order is given, then Sleiman would be prepared to issue the tactical orders. In terms of cabinet approval, Murr claimed to have worked out with Siniora an arrangement by which the LAF would start the operation and then the cabinet would be called into session to give post-facto blessing. This was, the LAF can preserve the element of surprise. As he had before (reftel),Murr said that he saw no other option than to take over the camp, as Fatah al-Islam fighters will not surrender. He predicted a "tough battle" with significant casualties on the LAF side. Let us hope, he said, that more Palestinian civilians can escape before the fighting begins. Murr repeated his estimate that, once pro-Syrian Palestinian groups joined Fatah al-Islam fighters, the LAF would face about 1,000 terrorists inside the camp. UNRWA ESTIMATES CIVILIANS AT 3,000; TRAPPED BY SNIPER FIRE -------------- ¶7. (S) Separately, the Ambassador met on 5/26 with UNRWA Commissioner General Karen Abu-Zaid and UNRWA's Lebanon Field Director Richard Cook. They estimated that about 3,000 Palestinian civilians remain in the camp, in horrific conditions. According to what they are hearing from sources (including some UNRWA local employees) inside Nahr al-Barid, the remainder of the residents are essentially trapped: if they try to leave, they are fired upon by Fatah al-Islam snipers, who wish to retain a human shield. As for the discrepancies between UNRWA estimates and the GOL's considerably higher figures of 6-8,000 residents remaining, Cook offered two explanations. First, the actual number of people living in Nahr al-Barid was probably a few thousand people less than those officially registered. Second, there are civilians remaining in what are essentially slums adjacent to the camp but outside its official boundaries. ¶8. (S) The Ambassador also spoke by phone on 5/27 with PM Siniora, MP Saad Hariri, and MP Walid Jumblatt. All vowed that Nasrallah's speech had made them more determined to see the LAF end the Fatah al-Islam threat in Nahr al-Barid. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) A few days ago, the GOL and LAF were not physically prepared for a full assault against Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid. But the political will was there. Soon the GOL and LAF will be physically prepared (in terms of ammunition, BEIRUT 00000746 003 OF 003 evacuation of civilians, sufficient troop strengths) -- in large measure because of the quick USG responsiveness in delivering and facilitating military assistance at rapid speed. But, at that point, the worry becomes whether the political will might have evaporated. Whatever his hope of protecting the Shia from Fatah al-Islam wrath, Nasrallah was undoubtedly using his Friday night prime-time speech to sow political doubts about the wisdom of invading the camp. So far, his words do not seem to have weakened the determination of key political and security leaders. Indeed, the fact that Aoun's senior advisor has publicly distanced the Aounists from the "red lines" Nasrallah would impose on the LAF suggests that the speech has backfired a bit politically. ¶10. (S) But the two or three days Murr claims the LAF still needs before being able to proceed into the camp is a very long time in surprise-plagued Lebanon. And if a full-scale assault inside what is now probably a booby-trapped camp begins, it is likely to take considerable time and cause considerable civilian and LAF casualties. This means that the political will must be sustained well beyond the initial order to attack. We note that Murr's worries about multiple attacks elsewhere in the country are shared by others. During the Ambassador's meeting with Murr, in fact, the Defense Minister was receiving messages from both LAF and ISF intelligence warning of potential al-Qaida and Fatah al-Islam attacks elsewhere in Lebanon. We defer to Embassy Damascus for analysis of Syrian thinking, but it seems to us that Bashar al-Asad would be quite satisfied to see multiple attacks inside Lebanon, just as the LAF contemplates moving against Fatah al-Islam and as UN Security Council members prepare to vote on a resolution establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. FELTMAN